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Abstract 
 
The study contains a theoretical and empirical examination of the relationship 
between the environmental and economic performance of firms. It reframes the 
crucial question to read, not whether, but when environmental performance 
improvements are profitable for firms. The study develops the novel concept of 
environmental profit and investigates its determinants.  
 
To this end, the study first reviews the existing literature to show how and why 
attempts to detect a systematic relationship between the environmental and economic 
performance of firms have been unsuccessful. In particular, the study identifies three 
gaps in the previous knowledge: (1) the relationship may not be constant across 
environmental performance levels, which means that it needs to be considered a 
function of environmental performance; (2) the relationship may not be uniform 
across cases, which means that the determinants of environmental profit need to be 
identified; and (3) the relationship may not be static across time, which means that 
changes in the determinants of environmental profit over time need to be discussed. 
 
The study approaches the topic through three research modules. The first research 
module uses mathematical model building to assert that the relationship should be 
considered a case-specific, inverted U-shaped function of environmental performance, 
represented by an environmental profit curve. So-called win-win situations exist as 
long as a firm is situated in the rising portion of its environmental profit curve.  
 
The second research module examines statistically the overcompliance of 108 Finnish 
manufacturing plants in the chemical forest industry, chemical industry, metal 
industry, and food industry with effluent discharge regulations during 1988-1996. 
This module finds that there is significant variation in overcompliance and, thus, in 
perceived win-win situations. The most important sources for this variation are to be 
found at the plant level. 
 
The third research module consists of eleven case studies concerning Finnish 
manufacturing plants, which are used to develop an understanding of the mechanisms 
behind the plant-level variation in perceived win-win situations. This analysis reveals 
six main determinants of environmental profit: technology, regime, visibility, 
willingness to pay, benchmarks, and discount rate. Combined, these determinants 
establish whether a particular environmental performance improvement in a particular 
firm results in a win-win situation or not.  
 
In sum, the study shows that the firm-level relationship between environmental and 
economic performance takes the form of an inverted U-shaped function of 
environmental performance, and varies from firm to firm according to the six main 
determinants of environmental profit. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
It has long been debated whether improved environmental performance hurts or helps 
the economic performance of firms. Understanding this relationship is important, both 
from an environmental and economic perspective, when the dual objective of high 
environmental quality and good economic performance is pursued. 
 
Many studies on the relationship between environmental and economic performance 
date back to the 1970s. Again in the 1990s, considerable attention started to focus on 
this issue on scientific, business and policy fora. However, knowledge of the topic is 
still limited and has not cumulated to allow a unified theory to emerge. Instead, results 
have remained isolated and sometimes conflicting. At one extreme, there is the 
traditional view that improved environmental performance increases production costs 
and thus necessarily harms economic performance. Such an argument is easy to 
establish based on economic theory.1 For example, McGuire (1982) maintains that if 
factors of production are mobile, environmental regulation can entirely drive out the 
polluting industry from the economy.2 
 
At the other extreme, there is the so-called Porter hypothesis. It contends that firms 
can obtain private benefits from improved environmental performance in the form of 
efficiency savings or added market value, even to the extent that their overall 
economic performance is improved.3,4,5 This view where environmental improvements 
coincide with economic gains for the individual firm is also called the "win-win" 
approach. 
 
Not only is there a conflict within literature, but there is also a conflict between theory 
and practice. There is anecdotal evidence supporting both of the polar views, but 
attempts to empirically verify any systematic impact of environmental performance 
on economic performance have been unsuccessful. The results of the empirical studies 
reviewed in chapter 3 range from negative correlation to positive correlation, no 
correlation, and inverted U-shaped correlation. Jaffe et al. (1995) conclude their 
review: "Just as we have found little consistent empirical evidence for the 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Siebert, H. 1985. Spatial aspects of environmental economics. In: 
Kneese, A V & Sweeney, J L, editors. Handbook of natural resource and energy 
economics, volume I. New York, North-Holland. Pages 125-164. 
2  McGuire, M. 1982. Regulation, factor rewards and international trade. Journal of Public 
Economics, 17. Pages 335-354.  
3  Porter, M. 1991. America's green strategy.  Scientific American, volume 264, 4. Page 96. 
4  Porter, M & van der Linde, C. 1995a. Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. 
Harvard Business Review, September-October. Pages 120-134.  
5  Porter, M & van der Linde, C. 1995b. Toward a new conception of the environment - 
competitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. Pages 97-
118. 
 2
conventional hypothesis regarding environmental regulation and competitiveness, 
there is also little or no evidence supporting the revisionist hypothesis that 
environmental regulation stimulates innovation and improved international 
competitiveness."6 
 
As a result, it is often suggested that the level of environmental performance does not 
affect the economic performance of firms one way or the other. But, in spite of 
researchers being unable to confirm the existence of a systematic link between 
environmental and economic performance, many people in business and politics are 
convinced that the link is there. As long as the perception of such a link keeps 
affecting decision-making, the question cannot be ignored. Further research is 
therefore warranted.  
 
Moreover, absence of proof is not proof of absence. The lack of evidence concerning 
a link between environmental performance and economic performance can at least 
partly be explained by conceptual and methodological shortcomings discussed in 
chapter 3, below. Indeed, it is the underlying conjecture of the present study that there 
are a number of factors impinging on this relationship. The economic impacts of 
environmental performance improvements are neither universally negative nor 
positive: some, but not all situations are win-win situations. This also makes 
understandable the fact that conflicting views on the relationship coexist and are 
supported by anecdotal evidence. When the factors influencing the relationship are 
identified and accounted for, part of the seeming discrepancy may be resolved and the 
conflicting evidence accommodated.  
 
1.2 Objectives and scope 
 
The objective of the present study is to improve the understanding of the firm-level 
relationship between environmental performance and economic performance. The 
main research question is what determines environmental profit, where environmental 
profit refers to the isolated net economic impact of environmental performance on a 
firm.7 To answer the main research question, the study addresses the following 
specific questions:  
 
- How and why have attempts to detect a systematic relationship between firms' 
environmental and economic performance failed? (chapter 3) 
 
- How should previous theoretical treatment of the relationship be extended to 
account for the possibility that the relationship may not be constant across 
                                                 
6  Jaffe, A, Peterson, S, Portney, P & Stavins, R. 1995. Environmental regulation and the 
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us? Journal of 
Economic Literature, volume 33. Pages 132-163. 
7  Environmental profit is defined more closely in section 2.3. 
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environmental performance levels and that it may not be uniform across cases and 
time periods? (chapter 4)  
 
- Does empirical evidence support the non-uniformity of the relationship? Where 
are the main sources of non-uniformity? (chapter 5) 
 
- What are the factors producing non-uniformity in the relationship? What 
circumstances favour and what circumstances hinder the creation of perceived 
win-win situations? (chapter 6) 
 
There are two important restrictions in the scope of the study. First, the social costs of 
environmental damage and social benefits of environmental protection are not 
covered. The focus is solely on firms' private costs and benefits. The social costs and 
benefits are, of course, important, but they do not matter for the economic 
performance of firms. This is true by definition. Any social costs that do affect firms' 
economic performance immediately become private costs for the firms. The presence 
of social costs and benefits is recognised in the present study in that they determine 
the socially optimal level of pollution and influence government policy. 
 
Several methods, such as contingent valuation, hedonic pricing, travel cost method, 
and others have been developed to assign monetary values to environmental goods 
and services. However, as long as such values are not reflected in market transactions, 
some environmental social costs remain outside the private decision-making 
calculations of firms. An analysis of the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance should therefore not confuse private costs and benefits with 
social costs and benefits. Table 1 shows two perspectives to examining the 
relationship that satisfy this condition. 
 
Even though the present study revolves around the firm's private optimum for 
environmental performance, this is not to suggest that impacts on individual firms' 
economic performance should dictate environmental protection efforts in society. The 
purpose of the study is to improve the understanding of what determines the privately 
optimal level of environmental performance for profit-maximising firms, so that the 
private optimum could eventually be pushed nearer the socially optimal level of 
environmental performance. The study thus takes the perspective of category A of 
Table 1 to the issue, in order to reduce the ground for conflict between A and B. 
 
There have been calls for new paradigms to address corporate environmentalism 
through a more integrated treatment of social and private environmental costs and 
benefits. Hart (1995) notes that the concept of the environment in management theory 
emphasises political, economic, social and technological aspects but often ignores the 
natural environment.8 Some of the proposed new paradigms prescribe a fundamental 
shift in firm values and goals away from profit maximisation towards broader 
                                                 
8 Hart, S. 1995. A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management 
Review, volume 20, 4. Pages 986-1014. 
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stakeholder responsibility and environmental sustainability. Examples include Garrod 
and Chadwick (1996) who advocate a transformation from a shareholder value 
paradigm to one reflecting an environmental focus.9  
 
The present study, however, is based on the assumption that the objective of firms is 
to maximise expected profit. Environmental performance counts for firms only 
inasmuch as it influences economic performance. This is not meant to be a value 
judgement. The assumption is intended to be as conservative as possible and to reflect 
the fact that so far any widespread pro-environmental value change has apparently not 
taken place in firms.10 Räsänen et al. (1994) express doubt that the greening of 
industry has involved any fundamental change in managerial logic of action.11 Garrod 
and Chadwick (1996) found that firms have adopted environmental management tools 
only to the extent to enable the firms to pursue more effectively their profit-centred 
approach.12 Lovio (1995) suggests that environmental regulations and market demand, 
not value changes, explain the observed improvements in environmental 
management.13 Halme (1996) found that traditional economic values such as 
profitability were still more important than environmental considerations in two firms 
where an environmental paradigm shift had occurred.14 In a 1997 study on 
management values in large Finnish firms, 75 per cent of managers named 
profitability as one of five central values in their firm; 15 per cent of managers named 
environmental concerns.15 Khanna and Damon (1999) demonstrated that the decision 
of firms to participate in a voluntary environmental programme was motivated by 
rational economic self-interest.16 
 
The profit maximisation assumption is also useful because it works as a devil's 
advocate by maximising the potential for conflict between societal and firm interests 
that the present study seeks to explore. If there are firms who care for the environment 
                                                 
9  Garrod, B & Chadwick, P. 1996. Environmental management and business strategy: 
Towards a new strategic paradigm. Futures, volume 28, 1. Pages 37-50. 
10  Indeed, in the case study module of the present study it repeatedly came across that 
environmental improvements had been made for business reasons, not for environmental 
reasons. 
11  Räsänen, K, Meriläinen, S & Lovio, R. 1994. Pioneering descriptions of corporate 
greening: notes and doubts on the emerging discussion. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 3. Pages 9-16. 
12  Garrod, B & Chadwick, P. 1996. Environmental management and business strategy: 
Towards a new strategic paradigm. Futures, volume 28, 1. Pages 37-50. 
13  Lovio, R. 1995. Yritykset ja ympäristö: ongelmien ratkaisuista uusiin ongelmiin. In: 
Massa, I & Rahkonen, O (editors). Riskiyhteiskunnan talous. Helsinki, Gaudeamus. Pages 
143-159. 
14  Halme, M. 1996. Shifting environmental management paradigms in two Finnish paper 
facilities: A broader view of institutional theory. Business Strategy and the Environment, 
5. Pages 94-105. 
15  EVA. 1997. Yritysjohtajien menestyksen eväät. Raportti yritysjohdon asenteista 1997. 
Helsinki, Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta. 71 pages. 
16  Khanna, M & Damon, L A. 1999. EPA's voluntary 33/50 program: impact on toxic 
releases and economic performance of firms. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 37. Pages 1-25. 
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for ethical reasons, then so much the better for the environment. But if it can be 
shown that there are circumstances where even solely profit-centred firms are 
encouraged to improve their environmental performance, tangible and immediate 
ways to promote sustainable development can perhaps be found by creating and 
reinforcing such conditions. Similarly, if it can be shown that certain circumstances 
hinder improvements in environmental performance, it is possible to consider whether 
business strategies or national and international policy-making could actively change 
such circumstances. 
 
Table 1 Two perspectives to examining the relationship between environmental 
and economic performance. The present study falls under category A, 
but with the goal of reducing the conflict between A and B 
 
Benefits  
Private Social 
Private A. The perspective of firms 
maximising their profit 
 Costs 
Social  B. The perspective of society 
maximising welfare 
 
The second major restriction in the scope of the present study is that the study only 
examines those private costs and benefits that relate to environmental performance, as 
marked by the shaded area in Figure 1. In other words, private costs and benefits that 
are unconnected to the environmental performance of a firm are excluded from the 
study, although they are important determinants of the overall economic performance 
of a firm. The scope is limited to the isolated economic performance impacts of 
environmental performance, that is, using the terms in Figure 1, to environmental 
profit instead of profit. In effect, thus, the study analyses the direction of the link 
between environmental performance and economic performance: whether marginal 
environmental profit is positive or negative. Analysing the magnitude of the link 
would require comparing environmental profit to overall profit. 
 
In addition, the scope of the study is restricted in a few other respects. The theoretical 
treatment in chapter 4 and the case-study approach in chapter 6 are applicable to all 
environmental impacts of firms throughout the life-cycle of the products, that is, from 
raw material extraction to final disposal. However, due to data availability, statistical 
treatment in chapter 5 is limited to direct production emissions into water. Finally, the 
empirical scope of the study covers manufacturing firms in four industrial sectors in 
Finland. 
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Figure 1 The scope of the study. The area covered by the study is marked by 
shading 
 
1.3 Approach  and design 
 
Neilimo and Näsi (1980) divide research approaches used in business economics in 
conceptual, nomothetic, decision-oriented and action-oriented approaches.17 
According to Neilimo and Näsi,  
 
- in the conceptual approach, new concepts and conceptual systems are developed 
that can be used to increase the understanding of a phenomenon. The approach is 
theoretical; the research method is reasoning and testing is realised through 
argumentation 
 
- in the nomothetic approach, law-like relationships between phenomena are sought 
with a heavy empirical emphasis, with a conceptual part usually preceding 
empirical analysis. A hypothetic-deductive and an inductive version of the 
nomothetic approach can be distinguished  
 
- in the decision-oriented approach, the objective is to build models for decision 
making through reasoning. The foundations of this approach lie in 
microeconomics, decision-making theory, and game theory. The empirical part 
usually consists of an application example  
 
                                                 
17  Neilimo, K & Näsi, J. 1980. Nomoteettinen tutkimusote ja suomalainen yrityksen 
taloustiede. Series A2: Research Reports 12. Tampere, University of Tampere. 
SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
Environ-
mental Non-environmental
Environ-
mental
PRIVATE COSTS AND BENEFITS
Non-environmental
Environmental profit
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 OPERATIONS
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- in the action-oriented approach, the emphasis is on understanding, and the results 
are often conceptual systems to understand a firm's behaviour. The foundations of 
the action-oriented approach are in teleological explanation and intentionality of 
human behaviour. The approach is empirical, but uses only a few research units 
and a flexible methodology. 
 
Rather than being pure representatives of a particular type, studies often share features 
of more than one research approach. The present study identifies somewhat with the 
nomothetic approach. It involves three modules that can be viewed as the conceptual, 
hypothetic-deductive, and inductive parts of a nomothetic study. However, strong 
conceptual aspects can also be recognised in the present study. 
 
As noted above, the nomothetic approach seeks law-like relationships between 
phenomena. The epistemological question of how causation is viewed is an important 
aspect of the research approach. The following treatment of causation is based on von 
Wright (1971).18 Two main types of explanation can be distinguished. Whereas causal 
explanation points to the past (p happens because c has happened), teleological 
explanation points to the future (c happened in order for p to happen). The difference 
between the two types is thus the intentionality of action involved in teleological 
explanation. Another difference lies in the validity of the explanation. The validity of 
teleological explanation does not depend on whether the assumed connection (the 
connection between c and p) is valid or not. For causal explanation the validity of the 
assumed connection between the cause and the effect does matter. Von Wright defines 
as quasi-causal those relationships that appear to be causal but whose validity does not 
depend on the truth of the assumed underlying connection.19 
 
Narrowly defined, a cause is a contingent sufficient condition. With the narrow 
definition of causation it is difficult to reduce human actions to causal laws. Indeed, 
teleological and quasi-causal explanations are characteristic of social sciences. The 
behaviour of individuals or firms can be understood through the schema of practical 
inference:  
 
A intends to bring about p. 
A considers that he cannot bring about p unless he does c. 
Therefore, A sets himself to do c. 
 
Following von Wright (1971), the "causalities" in the present study are considered to 
be quasi-causal relationships. The connection between "causes" and "effects" is 
through practical inference. It is not necessary for A to do c in the absolute sense, but 
                                                 
18  von Wright, G. 1971. Explanation and understanding. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. 230 pages. 
19  Compare this to the point that firms' choices are ex ante rational, in other words, rational in 
light of the expectations at the time of choosing. Firms do not maximise profit; they 
maximise expected profit. Expectations may later turn out to be mistaken, but this does not 
invalidate the ex ante rationality assumption. Randall, A. 1987. Total economic value as a 
basis for policy. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society, 116. Pages 325-335. 
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it is a rational choice if he is to bring about p. The law-like relationships sought in the 
present study are thus not pure causal connections like natural laws. 
 
As already brought up, a three-module portfolio approach was developed for the 
present study: to engage in model building, statistical work, and case studies. This is 
because the research problem does not easily lend itself to investigation. Each 
research module allows a different aspect of the research problem to be studied, and 
together they are expected to sufficiently illuminate the relationship between firms' 
environmental and economic performance. The portfolio includes a theoretical 
approach whose main undertaking is the theoretical identification of win-win 
situations (chapter 4); a statistical approach whose main undertaking is the empirical 
identification of win-win situations (chapter 5); and a case-study approach whose 
main undertaking is the empirical understanding of win-win situations (chapter 6). 
 
The theoretical research module utilises mathematical model building. The statistical 
module is quantitative and extensive. Panel data on all Finnish manufacturing plants 
in four sectors with regulated effluent discharges are studied with multivariate 
statistical methods. Data for this module are collected from existing emission 
databases and environmental permit decisions. The case-study module is also 
empirical, but qualitative, intensive, and cross-sectional. From among the plants, a 
sample is selected for an in-depth analysis based on theoretical sampling. The data 
collection method employed is personal interviews.  
 
Utilising more than one research method is also a means of trying to combine some of 
the inherent strengths of the methods and eliminate some of their weaknesses. 
Whereas extensive research deals with discovering general patterns in a population, 
intensive research looks at how a causal process works out in a limited number of 
cases.20 Stereotypically, quantitative research is thus sometimes considered to produce 
generalisable but somewhat superficial information, and qualitative research in-depth 
but somewhat anecdotal information.  
 
The research methods can add to one another and findings can be triangulated 
between the methods. Often, qualitative research precedes quantitative research. Case 
studies are first carried out to develop concepts and hypotheses which are then 
statistically tested on a larger population. However, the order can also be reversed. 
Statistical methods can be used to reveal relationships between phenomena, and 
qualitative methods thereafter employed to improve the understanding of what 
produces the relationships.21 This is the case in the present study.  
                                                 
20  Sayer, A. 1992. Method in social science. A realist approach. London, Routledge. 313 
pages. Page 242. 
21  Alasuutari, P. 1994. Laadullinen tutkimus. Tampere, Vastapaino. 281 pages. Pages 203-
205. 
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The structure of the study is illustrated in Figure 2. Chapters 1 and 2 lay the ground by 
introducing the study and its methods and by analysing the key concepts used. 
Chapter 3 reviews existing theoretical and empirical literature on the topic area. 
Chapter 4 takes a theoretical approach, chapter 5 a statistical approach, and chapter 6 
a case-study approach to examining the relationship between firms' environmental 
performance and economic performance. These three chapters form the core of the 
study. Each chapter constitutes a module with a particular contribution. However, the 
modules are not disconnected from each other but together build a logical whole that 
converges and deepens as the study proceeds. Chapter 7 discusses the findings and 
draws final conclusions.  
   
Figure 2 Structure of the study 
 
1 Introduction and 2 Core concepts
3 Literature review
6 A case study approach
7 Conclusions
5 A statistical approach
4 A theoretical approach
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2 CORE CONCEPTS 
 
The task of a concept is like that of a hoop net: to catch from complex and 
multidimensional reality those elements that are relevant from the point of view of the 
research questions. An explicit conceptual analysis is thus necessary to specify what 
exactly is referred to with the concepts used in a study. This chapter defines and 
examines the five core concepts of the present study – environmental performance, 
economic performance, environmental profit, win-win situation, and overcompliance.  
 
In addition to providing definitions, the chapter also discusses the operationalisation 
and measurement of the core concepts. According to Babbie (1990), 
operationalisation is the process where empirical observations are specified that can 
be taken as indicators of the attributes contained in a certain concept. The original 
concepts often summarise a variety of elements, thus having a "richness of meaning". 
Reducing them to specific empirical indicators is always unsatisfying, but necessary 
to permit empirical research.22  
 
Also in the present study, compromises had to be made in the operationalisation of the 
concepts. In particular, environmental performance is measured through emissions, 
not through environmental impacts, and environmental profit and win-win situations 
are measured through management perceptions and expectations. However, many 
concepts, especially in the field of social research, have no real meanings or ultimate 
definitions; they do not exist except as convenient summary notations for a variety of 
empirical observations. Consequently, such concepts cannot be measured correctly or 
incorrectly. They can only be measured more or less usefully with regard to 
developing theories or understanding the empirical data at hand.23  
 
2.1 Environmental performance 
 
The concept of environmental performance pertains to the level of harmful 
environmental impact caused by the activities of a firm. The more "environmentally 
friendly" a firm is the better its environmental performance. Conversely, the more 
environmental damage a firm causes the worse its environmental performance.  
 
Definition: Environmental performance refers to the level of harmful 
environmental impact caused by a firm so that the smaller the harmful 
environmental impact the better the environmental performance and 
vice versa. 
 
                                                 
22  Babbie, E. 1990. Survey research methods.  Second edition. Belmont, Wadsworth 
Publishing Сompany.  
23  Babbie, E. 1990. Survey research methods.  Second edition. Belmont, Wadsworth 
Publishing Сompany.  
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As the activities of a firm can have different environmental impacts, the concept of 
environmental performance is a vector of those impacts. Environmental impacts occur 
through land use, resource use, and pollutant releases into air, water, and land 
throughout the life-cycle of a product. Even if consideration is limited only to the 
direct environmental impacts of production, environmental performance has many 
dimensions as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 The concept of environmental performance (considering only the direct 
environmental impacts of production) 
 
A complete measure of environmental performance necessitates the identification of 
all components, performance measurement with regard to each component, and the 
combination of the measurements into a vector of indices or one overall indicator.24 
Combining the dimensions of environmental performance in a single indicator 
requires that the relative importance of the different environmental impacts be 
weighed. Such weighing, in turn, results in a difficult valuation problem. 
 
The present study does not attempt to capture the dimensions of environmental 
performance in a single indicator because important information might get lost in such 
an aggregation. Since the theoretical framework on the relationship between 
environmental and economic performance in chapter 4 is pollutant-specific, 
environmental performance must also be measured pollutant by pollutant. Guimaraes 
and Liska (1995) also call for disaggregation of environmental performance when 
they suggest that research on business benefits from high environmental performance 
                                                 
24  Spicer, B. 1978. Investors, corporate social performance and information disclosure: An 
empirical study. The Accounting Review, volume 53, 1. Pages 94-111. 
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ought to examine the impact of specific programmes rather than general stages of 
environmental stewardship.25 
 
There are studies that measure environmental performance by whether the firm has an 
environmental policy, an environmental management system, or an environmental 
manager of its own; whether the firm produces an environmental report or discloses 
environmental information; or by similar proxies. For example, Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) defined an environmentally responsive firm to be one that has 
formulated an official plan for dealing with environmental issues.26 In the present 
study such indicators are not considered to measure environmental performance. Only 
true physical inputs and outputs of a firm are counted in environmental performance 
since only they matter for the quality of the environment. Moreover, empirical studies 
have indicated that actual environmental performance may not be correlated with the 
disclosure of environmental information.27 The measures listed above can, 
nevertheless, be useful. Their employment may be reflected in future levels of 
environmental performance as defined in the present study. For example, Dasgupta et 
al. (2000) found that environmental management policies had a strong effect on 
compliance.28 
 
Sometimes environmental performance is measured by the absolute or relative 
reduction in emissions and resource use that a firm has attained. For example, Lang 
(1996) measured firm environmental performance based on changes in the generation 
or release of chemical waste, measured in pounds or percentages.29 In the present 
study such indicators are rejected because only firms with large initial emissions can 
achieve high absolute reductions. Due to increasing marginal abatement costs, it is 
also easier for them to achieve high relative reductions. Measurements based on 
                                                 
25  Guimaraes, T & Liska, K. 1995. Exploring the business benefits of environmental 
stewardship. Business Strategy and the Environment, volume 4, 1. Pages 9-22. 
26  Henriques, I & Sadorsky, P. 1996. The determinants of an environmentally responsive 
firm: an empirical approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
volume 30. Pages 381-395. 
27  See Ingram, R W & Frazier, K B. 1980. Environmental performance and corporate 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research. Pages 614-622; Freedman, M & Jaggi, B. 
1982. Pollution disclosures, pollution performance and economic performance. Omega, 
volume 10, 2. Pages 167-176; Rockness, J W. 1985. An assessment of the relationship 
between US corporate environmental performance and disclosure. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, volume 12, 3. Pages 339-354; Wiseman, J. 1982. An evaluation 
of environmental disclosures made in corporate annual reports. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, volume 7, 1. Pages 53-63; or Ullman, A A. 1985. Data in search of a theory: a 
critical examination of the relationships among social performance, social disclosure, and 
economic performance of U.S. firms. Academy of Management Review, volume 10, 3. 
Pages 540-557. 
28  Dasgupta, S, Hettige, H & Wheeler, D. 2000. What improves environmental compliance? 
Evidence from Mexican industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
39. Pages 39-66. 
29  Lang, J. 1996. Corporate environmentalism and regulatory interventions. Doctoral 
dissertation, Boston University Graduate School of Management.  
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emission and resource use reductions may thus not give a correct picture of 
environmental performance as defined in the present study. 
 
Furthermore, environmental performance is sometimes measured by the amount of 
money spent in environmental protection by a firm. But, to measure pollution 
abatement costs is notoriously difficult. Many cost items tend to be omitted when 
reporting environmental costs (for example, product quality impacts and regulatory 
delays) and knowledge about others is limited (for example, management time spent 
on environmental issues).30 End-of-pipe investments may be measured more 
accurately but the divisibility problems involved in process investments can be 
serious. The present study considers that even if pollution abatement costs could be 
accurately gauged, they do not measure environmental performance correctly. The 
relationship between the money spent in environmental protection and the level of 
harmful environmental impacts is not necessarily monotonic. The environmental 
spending of a firm may be inefficient.31 Moreover, firms that already have high 
environmental performance – perhaps as a result of earlier investments – may not 
need to invest as much in environmental protection as do "dirtier" firms.  
 
Environmental performance is operationalised as the absolute level of emissions, 
waste, and land and resource use of a firm. For the statistical module, only direct 
production emissions into water are measured. It is recognised that this measurement 
captures only part of the full life-cycle environmental impacts of a firm. It would also 
be conceptually more correct to measure harmful environmental impacts, that is, 
contributions to specific environmental problems, and not emissions. Translating 
emissions into environmental impacts calls for information on local conditions and on 
how the emissions contribute to different environmental problems, which is not yet 
fully understood. The use of emission data in the present study is justified by the 
assumption that less emissions can be equated with less harmful environmental 
impacts, although it must be acknowledged that this relationship need not be 
monotonic either.  
                                                 
30  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1994. Industry, technology, and the 
environment: Competitive challenges and business opportunities. OTA-ITE-586. 
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office. 
31  For example, it has been reported that only 12 per cent of payments on U.S. Superfund 
claims between 1986 and 1989 went for actual site cleanups whereas the remaining 88 per 
cent went for legal and administrative costs. Acton, J P & Dixon, L S. 1992. Superfund 
and transaction costs: the experiences of insurers and very large industrial firms. Working 
paper, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Santa Monica, California. Ref. Porter, M E & van 
der Linde, C. 1995a. Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. Harvard Business 
Review, September-October. Pages 120-134. 
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Operationalisation:  Environmental performance is (in the statistical module) 
measured by the absolute emissions of pollutants into water by 
a firm so that the smaller the emissions the better the 
environmental performance with regard to that pollutant and 
vice versa. 
 
2.2 Economic performance 
 
There are several measures that are commonly used to assess the economic 
performance of firms. Each of these measures captures a slightly different aspect of 
economic performance. Some, such as profitability, gauge return; others, like sales 
growth and market share growth, gauge growth. Some measure profitability (return on 
investment, return on equity), some liquidity (quick ratio, current ratio), and some 
solvency (gearing). Some measures are indicators of commercial success (growth, 
market share) while others are indicators of financial success (profitability). 
Accounting measures portray past performance, and stock market measures portray 
expectations of future performance. 
 
Which indicator or indicators should be chosen to measure economic performance 
depends on the perspective taken in a study and on its purpose. In the present study it 
is not necessary to select particular operational measurements of economic 
performance at all, since the concept is not directly measured. Expected changes in 
economic performance are analysed indirectly, through management perceptions and 
actions. Based on the profit maximisation assumption, managers voluntarily 
implement only such actions that they believe to promote the economic performance 
of the firm. 
 
However, it is very important to note the crucial difference between economic and 
commercial values.32 In the present study, all costs and benefits are to be understood 
as economic costs and benefits, present and future, discounted to present time. In 
other words, the concepts are significantly broader than the ordinary accounting 
concepts for expenses and revenues.  
 
2.3 Environmental profit and marginal environmental profit 
 
Environmental profit is a new construct formulated for the purposes of the present 
study. It gauges the isolated net income of a firm relating to its environmental 
performance level, that is, the total of isolated environmental private benefits and 
private costs. 
                                                 
32  Randall, A. 1987. Total economic value as a basis for policy. Transactions of the 
American Fisheries Society, 116. Pages 325-335.  
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Marginal environmental profit is the corresponding concept relating to a change in 
environmental performance. Marginal environmental profit is positive when the 
private benefits from a change in environmental performance exceed the private costs. 
Similarly, marginal environmental profit is negative when the private costs required 
by a change in environmental performance exceed the private benefits, and zero when 
the two are equal. 
 
Definition:  Environmental profit refers to the isolated net economic impact on a 
firm of an environmental performance level: the stream of 
environment-related costs and benefits discounted to the present. 
 
Marginal environmental profit refers to the isolated net economic 
impact on a firm of a change in environmental performance: the 
stream of costs and benefits related to an environmental performance 
change, discounted to the present. 
 
Benefits and costs that are unconnected to environmental performance are not counted 
in environmental profit but environmental benefits and costs are counted in 
conventional economic profit. Hence, environmental profit is a subset of profit.33 It 
can be positive, negative or zero regardless of the value of conventional profit.  
 
As defined above, marginal environmental profit equals the net present value of a 
change in environmental performance. This analogy reveals how crucial temporal 
aspects are when thinking about environmental profit. It is typical for investments in 
environmental performance that while many costs accrue in the short term, the related 
benefits are uncertain and may accrue only in the longer term. 
 
To empirically measure environmental profit or marginal environmental profit is very 
difficult, if not impossible. It would require perfect information on all present and 
future costs and benefits of a particular environmental performance level or 
environmental performance change. These are hard to obtain, partly because of the 
temporal aspect mentioned above and partly because of the complications involved in 
separating the environmental benefits and costs from the non-environmental ones. 
Further, the available data typically only allow for before-after comparisons whereas 
it would be theoretically more desirable to conduct with-without comparisons. 
 
The present study only measures whether marginal environmental profit is positive or 
negative. Moreover, expected marginal environmental profit is measured. When 
making management decisions on changes in environmental performance, firms need 
to assess the related benefits and costs, no matter how intangible, as best they can: 
consciously or subconsciously, correctly or incorrectly. If the assumption on profit 
maximisation holds, firms will voluntarily implement those – and only those – 
environmental improvements that they believe to yield positive marginal 
environmental profit.  
                                                 
33  See also chapter 4 for the relationship between environmental profit and profit. 
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Operationalisation:  Expected marginal environmental profit is considered to be 
positive if a firm would voluntarily undertake the improvement 
in environmental performance.  
 
Similarly, the starting point for Segerson and Miceli (1998) was that firms ratify a 
voluntary environmental agreement if and only if the costs without the agreement are 
expected to be higher than with the agreement.34 Arora and Cason (1995) theorised 
that firms join a voluntary environmental programme if it increases expected profit.35 
Liski (1997) took the environmental compliance strategy of firms to be based on 
profit maximisation.36 Biondi et al. (1996) also maintained that presumed benefits 
must exceed estimated costs in order for firms to participate in a voluntary 
programme, even though both are difficult to calculate.37 
 
2.4 Win-win situation 
 
In the debate on environmental performance and economic performance, the term 
win-win situation has become to signify those situations where it pays to protect the 
environment. It appears that sometimes the term is used in a narrow sense to refer 
only to those situations where the cost of an improvement in environmental 
performance to a firm is in fact negative. This is the case when the changing of inputs 
or processes results in improved efficiency, reduced waste, or savings in energy and 
raw material costs. In the present study, win-win situations do not refer only to such 
cases. They equally cover cases where the improvement in environmental 
performance has a positive cost, but where corresponding market benefits are 
obtained that can offset the cost.  
 
It is often said that in a win-win situation both the firm and the environment benefit. 
But, to be precise, the two parties in a win-win situation as defined in the present 
study are the firm and society. In a win-win situation the benefits of an individual firm 
and society at large coincide. The social benefits accrue through improvements in 
environmental quality; hence, the talk about business and environmental interests 
being aligned. In a win-win situation this is true. But, as chapter 4 will show, an 
                                                 
34  Segerson, K & Miceli, T J. 1998. Voluntary environmental agreements: Good or bad news 
for environmental protection? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36. 
Pages 109-130.  
35  Arora, S & Cason, T. 1995. An experiment in voluntary environmental regulation: 
Participation in EPA's 33/50 program. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, volume 28. Pages 271-286. 
36  Liski, M. 1997. On the regulation of pollution and polluters' long-term compliance 
strategies. Acta Universitatis Oeconomicae Helsingiensis A-129. 152 pages. 
37  Biondi, V, Frey, M & Iraldo, F. 1996. EMAS: first evaluation of a policy instrument. Paper 
presented at the conference "The economics of law and voluntary approaches in 
environmental policy", sponsored by Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei and Cerna, Venice, 
Italy, November 18-19. 
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improvement in environmental performance can also be a "lose situation" for society, 
even though it cannot be a "lose situation" for the environment.  
 
A win-win situation is an improvement in a firm's environmental performance where 
the social benefits exceed the social costs and the private benefits exceed the private 
costs. However, as will be seen in chapter 4, the social pollution abatement costs 
consist of the private abatement costs and the private benefits are usually a subset of 
social benefits.38 For this reason, a win-win situation can be recognised by looking at 
the environmental private costs and benefits alone. Whenever the private benefits 
from an improvement in environmental performance exceed private costs, social 
benefits also exceed social costs. Win-win situations are thus identifiable through 
marginal environmental profit: positive marginal environmental profit signals a win-
win situation. 
 
Definition:  A win-win situation refers to a case where a firm's benefits from 
improved environmental performance exceed the costs of improved 
environmental performance, that is, where marginal environmental 
profit is positive.  
 
It was noted earlier that to measure marginal environmental profit is difficult, as it 
would require perfect information on all present and future costs of, and benefits 
from, a particular environmental performance change. To empirically identify the true 
win-win situations available to a firm would require the same information relating to 
all imaginable changes in environmental performance. Such information is not 
available to firms themselves or anyone else. Instead of true win-win situations, what 
can be empirically identified are perceived win-win situations. To study perceptions is 
justified because they shape the actions taken when no information about true win-
win situations is available. 
 
Operationalisation:  A perceived win-win situation refers to a case where a firm's 
expected benefits from improved environmental performance 
exceed the expected costs of improved environmental 
performance, that is, where expected marginal environmental 
profit is positive. 
 
2.5 Overcompliance 
 
The fifth and last of the core concepts in the present study is overcompliance with 
environmental regulations. Overcompliance refers to exceeding the environmental 
performance requirements prescribed by law. Overcompliance can take place through 
participation in voluntary programmes between the government and the industry or 
through a firm's own initiative.  
                                                 
38  Section 4.2 also discusses the possibility that private benefits exceed social benefits and 
presents the justification for ignoring such cases in the present study.  
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Overcompliance relates to voluntary approaches in environmental policy-making. 
Consequently, it is sometimes referred to as voluntary overcompliance.39 However, 
the term "voluntary" requires careful interpretation in this context and may convey a 
false intuitive message. To be counted as voluntary, overcompliance does not have to 
be implemented for ethical reasons only. Voluntary overcompliance in the present 
study is voluntary in the sense that law does not mandate it. For a firm, 
overcompliance may well be a commercial necessity dictated by market requirements. 
In an extreme case, "voluntary overcompliance" may be a prerequisite for survival 
and thus not really a voluntary choice for the firm at all. As overcompliance can, by 
definition, never be mandated by law, the word "voluntary" has here been dropped 
from the concept altogether.  
 
Definition:  Overcompliance refers to a situation where a firm's environmental 
performance is better than required by law. 
 
The operationalisation of overcompliance for the statistical module is built on the 
operationalisation of environmental performance. Overcompliance is transformed 
from a dichotomous variable to a scalar by expressing actual emissions as a 
percentage share of permitted emissions.  
 
Operationalisation:  Overcompliance is (in the statistical module) measured by the 
absolute emissions of pollutants into water by a firm as a 
percentage share of the permitted emissions of the said 
pollutants, so that the closer the share is to zero the more 
overcompliance there is.  
 
                                                 
39  See, for example, Arora, S & Gangopadhyay, S. 1995. Toward a theoretical model of 
voluntary overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, volume 28, 
3. Pages 289-309. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Because of the cumulative nature of science, the value of a single study depends both 
on the merits of the study itself and on how it fits with and extends previous 
knowledge of the subject.40 Hence, a review of existing knowledge to build on is a 
necessary step in each study and an integral part of each research report. The present 
chapter reviews existing theoretical and empirical literature on the firm-level 
relationship between environmental performance and economic performance. 
Considering that there are contradictions both within theoretical literature and 
between theoretical and empirical literature, a separate account of the two is deemed 
best. 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to provide a systematic picture of past knowledge of the 
research topic. First, both the negative and positive links that have been suggested to 
exist between firms' environmental and economic performance are outlined, together 
with a strain of literature suggesting that how these links are experienced depends on 
the firm's interaction with its competitors in the markets. Second, a focused review of 
relevant empirical studies is provided, describing the different approaches that have 
been used to empirically examine the topic and the results obtained. The chapter 
closes with a discussion on the previous knowledge and the expected contribution of 
the present study to that knowledge. 
 
3.1 Theoretical literature 
3.1.1 Suggested negative links 
 
The traditional argument that increased environmental performance harms economic 
performance arises most often in the context of international trade theory. The 
environment acts as a sink for joint outputs of production such as pollution and waste. 
Therefore, the environment is a factor of production, and changes in the availability of 
this production factor induce changes in comparative advantage. Comparative 
advantage, in turn, determines import and export patterns and location of production.41 
Rauscher (1994), for example, notes that according to standard international trade 
theory, restrictions in the use of environmental resources induce changes both in the 
international division of labour and in the composition of production within an 
economy. In both cases the changes are to the detriment of those sectors that are 
relatively intensive in the use of the environmental resource in question.42 
 
                                                 
40  Cooper, H M. 1989. Integrating research. A guide for literature reviews. Second edition. 
Newbury Park, Sage Publications. Page 11. 
41  See, for example, Siebert, H, Eichberger, J, Gronych, R & Pethig, R. 1980. Trade and 
environment. A theoretical enquiry. Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company. 
42  Rauscher, M. 1994. On ecological dumping. Oxford Economic Papers, 46. Pages 822-840. 
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The argumentation goes that improved environmental performance results in 
increased costs. Who – producers or consumers – pays for these costs depends on 
whether the costs can be passed on to prices. This, in turn, depends on the elasticities 
of supply and demand. Two principal cases can be distinguished: a firm operating in 
the open sector, with international trade, and a firm operating in the closed sector, 
without international trade.43 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the case of a firm operating in the open sector, for example a firm 
exporting to the world markets. Because the market is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive with an identical product and many price-taking sellers, the firm cannot 
influence the market price and faces a horizontal demand curve D. The supply curve 
of the firm prior to the improvement in environmental performance is S, and the firm 
sells q units of its product at the price of p. Improving environmental performance 
results in increased costs to the firm and thus shifts the supply curve upwards to the 
position S'. Now the firm can sell only q' units at the price of p. The profitability of 
the firm is illustrated by producer surplus, the area between the supply curve and the 
price line. Figure 4 shows that improving environmental performance results in an 
unambiguous reduction in the producer surplus: from the grey triangle PS to the 
smaller dotted triangle PS'. 
 
Figure 4 The impacts of improved environmental performance on a firm 
operating in international markets. See text for explanations  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the second case, a firm operating in a closed domestic market. 
Now the market is imperfectly competitive and the firm faces a downward-sloping 
demand curve D. Again, the supply curve of the firm prior to the improvement in 
environmental performance is S, and the firm sells q units of its product at the price of 
p. Improving environmental performance results in increased costs and shifts the 
supply curve upwards to S'. Now the firm can sell only q' units, but at a higher price 
                                                 
43  See, for example, Ollikainen, M. 1995. Ympäristönsuojelun taloudellinen ohjaus ja 
ympäristöpolitiikka. In: Massa, I & Rahkonen, O (editors). Riskiyhteiskunnan talous. 
Helsinki, Gaudeamus. Pages 289-318. 
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of p'. Figure 5 shows that again the producer surplus changes from the grey triangle 
PS to the dotted triangle PS'. However, the size of PS' compared to PS is no longer 
obvious. It depends on the elasticities of demand and supply, represented by the 
slopes of the D, S and S' curves. In other words, in the case of imperfectly competitive 
markets, part of the cost increase that results from improvements in environmental 
performance can be passed on to customers, which reduces the losses to firms. But 
how large a part can be passed on depends on how sensitive the customers and the 
producers are to price changes. 
  
 
 
Figure 5 The impacts of improved environmental performance on a firm 
operating in a closed domestic market. See text for explanations 
 
The mechanism described above rests on the premise that improved environmental 
performance incurs private costs to firms, resulting in increased production costs. 
Many arguments about the reason for this have been presented in literature. For 
example, Sprenger (1996) lists several potential types of negative impacts of 
environmental policy on individual firms, ranging from straightforward production 
cost increases to delays caused by environmental permitting.44 Simpson and Bradford 
(1996) argue that the direct impact of stricter environmental regulation is to increase 
production costs. Situations where environmental regulations induce enough cost-
reducing investments to reduce variable costs are theoretically possible, but remain 
rare exceptions.45 Palmer et al. (1995) note as a basic point that it cannot be expected 
that increasing the constraints on a firm's set of choices through environmental 
regulation would result in increased profits. There may be overlooked opportunities 
                                                 
44  Sprenger, R-U. 1996. Environmental policies and competitiveness. In: Lim, J-S (editor), 
Trade and environment. International issues and policy options. Seoul, Korea 
Environmental Technology Research Institute. Pages 223-266. 
45  Simpson, R D & Bradford, R L III, 1996. Taxing variable cost: environmental regulation 
as industrial policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30. Pages 
282-300. 
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for profitable environmental innovation, but these "pale in comparison to expenditures 
for pollution abatement and control".46  Also Walley and Whitehead (1994) maintain 
that win-win opportunities are insignificant when put side by side with the vast 
amount of environmental costs that will not generate positive financial returns.47 
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) argue that the trade-off between environmental 
performance and profit remains, but is less sharp because of the downsizing and 
modernisation caused by environmental policy.48 
 
Jaffe et al. (1995) summarise five ways how environmental regulations can incur costs 
by adversely affecting productivity. These are directing inputs to producing 
environmental quality that is not accounted for in productivity calculations; inducing a 
shift to less efficient production processes; dictating environmental investments that 
crowd out other investments; discouraging greenfield investment if regulations are 
stricter for new plants; and discouraging technological innovation because of 
requirements to use best available technology.49 
 
One obvious group of private cost increases are the costs of installing and operating 
pollution control or prevention technologies. Productivity losses or other opportunity 
costs caused by environmental performance improvements belong to another group. A 
third group of costs is not related to environmental performance per se, but to 
environmental policies implemented to regulate the environmental performance of 
firms. The different types of private cost increases that may accrue from 
environmental performance improvements are listed in Table 2. 
                                                 
46  Palmer, K, Oates, W E & Portney, P R. 1995. Tightening environmental standards: the 
benefit-cost or the no-cost paradigm? Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. 
Pages 119-132. 
47  Walley, N & Whitehead, B. 1994. It's not easy being green. Harvard Business Review, 
May-June. Pages 46-52. 
48  Xepapadeas, A & de Zeeuw, A. 1999. Environmental policy and competitiveness: the 
Porter hypothesis and the composition of capital. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 37. Pages 165-182. 
49  Jaffe, A B, Peterson, S R, Portney, P R & Stavins, R N. 1995. Environmental regulation 
and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us? Journal of 
Economic Literature, volume 33, pages 132-163. 
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Table 2 Suggested private costs of improved environmental performance. 
Summarised from Jaffe et al. (1995) and other literature referred to in 
section 3.1.1 
 
Direct production cost increases 
- Search costs of identifying and analysing abatement options 
- Capital investments needed for pollution prevention or abatement: machinery, equipment, 
buildings 
- Operating costs needed for pollution prevention or abatement: energy, labour, materials 
 
Productivity loss and opportunity costs 
- Switching costs, obsolete capital in transitional phase 
- Production disruptions, production losses 
- Change to less efficient processes and production practices 
- Adverse product quality impacts 
- Environmental investments diverting scarce capital away from more productive 
investments 
- Management time, production resources, and R&D focus shifted to producing a non-
saleable output (environmental quality) 
 
Regulation-related costs  
- Legal and other transactional costs 
- Delays caused by permitting procedures 
- Freezing of technology by regulations  
- Investment in new plants discouraged by new source bias in regulations 
 
3.1.2 Suggested positive links  
 
The first time a positive link between environmental performance and economic 
performance was proposed is usually attributed to Porter (1991).50 In his one-page 
essay, Porter suggests that it is possible to obtain less pollution simultaneously with 
lower cost and / or improved quality. Environmental regulation can bring further 
private benefits through the growing environmental technology industry. Although 
similar views had been presented earlier, it was Porter's influential essay that started a 
wide debate on the possibility of win-win situations.51 
                                                 
50  Porter, M E. 1991. America's green strategy. Scientific American, volume 264, 4. Page 96. 
51  See, for example, Ashford, N A, Ayers, C & Stone, R F. 1985. Using regulation to change 
the market for innovation. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 9. Pages 419-466; Porter, 
M E. 1990. The competitive advantage of nations. New York, the Free Press. Pages 647-
648; or Mäkelä, P. 1986. Ympäristönsuojelun taloudelliset vaikutukset. Working paper 
based on OECD work. Helsinki, Taloudellinen suunnittelukeskus. 31 pages.  
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These ideas were further elaborated by van der Linde (1993) and in two articles by 
Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b).52,53,54 Their principal argument is that the 
perception of high environmental performance necessarily harming economic 
performance results from a static viewpoint. Indeed, in the short term compliance with 
environmental requirements can increase costs. But, a dynamic view is required to 
understand the innovation offsets taking place as a reaction to environmental 
regulations.  
 
According to Porter and van der Linde, the pressure to improve environmental 
performance triggers innovation. Innovation is defined broadly as "a product's or 
service's design, the segments it serves, how it is produced, how it is marketed and 
how it is supported".55 Innovation produces partial, full, or more than full offsets 
against the costs of improved environmental performance. Correspondingly, there can 
be a minimisation or elimination of compliance costs, or even a net improvement in 
economic performance. 
 
Porter and van der Linde do not claim that innovation offsets can always take place 
and that improved environmental performance always improves economic 
performance. However, they think that innovation opportunities are probable, not only 
possible.56 This is because pollution is a sign of economic waste: after using resources 
inefficiently, additional activities that do not create value have to be performed. 
Hence, the same basic principle of resource productivity underlies profit maximisation 
and pollution reduction.57  
 
Many other authors have embraced the idea of a positive link between environmental 
performance and economic performance. Elkington (1994) argues that strategies that 
simultaneously benefit the firm, its customers, and the environment will emerge as a 
major feature of doing business.58 Corbett and van Wassenhove (1993) mention a 
number of economic benefits that relate to internalising environmental issues in 
                                                 
52  van der Linde, C. 1993. The micro-economic implications of environmental regulation: a 
preliminary framework. In: Environmental policies and industrial competitiveness. Paris, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Pages 69-77.  
53  Porter, M E & van der Linde, C. 1995a. Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. 
Harvard Business Review, September-October. Pages 120-134.  
54  Porter, M E & van der Linde, C. 1995b. Toward a new conception of the environment-
competitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. Pages 97-
118. 
55  Porter, M E & van der Linde, C. 1995b. Toward a new conception of the environment-
competitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. Pages 97-
118. 
56  van der Linde, C. 1993. The micro-economic implications of environmental regulation: a 
preliminary framework. In: Environmental policies and industrial competitiveness. Paris, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Pages 69-77.  
57  Porter, M E & van der Linde, C. 1995b. Toward a new conception of the environment-
competitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. Pages 97-
118. 
58  Elkington, J. 1994. Towards the sustainable corporation: win-win-win business strategies 
for sustainable development. California Management Review, Winter. Pages 90-100. 
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business.59 Dechant and Altman (1994) discuss forces promoting corporate 
environmentalism and ways of deriving competitive advantage from environmental 
performance.60 Barrett (1992) examines how strategy can improve profitability and 
simultaneously benefit the environment.61 Schmidheiny (1992) argues that there are 
increasing profitability opportunities in eco-efficiency, which refers to adding the 
most value with the least use of resources and the least pollution.62 Cairncross (1992) 
notes that many of the economic arguments in favour of good environmental 
performance are defensive – avoiding fees, taxes, liabilities, environmentalist attacks 
and so on – but that there are also competitive opportunities to be exploited.63 
Shrivastava (1995) emphasises the role environmental technologies can play in 
changing the competitive dynamics of industries, because they allow "rapid, quantum, 
and nonuniform" cost reductions.64 Madu et al. (1995) note that poor environmental 
performance can threaten the polluting firm itself by damaging its raw material 
sources and the productivity of its workers.65 Bonifant et al. (1995) write that 
businesses can develop a competitive edge through innovative environmental 
compliance strategies.66 Repetto (1992) approaches the issue from the economy-wide 
perspective and suggests that economic and environmental goals need not conflict as 
shifting the tax burden from productive activities to unproductive ones such as 
pollution and resource waste would bring real economic savings.67 The list could 
easily be continued. 
 
The private benefits that these studies suggest to accrue from improved environmental 
performance can be divided into different categories. In very broad terms, increased 
efficiency brings cost savings in production. Environmental product differentiation 
enhances benefits from output markets. Benefits vis-à-vis regulations can be of 
strategic and cost-saving nature.68 Cost savings are also available when obtaining 
capital and insurance, and private benefits can be seized from labour and community 
                                                 
59  Corbett, C J & van Wassenhove, L N. 1993. The green fee: internalizing and 
operationalizing environmental issues. California Management Review, Fall. Pages 116-
135. 
60  Dechant, K & Altman, B. 1994. Environmental leadership: from compliance to 
competitive advantage. Academy of Management Executive, volume 8, 3. Pages 7-20.  
61  Barrett, S. 1992. Strategy and the environment. Columbia Journal of World Business, 
volume 27, 3&4. Pages 202-208. 
62  Schmidheiny, S. 1992. The business logic of sustainable development. Columbia Journal 
of World Business, volume 27, 3&4. Pages 18-23. 
63  Cairncross, F. 1992. UNCED, environmentalism and beyond. Columbia Journal of World 
Business, volume 27, 3&4. Pages 12-17.  
64  Shrivastava, P. 1995. Environmental technologies and competitive advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, volume 16. Pages 183-200. 
65  Madu, C N, Kuei, C & Winokur, D. 1995. Environmental quality planning. A strategic 
total quality management (STQM) approach. Futures, volume 27, 8. Pages 839-856. 
66  Bonifant, B C, Arnold, M B & Long, F J. 1995. Gaining competitive advantage through 
environmental investments. Business Horizons, July-August. Pages 37-47. 
67  Repetto, R. 1992. Environmental taxes and U.S. competitiveness. Columbia Journal of 
World Business, volume 27, 3&4. Pages 128-134.  
68  On strategic rent-seeking from regulations, see Salop, S C & Scheffman, D T. 1983. 
Raising rivals' costs. AEA Papers and Proceedings, volume 73, 2. Pages 267-271. 
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relations. Table 3 provides a detailed listing of the suggested private benefits under 
each category. Note that these benefits accrue in addition to the social benefits of 
environmental protection. 
 
Table 3 Suggested private benefits from improved environmental performance. 
Summarised from literature referred to in section 3.1.2 
 
Benefits from production  
- More efficient use of materials and energy, resulting in higher yields or reduced use of 
purchased inputs 
- Substitution of less expensive inputs for hazardous materials, resulting also in lower 
storage and handling costs and avoidance of permitting and inspection delays 
- Improved purity and quality of natural resource inputs 
- Elimination of risky or unnecessary production steps and simplification of designs, 
resulting in fewer accidents and shorter production time 
- Implementing process changes that prevent pollution, thus avoiding end-of-pipe pollution 
abatement or clean-up that are costlier alternatives  
- More careful monitoring and maintenance, resulting in less downtime, less rejects, and 
higher or more consistent quality 
- Reducing, reusing, and recycling by-products and waste and recovering valuable 
materials from waste streams, resulting in reduced waste disposal costs and added 
revenue or savings  in input costs 
- Lower packaging costs 
 
Benefits from output markets  
- Improved firm image, resulting in increased customer loyalty, ability to protect market 
share, and avoidance of boycotts and negative publicity by the media and environmental 
groups 
- Attractiveness to customers in environmentally conscious market segments, resulting in 
an ability to increase market share by creating or occupying new market niches with new 
or existing products 
- Ability to obtain eco-labels and other means of distinction that favourably affect customer 
choice  
- Ability to obtain an initial or permanent price premium for environmentally friendly 
products 
- Ability to sell to firms who screen their suppliers using environmental criteria (for 
example, because of the trickle-down effect from their own environmental management 
systems), and ability to tender for contracts to public organisations with an environmental 
procurement policy 
- Better product quality, improved product safety, lower operating and disposal costs for 
customers, or higher resale or scrap value, resulting in added customer value 
- Ability to enter the growing market for environmental goods and services 
- Ability to obtain early mover advantages both in the market for environmental goods and 
services and in the environmentally conscious niche of other goods and services 
- Ability to build an inimitable strategy as an environmental leader since not everyone can 
become equally environmentally friendly 
 
Regulatory benefits  
- Reduced environmental taxes and charges 
- Ability to sell and not buy pollution rights in emission trading markets  
- Dramatic emergency measures such as output restrictions avoided 
- Ensured continuous compliance with regulations, resulting in less time, money, and 
reputation lost and less uncertainty created in litigation  
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- Reduced liability costs 
- Anticipating future regulations, resulting in more flexibility and thus less costs, reduced 
regulatory pressure and postponement of some regulatory costs, and in longer-term 
planning horizons 
- A possibility to influence, in accordance with own strategy, the shape and content of new 
standards required of the industry, and thus create an entry barrier to rivals or raise their 
costs 
 
Benefits from capital markets  
- Less expensive and easier borrowing due to reduced risk 
- Protecting collateral and balance sheet values 
- Favourable stock price impact  
- Attractiveness to non-speculative ethical investors 
 
Benefits from insurance markets  
- Reduced insurance premia due to reduced risk 
 
Benefits from labour markets  
- Ability to hire and retain high quality staff, especially young workers who tend to be 
environmentally conscious 
- Improved worker health and morale; no whistle-blowing 
 
Community benefits  
- Good community relationships, facilitating, for example, siting or expansion 
 
3.1.3 Vertical product differentiation literature  
 
The results from the previous theoretical literature are somewhat changed in the case 
of an oligopoly. Oligopolistic firms are interdependent so that a firm's profits are also 
affected by the other firms' decisions. In an oligopoly, environmental performance 
thus affects profits in two ways: through the customary trade-off between the costs of 
and market benefits from provision of environmental performance, and also through 
the disparity in environmental performance that reduces the intensity of price 
competition between the firms.69  
 
A strain of theoretical literature addressing this issue is the vertical product 
differentiation literature. Vertical product differentiation refers to differentiation 
where a change in a product attribute makes the product more attractive to all 
customers. This contrasts with horizontal differentiation where a change in a product 
attribute makes the product more attractive to some customers but less so for some 
other customers. More formally, differentiation is vertical when all customers have 
the same ranking of the product variants if they are offered at the same price.70 
 
The vertical product differentiation literature initially developed to address quality 
choices but has recently been increasingly applied to the provision of environmental 
                                                 
69  Crampes, C & Hollander, A. 1995. Duopoly and quality standards. European Economic 
Review, 39. Pages 71-82. 
70  Lancaster, K J. 1979. Variety, equity and efficiency. New York, Columbia University 
Press. Chapter 2. 
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performance.71 Reinhardt (1999b), however, notes that, in practice, opportunities for 
vertical environmental differentiation may be rare since augmenting environmental 
performance often entails sacrifices in some other product attributes and not all 
customers have the same preferences for environmental performance.72 
 
Applied to the provision of environmental performance, in the absence of regulations 
the reasoning in vertical product differentiation models is as follows.73 There are two 
firms, one producing the high environmental performance (H) variant of the product 
and the other producing the low environmental performance variant (L) of the 
product. Consumers have in their utility function the argument θ , which denotes 
preferences for environmental performance (willingness to pay for environmental 
performance) and varies between consumers so that [ ]θ θ θ∈ , . A consumer's utility 
from consuming the high environmental performance variant of the product is 
u e pi H H= −θ  and from consuming the low environmental performance variant of the 
product is u e pj L L= −θ , where e stands for environmental performance and p for the 
price. 
 
In full market coverage models, all consumers participate in the market. A consumer 
is indifferent between purchasing the high environmental performance product and 
purchasing the low environmental performance product when θ θe p e pH H L L− = − . 
This gives us θ* = −−
p p
e e
H L
H L
 which segments the market so that the consumers with 
[ ]θ θ θ∈ , * purchase the low environmental performance product and the consumers 
with [ ]θ θ θ∈ *, purchase the high environmental performance product.  
 
In incomplete market coverage models some consumers may not participate in the 
market. A consumer is indifferent between purchasing the low environmental 
performance product and not purchasing any product when θe pL L− = 0 . This gives 
us θ '= p
e
L
L
 which segments the market so that the consumers with [ ]θ θ θ∈ , ' do not 
                                                 
71  Examples include Arora, S & Gangopadhyay, S. 1995. Toward a theoretical model of 
voluntary overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, volume 28, 3. 
Pages 289-309; Amacher, G S, Fina, M, Koskela, E & Ollikainen, M. 2000. 
Environmental quality competition and eco-labeling. Mimeo; and Lombardini-Riipinen, C. 
2000. Taxation, environmental quality choice and welfare in a vertically differentiated 
duopoly. Paper presented at the European Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists (EAERE) conference, University of Crete, June 30 - July 2. 
72  Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Pages 37-38. 
73  See, for example, Crampes, C & Hollander, A. 1995. Duopoly and quality standards. 
European Economic Review, 39. Pages 71-82, or Motta, M. 1993. Endogenous quality 
choice: price vs. quantity competition. The Journal of Industrial Economics, volume 41, 2. 
Pages 113-131, or Arora, S & Gangopadhyay, S. 1995. Toward a theoretical model of 
voluntary overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, volume 28, 3. 
Pages 289-309. 
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purchase any product, the consumers with [ ]θ θ θ∈ ' , * purchase the low environmental 
performance product, and the consumers with [ ]θ θ θ∈ *, purchase the high 
environmental performance product. Since each consumer participating in the market 
is assumed to purchase one unit of the product, each firm's demand q is obtained from 
the number of customers purchasing its product. 
 
The profit of the firm producing the high environmental performance product is 
( )πH H H Hp c q= −  and the profit of the firm producing the low environmental 
performance product is, similarly, ( )π L L L Lp c q= − . As is typical for the case of a 
non-collusive oligopoly, game theory is next used to examine the optimal strategies of 
the two firms. The firms engage in a two-stage game, where they first choose their 
level of environmental performance and thereafter compete either in prices or in 
quantities. 
 
The general result from such vertical product differentiation models is that duopoly 
firms always choose to provide distinct levels of environmental performance at the 
optimum. The details on the selected environmental performance levels vary, but the 
general result is robust to several model assumptions such as whether the costs of 
provision of environmental quality are assumed to be fixed or variable, and whether 
competition occurs in prices or in quantities.74 
 
Hence, one firm may find it the most profitable to provide low environmental 
performance and another firm may simultaneously find it the most profitable to 
provide high environmental performance. This implies that the firm-level relationship 
between environmental performance and economic performance is not uniform across 
cases and depends on the actions of competitors when there is interdependence 
between the firms.75 
 
3.2 Empirical literature  
 
The empirical review below is strictly focused on studies that are directly pertinent to 
the research question at hand. This is typical of literature reviews such as the present 
one that serve as introduction to new original work.76 Moreover, although the review 
                                                 
74  Motta, M. 1993. Endogenous quality choice: price vs. quantity competition. The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, volume 41, 2. Pages 113-131. 
75  In fact, the focal point in vertical product differentiation literature is that the levels of 
environmental performance selected by the two firms are not socially optimal, which 
invites regulatory intervention. The literature then analyses the impacts of different 
regulatory policies on environmental performance levels, profits, and welfare. For the 
purposes of the present study, however, these results are of less interest than the general 
finding that the most profitable level of environmental performance for a firm depends on 
the level selected by the other firm. 
76  Cooper, H M. 1989. Integrating research. A guide for literature reviews. Second edition. 
Newbury Park, Sage Publications. Page 12. 
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is relatively comprehensive, its goal is to be selective rather than exhaustive, and 
"timeless rather than timely".77  
 
To facilitate obtaining a quick overview of the studies, they are grouped based on the 
main approach utilised (section headings) and labelled based on the main type of 
result (individual study headings). However, each reviewed study is also reported in 
depth because many of the problems and controversies with the studies originate from 
details in their designs, assumptions and measurements. These will be summarised in 
the discussion at the end of the chapter.  
 
3.2.1 Environmental performance and accounting performance 
 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to examining empirically the relationship 
between firms' environmental and economic performance is to take some measures of 
environmental performance and regress them against some accounting measures of 
economic performance. This strain of studies began already in the early 1970s. 
However, the results remain unsettled, as can be seen from the studies reviewed 
below.  
 
The body of literature on corporate social responsibility and economic performance is 
much larger than that of environmental performance and economic performance. 
Some of the corporate social responsibility studies explicitly use environmental 
performance as a proxy for corporate social responsibility. Such studies have been 
included in the present review. 
 
Bragdon and Marlin (1972): positive relationship78 
 
Bragdon and Marlin examined 17 firms in the pulp and paper industry using a Council 
on Economic Priorities (CEP) environmental rating. They found a positive 
relationship between the environmental rating and 5-year return on equity, 5-year 
return on capital, and 5-year earnings growth. However, no tests for significance were 
conducted.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77  Wolcott, H F. 1990. Writing up qualitative research. Qualitative Research Methods 
Volume 20. Newbury Park, Sage Publications. 94 pages. 
78  Bragdon, J & Marlin, J. 1972. Is pollution profitable? Risk Management, volume 19, 4. 
Pages 9-18. Reviewed as reported in Johnson, S. 1995. An analysis of the relationship 
between corporate environmental and economic performance at the level of the firm. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Irvine, and in Aupperle, K E, Carroll, A B 
& Hatfield, J D. 1985. An empirical examination of the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and profitability. Academy of Management Journal, volume 28, 2. 
Pages 446-463. 
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Bowman and Haire (1975): inverted U-shaped relationship79 
 
Bowman and Haire questioned whether the same relationship between the costs and 
benefits of social responsibility holds across the entire scale; in other words, whether 
more is always better. Taking pollution control as an example, they recomputed the 
data in Bragdon and Marlin (1972).80 Bowman and Haire grouped 15 of the pulp and 
paper firms in the sample into low, middle and high performers with regard to 
pollution control. They found that measured by return on equity, middle performers 
were more profitable than either low or high performers. Thus, extreme performance 
in both directions was associated with reduced profitability. Nevertheless, high 
performers were somewhat more profitable than low performers. Again, no tests for 
significance were performed. 
 
These results led Bowman and Haire to conclude that the relationship between 
environmental performance and profitability follows an asymmetrical inverted U-
shaped curve where the low-end tail is lower than the high-end tail. Bowman and 
Haire did not suggest that environmental performance, or corporate social 
responsibility in general, was a causal factor of high profitability. Instead, they argued 
that both corporate social responsibility and profitability were signals of the presence 
of a third, causal factor: sensitivity to the external requirements facing the firm.  
 
Spicer (1978a): positive relationship, but reducing over time81 
 
Spicer noted a seemingly widespread view among investors that there was a moderate 
to strong association between a firm's performance on key social issues and the 
investment worth of the firm's securities. He set out to empirically ascertain whether 
such a perception was warranted. Spicer tested associations between firm pollution 
control performance and a number of economic indicators of investment worth. The 
hypotheses developed were that firms with better pollution control records have 
higher profitability, are larger in size, have lower total risk, have lower systematic 
risk, and have higher price per earnings ratios than firms with poorer pollution control 
records.  
 
Spicer's sample consisted of 18 pulp and paper firms whose environmental 
performance had been rated by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). Spicer 
derived a pollution control index from the CEP data and combined the index with 
financial indicators. He found that, as hypothesised, the financial indicators were 
better for firms with better pollution control records. However, he also found a 
marked reduction in these associations over time.  
 
                                                 
79  Bowman, E & Haire, M. 1975. A strategic posture toward corporate social responsibility. 
California Management Review, volume 18, 2. Pages 49-58. 
80  Bragdon, J & Marlin, J. 1972. Is pollution profitable? Risk Management, volume 19, 4. 
Pages 9-18. 
81  Spicer, B. 1978a. Investors, corporate social performance and information disclosure: An 
empirical study. The Accounting Review, volume 53, 1. Pages 94-111. 
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Chen and Metcalf (1980): no relationship82 
 
The first purpose of Chen and Metcalf was to show that the evidence on a moderate to 
strong association between a firm's pollution control record and financial indicators 
was not as definitive as Spicer (1978a) had indicated. Chen and Metcalf criticised the 
validity of Spicer's study and argued that its conclusions were not justified. They 
examined Spicer's results at the 0.05 significance level and found that only three of 
the five financial variables were positively correlated with pollution control record. 
These were profitability, size, and price per earnings ratio. The measures of total risk 
and systematic risk did not exhibit a correlation with pollution control record at the 
0.05 significance level. Furthermore, Chen and Metcalf questioned the fact that there 
were significant associations of pollution indices with the three financial indicators in 
the 1969-71 period but not in the 1971-73 period.  
 
On pollution control and profitability, Chen and Metcalf maintained that it was 
difficult to see how a firm's pollution control record could have a significant positive 
impact on profitability. On pollution control and size, they similarly wrote that it 
"hardly seems possible for the result of controlling pollution to have a positive effect 
on the size of operation." Instead, they suggested reversed causation: firms with high 
earnings were more likely to incur pollution abatement costs than were firms with low 
earnings, and large firms tended to do more on pollution control, voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  
 
The second purpose of Chen and Metcalf was to show that the relationship between 
pollution control record and financial indicators was not genuine but spurious, as it 
was created through one or more intervening variables. One possible third variable in 
this case could be size, measured by total assets. Besides affecting pollution control 
record, which was Spicer's independent variable, size may have a significant effect on 
the other four dependent financial variables.  
  
Chen and Metcalf replicated Spicer's study using product-moment correlations 
between size and the other financial indicators. When the effects of size variations 
were held constant, there were no significant relationships between pollution control 
record and profitability, price per earnings ratio, total risk, or systematic risk. Thus, in 
direct conflict with Spicer's conclusions, Chen and Metcalf concluded that size was an 
explanatory variable for both pollution control and financial indicators and that there 
was no genuine relationship between pollution control and financial indicators.  
 
In his reply to Chen and Metcalf, Spicer (1980) argued that Chen and Metcalf had 
fundamentally misinterpreted his study. Spicer's purpose had been to determine 
whether the perceived association between firms' pollution control record and a 
number of financial indicators was borne out by observation. The objective had not 
been to establish a causal relationship from pollution control record to the financial 
                                                 
82  Chen, K & Metcalf, R. 1980. The relationship between pollution control record and 
financial indicators revisited. The Accounting Review, volume 55, 1. Pages 168-177. 
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indicators. Spicer suspected that, in fact, the real relationship between pollution 
control record and profitability was of a reciprocal nature. Furthermore, background 
variables such as social pressure could affect both the pollution control record and 
profitability. 83  
  
Freedman and Jaggi (1982): negative relationship for large firms, otherwise no 
relationship84 
 
Strictly speaking, the study by Freedman and Jaggi relates economic performance to 
environmental disclosures, not to environmental performance. It is included in the 
review, but with reference to section 2.1 where the potential discrepancy between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosures was noted.  
 
Freedman and Jaggi studied the link between the disclosure of pollution information  
and economic performance for 109 firms in the chemical, oil refining, steel, and pulp 
and paper industry. They developed an index of pollution disclosure and correlated it 
with different indices of economic performance such as return on assets, return on 
equity and operating ratio. Freedman and Jaggi found that in the total sample and in 
small firms there was no relationship between the extensiveness of pollution 
disclosures and economic performance. However, in large firms there was a 
significant negative correlation between pollution disclosures and economic 
performance, especially return on equity. Pollution disclosures were more detailed for 
large firms with poor economic performance. Freedman and Jaggi suggested that this 
might imply that pollution disclosures were used to justify poor economic 
performance by large firms.  
 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988): reverse causality85 
 
The study by McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis addressed corporate social 
responsibility in general, not only environmental performance. However, the study is 
included in the review because it is relevant for consideration of the possible direction 
of causality. The authors examined whether corporate social responsibility predicted 
financial performance, and whether prior financial performance predicted corporate 
social responsibility. They found that a firm's prior economic performance was more 
closely related to corporate social responsibility than subsequent economic 
performance, and concluded that it might be better to consider financial performance a 
variable influencing corporate social responsibility than vice versa. 
 
                                                 
83  Spicer, B. 1980. The relationship between pollution control records and financial 
indicators revisited: Further comment. The Accounting Review, volume 55, 1. Pages 178-
185. 
84  Freedman, M & Jaggi, B. 1982. Pollution disclosures, pollution performance and 
economic performance. Omega, volume 10, 2. Pages 167-176. 
85 McGuire, J, Sundgren, A & Schneeweis, T. 1988. Corporate social responsibility and firm 
financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, volume 31, 4. Pages 854-872. 
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McGuire et al. further found that risk was closely associated with corporate social 
responsibility. This led them to conclude that instead of looking for increased 
profitability from corporate social responsibility one should look for reduced risk. 
Lower risk would justify lower returns in socially responsible firms.  
 
Sjöblom (1994): positive or no relationship depending on environmental performance 
measure86  
 
Sjöblom, using Finnish data, measured the environmental performance of firms in two 
different ways: by incurred environmental protection costs and a pollution index. 
Financial performance was measured with several financial indicators calculated for 
firms for 1988-1992. The financial data were received from the large corporations 
database of the Talouselämä magazine. 
 
The cost-based measures of environmental performance were the share of 
environmental investments in total investments and the share of environmental costs 
in gross production value. Environmental protection costs consisted of investment 
costs and operating costs. Site-specific data for 1027 sites in 1992 were obtained from 
Statistics Finland, which had collected the data through a detailed questionnaire to 
firms. It is noteworthy that in the questionnaire environmental investments were 
defined to be investments that are made for environmental protection purposes but do 
not meet firms' general profitability requirements. Cost savings from environmental 
protection were also not registered in the data.   
 
Correlation analysis and factor analysis of 121 firms in the industrial, mining and 
energy sectors were performed. No statistically significant relationship was found 
between environmental performance (measured by the share of environmental 
investments in total investments, share of environmental costs in gross production 
value, share of environmental costs in total costs) and profitability (measured by 
return on investment).  
 
Environmental performance was also measured by a pollution index. The pollution 
index data were obtained for 54 firms in 1990 and 1991 to measure the emissions per 
turnover and the changes in emissions.87 When correlation analysis and factor analysis 
were performed with the pollution-index-based measures of environmental 
friendliness, a positive correlation was found between emission reduction and 
profitability. Sjöblom did not take a stand on the possible direction of causality.  
 
 
                                                 
86  Sjöblom, M. 1994. Yrityksen ympäristöystävällisyys ja liiketaloudelliset tunnusluvut. 
Master's thesis, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration. 
87  See Reinikainen, T. 1993. Suomen suurimmat pistekuormittajat vuosina 1990 ja 
1991.Ympäristökatsaus, March, special issue. 
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Johnson (1995): no relationship for most industries and environmental issues88  
 
The research hypothesis of Johnson was that firms with superior environmental 
performance also have superior economic performance. To test this hypothesis, 
Johnson examined associations between various measures of environmental and 
economic performance for a sample of firms in the Fortune 500 Industrials in 1987-
1992. The sample size varied between 105 and 381 for different analyses. 
 
Johnson measured environmental performance by oil and chemical spills, number of 
Superfund sites89, toxic chemicals emissions per sales, Council on Economic Priorities 
(CEP) rating, regulatory fines and violations, and required cleanups and corrective 
actions. Financial performance was measured by return on assets, return on 
investment, return on equity, net income growth, and total return. Johnson controlled 
for market risk level and industry sector in the analysis. Firm size was also 
"controlled" for by restricting the sample to large firms.  
 
The findings of Johnson did not support his research hypothesis. Superior 
environmental performance was related to superior economic performance only for 
some environmental issues such as oil spills, RCRA sites,90 and Superfund sites in 
some industry sectors (chemicals; jewellery, metals and metal products; and motor 
vehicles). In most cases, economic performance was not affected by environmental 
performance. Furthermore, poor environmental performance with regard to chemical 
spills and chemical emissions was economically rewarded. From these findings, 
Johnson drew the conclusion that environmental regulations were not creating 
economic incentives for firms to improve their environmental performance.  
 
Repetto (1995): no relationship for most industries and environmental issues91  
 
Repetto examined whether firms with superior environmental performance tended to 
be more or less profitable than firms with inferior environmental performance within 
the same industry. To address this question he merged production cost, sales and 
revenue data on thousands of industrial establishments with information on emissions 
and pollution control expenditures. The number of establishments within an industry 
ranged between 10 and 429. 
 
                                                 
88  Johnson, S. 1995. An analysis of the relationship between corporate environmental and 
economic performance at the level of the firm. Doctoral dissertation, University of 
California, Irvine. 
89  Hazardous waste sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act that addresses uncontrolled or abandoned historical hazardous waste 
sites. 
90  Hazardous waste sites where corrective actions had been required by authorities under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that addresses the control of hazardous wastes 
from cradle to crave. 
91  Repetto, R. 1995. Jobs, competitiveness and environmental regulation: What are the real 
issues? Washington, D.C., World Resources Institute. 43 pages. 
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Repetto developed three measures of environmental performance and two measures of 
profitability. The environmental performance measures were total airborne particulate 
emissions per dollar of output; water-borne emissions, measured as biological oxygen 
demand (BOD) plus total suspended solids (TSS) per dollar of output; and toxic 
releases per dollar of output. The profitability measures were gross operating margin 
and net return on capital. 
 
Repetto undertook several measures to reduce the possibility that factors affecting 
both environmental performance and profitability could create spurious correlations 
between the two variables. First, the study was confined to specialised industrial 
sectors at the 5-digit Standard Industrial Classification level that produced a relatively 
narrow range of homogeneous products. Repetto argued that firms within such sectors 
would use similar materials and technologies, have similar capital intensity, and face 
similar inflationary trends and tax regimes. Second, Repetto controlled for plant age 
and size as well as for recent investments in plant and equipment.  
 
Repetto found that environmental performance varied considerably even within the 
narrowly defined industrial sectors. However, he found few correlations between 
environmental performance and profitability that were significant at the 0.05 level. 
There was a significant positive association for one out of the six industrial sectors 
studied with regard to airborne emissions and a significant negative association for 
one out of the 14 industrial sectors studied with regard to waterborne emissions. Four 
out of the 25 industrial sectors studied with regard to toxic emissions exhibited a 
positive association between environmental performance and profitability. However, 
the fact that different toxic emissions were simply added up by weight to construct 
this measurement, ignoring the important differences in toxicity, casts doubt on the 
validity of this particular indicator. 
 
Based on these findings, Repetto concluded that the associations between 
environmental performance and profitability were weak. Other factors than 
environmental performance were determining the profitability of firms. At least, there 
was no overall tendency for firms with superior environmental performance to be less 
profitable, and in some cases there was a positive correlation between environmental 
performance and profitability. 
 
Hart and Ahuja (1996): positive relationship92 
 
Hart and Ahuja studied the relationship between emission reduction and financial 
performance for a sample of 127 firms on the Standard & Poor's 500 list. They 
measured environmental performance with the help of the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) emissions efficiency index: total emissions in pounds as 
reported in the Toxics Release Inventory, standardised by firm revenues. Hart and 
                                                 
92  Hart, S L & Ahuja, G. 1996. Does it pay to be green? An empirical examination of the 
relationship between emission reduction and firm performance. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, volume 5. Pages 30-37. 
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Ahuja calculated the percentage change in the emissions efficiency index between 
1988 and 1989 for each firm and used this as the environmental performance measure.  
 
Financial performance was measured by return on sales, return on assets, and return 
on equity. Hart and Ahuja used multiple regression and controlled for R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, capital intensity, leverage, and four-digit industry average 
performance. They found that emission reduction efforts showed positively on the 
bottom line within one to two years of initiation. As hypothesised, there was no 
relationship with concurrent economic performance. This was taken as an indication 
that there was a time lag before the emission reduction efforts materialised as 
financial benefits. Note, however, that Hart and Ahuja measured environmental 
performance only at time t, and economic performance at times t, t+1, t+2, and t+3. 
They did not control for changes in environmental performance that may have 
occurred at times t+1, t+2, and t+3. Hart and Ahuja further found that those firms that 
had the highest initial emissions stood to gain the most, and argued that this was 
because many unutilised low-cost emission reduction possibilities remained for such 
firms.  
 
Hart and Ahuja could not rule out reverse causation in their study.  In fact, they put 
forth an argument that a "virtuous circle" exists between pollution prevention and 
economic performance: good economic performance enables good environmental 
performance, which again contributes towards good economic performance. 
 
Russo and Fouts (1997): positive relationship93  
 
The hypothesis of Russo and Fouts was that high levels of environmental performance 
are associated with enhanced profitability. Furthermore, Russo and Fouts 
hypothesised that this relationship is moderated by industry growth rate, so that in 
high-growth industries the returns to environmental performance are higher.  
 
Russo and Fouts measured environmental performance by an independent 
environmental rating produced by Franklin Research and Development Corporation. 
The rating was based on compliance records, abatement expenditures, and firm 
initiatives to improve environmental performance. Profitability was measured by 
return on assets. In addition, Russo and Fouts controlled for industry concentration, 
firm growth rate, firm size, capital intensity, advertising intensity, and industry growth 
rate. 
 
In their sample of 243 firms, Russo and Fouts found that, as hypothesised, higher 
environmental performance was associated with higher financial performance. 
However, the share of variance in firm performance that was explained by 
environmental performance was modest. Also, as hypothesised, the relationship was 
                                                 
93  Russo, M & Fouts, P. 1997. A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental 
performance and profitability. Academy of Management Journal, volume 40, 3. Pages 534-
559. 
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strengthened by industry growth. Improved environmental performance enhanced 
financial performance in all cases where de-meaned industry growth exceeded -3.14 
per cent. 
 
3.2.2 Environmental performance and stock market performance 
 
Another major strain of empirical studies on the firm-level relationship between 
environmental and economic performance uses stock market measures instead of 
accounting measures of financial performance. The logic behind these studies is based 
on the efficient market hypothesis, according to which stock prices reflect the present 
value of future cash flows and thus do capture the economic impacts of environmental 
performance. When reviewing these studies, it is necessary also to include studies that 
focus on environmental disclosures: because stock markets react to publicly available 
information, disclosures play a central role. 
 
Most of the studies reviewed below use the event study methodology that calculates 
the change in market valuation, termed abnormal return, the result of a specific event 
such as the publication of environment-related news. Abnormal returns are obtained 
by comparing observed actual returns during the event window to "normal" returns 
predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The event study methodology 
thus isolates the event-related change by correcting for general market movements 
and individual firm variability.94  
 
Again, the studies show varying results as disclosed below. However, the majority of 
the studies document a positive relationship between environmental performance and 
stock market reaction. 
 
Fogler and Nutt (1975): no relationship95  
 
Fogler and Nutt hypothesised that if investors were socially conscious, demand for, 
and hence price of, the stock of socially irresponsible firms would be reduced. Thus, 
firms with better pollution ratings would have higher price per earnings ratios than 
firms with lower ratings. Fogler and Nutt combined the data in Bragdon and Marlin 
(1972)96 with data on quarterly price per earnings ratios. They found that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between a firm's pollution rating and its price per 
                                                 
94  See, for example, Klassen, R D & McLaughlin, C P. 1996. The impact of environmental 
management on firm performance. Management Science, volume 42, 8. Pages 1199-1214.  
The methodology was originally developed in Fama, E F, Fisher, L, Jensen, M C & Roll, 
R. 1969. The adjustment of stock prices to new information. International Economic 
Review, volume 10, 1. Pages 1-21. 
95  Fogler, H & Nutt, F. 1975. A note on social responsibility and stock valuation. Academy of 
Management Journal, volume 18, 1. Pages 155-160. 
96  Bragdon, J & Marlin, J. 1972. Is pollution profitable? Risk Management, volume 19, 4. 
Pages 9-18. 
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earnings ratio in subsequent quarters. However, a lack of stable earnings histories 
limited the sample to only nine pulp and paper firms.  
 
Fogler and Nutt also tested whether publicity on firms' pollution performance results 
in short-term stock price changes. By examining daily stock prices for 10 days before 
and 10 days after the release of pollution ratings they found that the pollution 
information had no discernible impact on the market.  
 
Belkaoui (1976): positive relationship97 
 
Belkaoui studied two groups of U.S. firms: an experimental group of 50 firms from 
different industries that disclosed pollution control information in annual reports and 
had pollution control expenditure of at least one per cent of sales, and a control group 
of 50 firms of a similar industrial classification and asset size. Using monthly closing 
common stock prices 12 months before and 12 months after the publication of the 
annual reports, he found that the effect of the disclosure of pollution control 
information had an immediate but temporary (four months) positive effect on the 
market. 
 
Spicer (1978b): positive relationship98 
 
In another study based on the same data as Spicer (1978a)99, Spicer addressed the 
question whether firms' relative pollution control records conveyed relevant 
information to investors about the riskiness of the common stocks of firms in 
pollution-prone industries. He examined the relationship between market measures of 
risk and firms' pollution control records and concluded that, tentatively, there seemed 
to be an inverse association between the two even after the effects of other non-
market measures of risk were removed.  
 
Shane and Spicer (1983): positive relationship100  
 
Shane and Spicer investigated whether movements in security prices were associated 
with the release of externally produced information about firms' pollution control 
performance and pollution control costs. They hypothesised that if investors were 
using such information, an overall movement in the share prices of the firms reported 
on should be observable. Shane and Spicer found that firms in their sample of 72 
firms in the pulp and paper, electric power, iron and steel, and petroleum refining 
sectors suffered relatively large negative abnormal returns in connection with the 
                                                 
97  Belkaoui, A. 1976. The impact of the disclosure of the environmental effects of 
organizational behavior on the market. Financial Management, volume 5, 4. Pages 26-31. 
98  Spicer, B. 1978b. Market risk, accounting data and companies' pollution control records. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. Pages 67-83. 
99  Spicer, B. 1978a. Investors, corporate social performance and information disclosure: An 
empirical study. The Accounting Review, volume 53, 1. Pages 94-111. 
100  Shane, P & Spicer, B. 1983. Market response to environmental information produced 
outside the firm. The Accounting Review, volume 58, 3. Pages 521-538. 
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release of their pollution control record by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). 
Firms rated to have low pollution control performance suffered a more adverse price 
movement than firms with a high pollution control rating. Shane and Spicer attributed 
these results to CEP studies changing investors' perceptions of the probability 
distributions of future cash flows of the rated firms. They also suggested that investors 
were using the CEP information to discriminate between firms with different pollution 
control records.  
 
Muoghalu, Robison and Glascock (1990): positive relationship101 
 
Muoghalu et al. examined the impact that hazardous waste mismanagement lawsuits 
were having on stockholder returns. They used the event study methodology with a 
121-day event window on 128 lawsuits against firms in the United States between 
1977 and 1986, and found that the filing of such lawsuits resulted in significant 
abnormal losses for the firms concerned. The adjustment in stock price was 
interpreted to reflect changes in the present value of expected future earnings, as well 
as penalties imposed by court. The average reduction in a firm's market value due to a 
hazardous waste mismanagement lawsuit was 1.2 per cent. 
 
Cormier, Magnan and Morard (1993): positive relationship102 
 
Cormier et al. studied the relationship between the pollution record and market 
valuation of 74 publicly listed Canadian industrial and mining firms in 1986-1988. 
They measured a firm's pollution record as effluent discharges relative to 
environmental regulations, and inserted this pollution index into regression equations 
based on the accounting identity framework (equity equals assets less liabilities).  
 
The results of Cormier et al. lent weak support to the existence of a premium in the 
stock market for firms that meet environmental regulations and a discount for firms 
that do not. This was both because investors assessed bad environmental performance 
to incur future liabilities for a firm, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, because ethical 
investors bid up the share price for firms with good environmental performance. 
Cormier et al. concluded that environmental performance had a multi-dimensional 
impact on stock prices through multiple factors. 
 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994): positive relationship103 
 
Blacconiere and Patten set out to analyse the market reaction that Union Carbide's 
chemical leak in Bhopal in 1984 had on other firms in the chemical industry. Using  
                                                 
101  Muoghalu, M I, Robison, H D & Glascock, J L. 1990. Hazardous waste lawsuits, 
stockholder returns, and deterrence. Southern Economic Journal, volume 57, 2. Pages 357-
370. 
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the event study methodology with a 5-day event window, they found that there was a 
significant negative overall reaction on a sample of 47 firms. However, this reaction 
was less negative in firms that had, prior to the accident, disclosed extensive 
environmental information in their financial reports. Blacconiere and Patten took this 
as an indication that because managers have incentives to withhold "bad news", such 
disclosures were a positive sign for investors about the firm's exposure to 
environmental risk and regulatory costs. They could not, though, rule out the 
possibility that the measure for the extensiveness of environmental disclosures was 
proxying for some other, unidentified variable. 
 
Laplante and Lanoie (1994): positive, negative, or no relationship depending on the 
environmental event104 
 
Laplante and Lanoie studied, with the event study methodology, the impact of news of 
47 environment-related events on the equity value of Canadian firms between 1982 
and 1991. They found that announcements of investments in pollution control 
equipment were followed by a negative stock market reaction (about 1.2 per cent). 
There was also a negative stock market reaction to announcements of suit settlements 
resulting in fines (about 2.0 per cent). However, the effects were temporary and could 
be observed on the day of the announcement only. No market reaction was found 
relating to environmental lawsuits, non-compliance, or spills. Based on these results, 
Laplante and Lanoie felt they could not conclude that the market had the power to 
discipline firms not complying with environmental regulations. 
 
Diltz  (1995): positive relationship105 
 
In order to determine whether ethical screening affected portfolio performance, Diltz 
studied 28 common stock portfolios, covering 159 firms, over three years (1989-
1991). He compared estimated market model alphas as well as excess returns for 
fourteen portfolio pairs of high and low performers. Diltz found that although in 
general there was little impact, the market appeared to reward good environmental 
performance. The environmental performance measure was based on a Council on 
Economic Priorities (CEP) rating.  
 
Hamilton (1995): positive relationship106 
 
Hamilton set out to examine stock market reactions to the release of pollution figures. 
Using the event study methodology and a sample of 436 firms, he found that firms 
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reporting Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) pollution figures experienced negative 
abnormal returns when the information was first released, especially if the TRI 
information diverged negatively from the market's previous perceptions of pollution 
patterns.  
 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996): positive relationship107 
 
Again using the event study methodology, Klassen and McLaughlin examined 
whether environmental performance was related to a firm's stock market valuation. 
They identified strong environmental performance through environmental awards and 
weak environmental performance through environmental accidents and crises, 
mentioned in a database of newswire services. The resulting sample consisted of 140 
environmental awards to 96 firms and 22 environmental crises of 16 firms. 
 
The findings were that environmental awards resulted in positive returns on the stock 
market, and environmental crises resulted in even larger negative returns within a 3-
day event period. There was also an industry difference in the market reaction: in 
"dirty" industries the positive reaction to environmental awards was smaller. Klassen 
and McLaughlin considered that this might be due to market scepticism. Against their 
hypothesis, no change in the market's reaction to positive environmental events could 
be observed over time. 
 
Feldman, Soyka and Ameer (1996): positive relationship108 
 
Feldman, Soyka and Ameer hypothesised that good environmental management 
systems and environmental performance lead to reduced risk, which in turn is valued 
by financial markets. The link between the environmental indicators and risk goes 
through environmental signalling. Such signalling can be unmanaged, like regulatory 
compliance reporting and media coverage, or managed, like press releases, 
advertisements, corporate environmental reports, and industry codes of conduct. 
 
Feldman et al. used the change in a firm's systematic risk as the dependent variable 
that they regressed against financial and environmental variables. The two 
environmental variables were environmental performance and environmental 
management systems. Environmental performance was measured as the average 
annual change in toxic releases per capital. The environmental management systems 
were measured using a proprietary, qualitative rating system based on the firms' 
public environmental communications. The financial variables were intended to 
capture non-environmental factors affecting a firm's systematic risk. They included, 
for example, measures of financial and operating leverage and variability in operating 
income and productivity. 
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Feldman et al. found both environmental management system and environmental 
performance to be significantly and inversely related to firm risk. They considered the 
findings to suggest that an increase of up to five per cent in stock price was obtainable 
to firms from improved environmental performance, in addition to the environmental 
benefits and potential cost savings. Thus, firms could increase shareholder value by 
going beyond regulatory compliance.  
 
Note that as the model was proprietary, the rating system for one of the key variables, 
environmental management systems, was not reported. The regression coefficients 
were also not reported for the same reason. Hence, it is not possible to evaluate the 
study by Feldman et al.  
 
Niskanen and Halme (1997): negative relationship109 
 
Niskanen and Halme examined market reactions to print media news of 64 
environmental investments that had been implemented by 10 listed Finnish forest 
industry firms during 1970-1996. Using the event study methodology with a 21-day 
event window and regression analysis, Niskanen and Halme found that the firms' 
shareholders experienced abnormal losses around the date of publication of the 
investment news. Thus, environmental investments were "bad news for the capital 
market". Contrary to expectations, the effect was even more pronounced during 1987-
1996 than it had been during 1970-1986. The authors further found that unknown 
firm-specific factors were involved that caused the stock market effect to vary 
between firms. The effect did not, however, vary between mandatory and voluntary 
environmental investments. 
 
Lanoie, Laplante and Roy (1998): no relationship110 
 
The Ministry of the Environment of British Columbia in Canada regularly publishes a 
list of firms that are not complying with the environmental regulations, or that are 
otherwise of concern to the Ministry because of their high levels of pollution. Lanoie 
et al. examined whether appearing on such lists had an effect on firms' equity values. 
Their sample consisted of 19 firms in total and they used a single-index market model 
version of the event study methodology. Lanoie et al. found that appearing on the 
Ministry's list affected the equity values of neither non-complying firms nor firms that 
were "of concern". To explain this result, Lanoie et al. suggested that the list may not 
provide unexpected information to investors, or that the listing may not be perceived 
by investors to present a significant threat to the firms. 
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Khanna and Damon (1999): positive relationship with stock market measure, 
negative relationship with accounting measure111 
 
Khanna and Damon examined the impact that participation in the 33/50 programme 
had on firms' short-term and long-term economic performance. The 33/50 programme 
is a voluntary initiative by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to reduce the 
release and transfer of 17 high priority toxic chemicals by 33 per cent from 1988 
levels by 1992 and by 50 per cent by 1995.  
 
Khanna and Damon argued that short-term and long-term economic impacts on firms 
were likely to differ since the costs of participation were likely to be incurred in the 
short term but the benefits only in the long run. They used an accounting-based 
measure, current return on investment (ROI), to measure short-term economic 
performance. Long-term economic performance was measured through a market-
based measure, EV/S, which is defined as the excess of market value over the book 
value of assets, normalised by sales. Using regression analysis and a panel data set for 
123 firms over the years 1988-1993, and after controlling for firm-specific factors, 
Khanna and Damon found that participation in the voluntary 33/50 programme had a 
negative impact on ROI (1.2 per cent on the average) but a positive impact on EV/S 
(2.2 per cent on the average).  They interpreted this finding to suggest that 
participation in the 33/50 programme imposed costs that were not fully offset in the 
current period, but that investors expected those costs to be offset over the longer 
term. 
 
3.2.3 Other cross-sectional studies 
 
Various other methods have been employed to examine the link between firms' 
environmental and economic performance or parts thereof. The approach in these 
studies to the topic area of the present study is less direct, but the same basic issue can 
be identified. These studies are also ambivalent in their results, but compared to the 
accounting and stock market studies they show much more variation in the 
relationship. 
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Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1993): negative relationship, but with large 
variation 112  
 
Färe et al. developed an analytical framework for calculating plant-specific shadow 
prices for pollutants. Such shadow prices reflect the opportunity cost of pollution 
abatement and hence the impact of pollution control regulations faced by the firms. 
Applying this framework to a sample of 30 pulp and paper mills operating in 
Michigan and Wisconsin in 1976, Färe et al. found that the shadow prices for 
pollutants were negative, reflecting forgone output and thus revenue. However, there 
was large variation in the shadow prices both by production process and by mill. Färe 
et al. interpreted this to suggest that environmental regulations did not result in an 
efficient allocation of pollution control resources. 
 
Brännlund, Färe and Grosskopf (1995): no relationship for most firms, but significant 
variation113 
 
The aim of Brännlund et al. was to analyse the impact that mill-specific 
environmental regulations were having on profits in the Swedish pulp and paper 
industry. They used a panel data set for 41 Swedish pulp and paper mills in 1989-
1990 that contained annual data on inputs, production, emissions, input and output 
prices, and environmental regulations. As no data on investment in abatement capital 
were available, the authors viewed the model as a short-run model with fixed capital. 
 
Using a non-parametric programming model of the technology Brännlund et al. 
calculated both the regulated and unregulated short-term profits for firms. A profit 
ratio was calculated as the share of regulated profits in unregulated profits to measure 
the regulatory "cost", that is, forgone profits due to environmental regulations.  
 
Brännlund et al. found that the impact of environmental regulations on profitability 
varied substantially between mills. As expected by the researchers, some firms did 
encounter a loss in profits. However, for 66 per cent of the firms in 1989 and 88 per 
cent in 1990, profit was unaffected by environmental regulations. Overall, the profit 
ratios increased between 1989 and 1990 in all processing categories, suggesting that 
the regulations had become less strict. Technological development, together with the 
fact that almost all firms studied had an unchanged permit level between 1989-1990, 
was offered as an explanation for this. 
 
Firm size and processing category were found to have an impact on the profit ratio. 
The profit of small firms was less affected by environmental regulations than that of 
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large firms. Integrated mills and mills producing unbleached sulphate pulp were less 
affected than other processing categories. 
 
Based on their findings the authors concluded that the prevailing regulation scheme 
may be ineffective. However, two qualifications were made. First, weak disposability 
of pollution was imposed in the model. This means that a firm cannot reduce pollution 
freely but only if some of the desirable output is also given up. The possibility of win-
win situations could thus not be tested as those situations were ruled out from the 
model altogether. 
 
Second, environmental regulations were expressed as absolute limits and firms 
polluting below the permitted level were considered in the model to be unconstrained 
by environmental regulations. However, the regulations may be affecting the firm 
even in such a case. This is because if there are random fluctuations in the production 
of pollution, and if a firm decides not to violate the permit by a certain probability, it 
must on the average pollute less than permitted.  
 
Arora and Cason (1995): variation in the relationship114 
 
Arora and Cason studied the factors that lead firms to participate in the 33/50 
programme. They theorised that a firm joins the 33/50 programme if its expected 
profit with participation is larger than expected profit without participation. From this 
basic tenet they developed the hypotheses that industrial sector, firm size, financial 
health and profitability, industry concentration, research and development intensity, 
consumer contact, and releases of the 17 toxic chemicals covered by the 33/50 
programme affect the participation decision. 
 
Arora and Cason studied 302 large publicly traded firms in seven industrial sectors 
and found that the most likely participants in the 33/50 programme were large firms 
with substantial chemical releases. Moreover, participation in the programme was 
highest in unconcentrated industries. Note that the dependent variable was whether 
firms announced to participate in the voluntary programme, not actual emission 
reductions. Since there are no enforcement sanctions in the 33/50 programme, the 
achievement of reductions may not automatically follow from participation.  
 
Arora and Cason (1996): variation in the relationship115 
 
In another study similar to Arora and Cason (1995), Arora and Cason expanded their 
sample to 6265 firms. They also studied the interaction between the 33/50 programme 
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and environmental regulations, and focused more on the role of consumer contact in 
the participation decision.  
 
The findings again indicated that the most likely participants in the 33/50 programme 
were large firms with the greatest toxic releases. Participation was higher in industries 
that had greater consumer contact. However, the impact of industry concentration was 
ambiguous.  
 
Hetemäki (1996): positive relationship in some cases, negative in others116  
 
Hetemäki used output distance functions and a plant level panel data set of eight 
Finnish sulphate pulp plants between 1972-1990 to examine the impact that water 
pollution abatement had on the production of the pulp mills. He separated the analysis 
of an unregulated pollution output, namely total wastewater flow, and regulated 
pollution outputs, namely biological oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended 
solids (TSS). 
 
Hetemäki calculated the shadow prices of pollution that represent costs of pollution 
abatement to the mills. He found that the shadow price for total wastewater flow was 
positive, indicating that reductions in total wastewater flow had brought cost savings 
to the mills through improved efficiency. The shadow price for biological oxygen 
demand was less clear as the findings showed to be dependent on model 
specifications. However, with most specifications the shadow price was negative, 
implying that reductions in biological oxygen demand of the effluents had resulted in 
forgone profit.  
 
Hetemäki attributed these findings to the fact that total wastewater flow was abated 
through pollution prevention methods, whereas biological oxygen demand was mainly 
addressed with end-of-pipe methods. However, another explanation might be that the 
reductions in the total wastewater flow were voluntary – thus, firms only implemented 
such reductions in cases where economic gains were in sight. 
 
On the efficiency impacts of environmental regulations, Hetemäki found that an 
increase in environmental regulation led to a decrease in production efficiency. 
Hetemäki interpreted this finding as evidence against the central argument of the 
Porter hypothesis that properly designed environmental regulations can trigger 
efficiency gains in the regulated firms.117 Note, however, that the regulations involved 
may not have been "properly designed" in Porter's sense.  
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Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997): negative relationship118 
 
Cordeiro and Sarkis argued that both accounting and stock market data were 
unsatisfactory measures of economic performance and used industry analyst 1- and 5-
year earnings per share performance forecasts instead. Environmental performance 
was measured with data from the Toxics Release Inventory: the difference of total 
waste generated and total releases, standardised by firm sales. This measure was 
designed to capture proactive treatment and recycling. Controlling for firm size, 
leverage, and industry, Cordeiro and Sarkis found a negative relationship between 
environmental performance and economic performance for a sample of 523 U.S. firms 
in 1992. 
 
Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler (2000): variation in the relationship119 
 
Dasgupta et al. hypothesised that the cost-minimising level of emissions for a plant 
was determined by the abatement costs, and by the penalty from pollution that could 
be expected from regulatory authorities, local communities, and market agents. These, 
in turn, were determined by plant or firm characteristics, informal regulation or 
community pressure, and environmental management practices. 
 
Using survey data from 236 Mexican facilities in the food, chemicals, nonmetallic 
minerals, and metal industries, Dasgupta et al. found that significant determinants of 
cost-minimising emissions and, hence, compliance included the adoption of 
environmental management systems; the selected environmental management strategy 
(mainstreaming vs. specialisation); the amount of regulatory pressure through 
inspections; exposure to public scrutiny through stock market presence; plant size; 
being part of a multiplant company; and workforce education. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, technology vintage was found to have no effect on compliance. 
 
Christmann (2000): variation in the relationship120 
 
Christmann analysed how factors that are internal to the firm affect the relationship 
between environmental and economic performance. She hypothesised that 
implementing "best practices" of environmental management might not create 
competitive advantage for all firms, only for firms with resources and capabilities that 
enable them to capitalise on such best practices.  
 
                                                 
118  Cordeiro, J J & Sarkis, J. 1997. Environmental proactivism and firm performance: 
evidence from security analyst earnings forecasts. Business Strategy and the Environment, 
volume 6. Pages 104-114. 
119  Dasgupta, S, Hettige, H & Wheeler, D. 2000. What improves environmental compliance? 
Evidence from Mexican industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
39. Pages 39-66. 
120  Christmann, P. 2000. Effects of "best practices" of environmental management on cost 
advantage: The role of complementary assets. Academy of Management Journal, August, 
forthcoming.  
 49
Using data from a mail questionnaire survey of 88 business units in the chemical 
industry in the United States, Christmann found that capabilities for process 
innovation and implementation were complementary assets that moderated the 
relationship between environmental "best practices" and cost advantage. Proactive 
environmental measures such as implementation of pollution prevention and early 
timing of environmental strategies brought cost advantage to firms that possessed 
capabilities for process innovation and implementation, not to all firms on the 
average. Christmann concluded that the findings highlighted the importance of firm 
heterogeneity. 
 
3.2.4 Case studies 
 
Besides large-scale quantitative studies, the relationship between firms' environmental 
and economic performance has invited a considerable number of case studies. The 
most often quoted case is perhaps that of 3M and its Pollution Prevention Pays 
programme. Between 1975 and 1990, 3M are reported to have reduced their total 
emissions by 50 per cent while simultaneously saving over $500 million through 
lower raw material, compliance, disposal, and liability costs.121 
 
Several similar examples appear in the literature. For instance, Schmidheiny (1992) 
describes 38 cases that illustrate how firms have achieved commercial success while 
improving their environmental performance.122 Porter and van der Linde (1995a) 
support their argument of a positive link between environmental and economic 
performance with the help of a series of case studies from six industries that are 
significantly affected by environmental regulations.123  
 
These and the many other cases reported will not be reviewed in detail. Suffice it to 
note what they prove: that it has been possible, at least in some cases, for firms to 
obtain economic benefits from improved environmental performance. However, the 
case-study evidence remains anecdotal in the sense that a systematic approach to 
examining how generalisable the findings are has been lacking. It is typical that only 
successful cases are reported – never those with no impacts and very seldom cases 
with negative economic impacts. A rare exception of the latter kind is the StarKist 
case reported by Reinhardt (1998).124 
 
                                                 
121  Hart, S L & Ahuja, G. 1996. Does it pay to be green? An empirical examination of the 
relationship between emission reduction and firm performance. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, volume 5. Pages 30-37. 
122  Schmidheiny, S. 1992. Changing course. A global business perspective on development 
and the environment. Cambridge, MIT Press. 374 pages. 
123  Porter, M E & van der Linde, C. 1995a. Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. 
Harvard Business Review, September-October. Pages 120-134. 
124  Reinhardt, F L. 1998. Environmental product differentiation: implications for corporate 
strategy. California Management Review, volume 40, 4. Pages 43-73. 
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3.2.5 Macro-level studies 
 
Much of the empirical research on the economic impacts of environmental 
performance has been undertaken not at the firm level, but at the country or industry 
level. These studies have typically focused on environmental regulation instead of 
environmental performance, and analysed its impacts on economic growth, 
productivity, trade flows, and investment flows.  
 
Fundamentally, these macro-level studies address the same issue as does the present 
study. The often-quoted conclusion from the review by Jaffe et al. (1995) is that the 
studies "have produced estimates that are either small, statistically insignificant, or not 
robust to tests of model specification".125 However, the higher aggregation level may 
mask important differences between firms or industries in the relationship. Aggregate 
results are of limited value from an environmental strategy viewpoint since firms do 
not operate "on the average" or "in most industries", but in specific individual 
circumstances. Thus, the results are of minor importance for the present study. The 
methods employed by most of the macro-level studies are also not applicable in the 
present study. For these reasons, the macro-level studies are excluded from a detailed 
review. For other reviews, see, for example, Dean (1992)126, Cropper and Oates 
(1992)127, or Jaffe et al. (1995).128 
 
3.3 Discussion on previous knowledge 
3.3.1 Theoretical links 
 
Two different views in theoretical literature were reviewed: one according to which 
there is a negative link between environmental performance and economic 
performance, and one according to which the link is a positive one. Another 
distinction that can be made in the theoretical literature is between economics and 
management literature. Broadly speaking, economics literature tends to support the 
negative view and management literature tends to support the positive view. The 
emerging literature on vertical product differentiation in an environmental context, 
also reviewed in the chapter, is beginning to point to the direction that not all firms 
                                                 
125  Jaffe, A B, Peterson, S R, Portney, P R & Stavins, R N. 1995. Environmental regulation 
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Economic Literature, volume 30, June. Pages 675-740. 
128  Jaffe, A B, Peterson, S R, Portney, P R & Stavins, R N. 1995. Environmental regulation 
and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: What does the evidence tell us? Journal of 
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may experience the relationship between environmental and economic performance in 
a similar manner. 
 
Four major problem areas can be identified in past theoretical knowledge of the 
relationship between firms' environmental and economic performance. First, the two 
views disagree fundamentally with each other. If interpreted strictly, the views are not 
compatible. And, even if proponents of the positive view admit that win-win 
situations are not always possible, and vice versa, the two sides still disagree over the 
extent and significance of win-win situations.  
 
Second, the views are not systematically supported by empirical evidence. As was 
seen above, it has not been possible to empirically confirm or reject either of the 
views. This has lead many analysts asking which is wrong: theory or data? 
 
Third, the existing theoretical literature has, in fact, to a large extent grown to address 
the issue of how environmental regulations affect economic performance. It is thus 
not wholly adequate to address the issue of how environmental performance per se 
affects economic performance. Nehrt (1996) notes that when an environmental 
innovation reduces costs or enhances sales, differences in environmental regulations 
between countries become irrelevant.129 Explicit theoretical analysis of the impacts of 
environmental performance per se on economic performance is rare. 
 
Fourth, there are problems within each of the views. The negative view sees 
competitiveness narrowly in terms of cost competitiveness only. It cannot 
accommodate private benefits from environmental differentiation, even though there 
is evidence from practice that obtaining such benefits is possible.  
 
Much of the literature in support of the positive view, on the other hand, lacks 
theoretical rigour. The literature is normative and speculative, contingent on 
significant green consumerism in the future. For example, Shrivastava (1995) notes 
that "if the world economy shifts towards an ecological orientation, it will change the 
competitive landscape of industries in terms of consumer preferences and demands, 
industrial regulations, and competitive opportunities".130 Further, the literature has 
tended to simply extrapolate the benefits obtained from improved environmental 
performance, assuming that further improvements will bring further benefits. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical studies 
 
It is evident from the preceding review of previous empirical studies on the firm-level 
relationship between environmental performance and economic performance that the 
                                                 
129  Nehrt, C. 1996. Timing and intensity effects of environmental investments. Strategic 
Management Journal, volume 17. Pages 535-547. 
130  Shrivastava, P. 1995. Environmental technologies and competitive advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, volume 16. Pages 183-200. Emphasis added. 
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findings have not converged. What may, at best, be concluded from the existing 
empirical studies is that at present levels of environmental performance, on the 
average, there has not appeared to be a significant systematic uniform link between 
environmental performance and economic performance.  Because of the many 
disclaimers required, such a conclusion provides inadequate guidance for competitive 
strategy or environmental policy. In 1985, Ullman characterised the situation 
concerning the relationships between social performance, social disclosure, and 
economic performance as "empirical data in search of an adequate theory".131 The 
same could be said about firms' environmental performance and economic 
performance fifteen years later.  
 
Several reasons have been offered to explain why there has not been a strong 
systematic relationship between environmental performance and economic 
performance – or, why the relationship has not been borne out by empirical data, even 
if it exists.  
 
One such reason is the small size of environmental costs. Environmental costs have 
constituted such a minor share in production costs (perhaps 1-2.5 per cent of total 
costs in most industries132) that their impact on economic performance has been 
negligible. Other issues have been more important in determining economic 
performance. Thus, even if there in principle were a link between environmental and 
economic performance, its magnitude is so small that it is difficult to observe 
empirically. This, however, is not necessarily true for all industries and all firms. 
Also, if competition is fiercer in the future, smaller and smaller cost impacts may 
begin to matter.133  
 
An explanation for the relatively low environmental costs may be that firms have been 
situated on the flat portion of their marginal abatement cost curves.134 If 
environmental performance is further improved in the future, the costs may rise, 
perhaps steeply, and the economic impacts become more pronounced. The result may, 
therefore, not hold for future levels of environmental performance. Since full 
environmental cost internalisation has not taken place, its economic impacts cannot 
have been empirically studied. Knowledge of the relationship at past levels of 
environmental performance cannot automatically be extrapolated to future levels of 
environmental performance. For example, Hart and Ahuja (1996) qualify their results 
by noting that their data originate from a time when important industries had not yet 
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Economic Literature, volume 30, June. Pages 675-740. 
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implemented large-scale environmental improvements.135 The only way to gain some 
insight into possible future impacts is to understand the underlying mechanism that 
may link environmental and economic performance at the firm level. 
 
Further, the differential between the environmental costs of competitors has (again, on 
the average) been small as environmental regulations have moved roughly in tandem 
in many OECD countries.136 This can, indeed, limit the economic impacts of improved 
environmental performance between competing producers of the same product, but 
not necessarily between competing substitutes.137 
 
In fact, it should not come as a surprise that large-scale economic impacts of 
environmental policies have not been observed. The timing and content of 
environmental policies are often designed so as to minimise adverse effects on 
economic performance in the first place.138 The very purpose of effective 
environmental policies is to affect production and consumption patterns by promoting 
sustainable and discouraging unsustainable economic activities. While such changes 
promote overall economic efficiency, their distributional and transitional effects raise 
political concerns. As a result, the effects of environmental policies may not 
materialise as measurable economic impacts but as downward pressure on 
environmental regulations. This "chilling effect" is hard to measure.139  
 
Offsetting effects may also have masked the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance. Such offsetting effects may include pollution abatement 
subsidies and trade protection of polluting industries.140 Long (1995) notes that 
exemptions, subsidies, rebates, or time differentials are granted precisely to minimise 
adverse economic effects of environmental policies.141 
 
Finally, there are many data and methodological problems in attempting to study the 
relationship between firms' environmental and economic performance. Ullman (1985) 
attributed inconsistencies in results concerning general corporate social responsibility 
and economic performance to lack of theory, inappropriate definition of key terms, 
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and deficiencies in the available empirical databases.142 On the same subject, Aupperle 
et al. (1985) found the following weaknesses: lack of valid measures of performance, 
no testing of significance, no adjustment for risk, small samples, subjectively selected 
and biased samples, short time period, and failure to identify curvilinear 
relationships.143 All these problems can also be identified in studies on environmental 
and economic performance. The remainder of this section will take a critical look at 
data and methodology issues in the reviewed studies.  
 
There has been some discussion on whether accounting or stock market data should 
be used to measure economic performance, and which particular indicators within 
each type ought to be employed. This is such an important issue that it was used as the 
basis of dividing the cross-sectional empirical studies in the present review to 
accounting-based, stock-market-based, and other studies. 
 
Davidson and Worrell (1990) contend that accounting measures are inappropriate in 
large cross-sectional comparisons that relate corporate social responsibility and 
financial performance across industries and across time. They note that, first, there are 
general problems with accounting data that relate to industry and regulatory 
differences, accounting and demographic differences, risk, leverage, inflation, and 
timing. Second, particular accounting measures of economic performance also carry 
with them specific problems. For example, net income is not comparable between 
firms, and return on equity is highly sensitive to debt usage. Thus, studies using 
accounting data should control at least for industry, leverage and risk. Studies based 
on stock market data need to control only for risk.144  
 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) note that accounting measures tap only 
historical performance, are subject to manipulation allowed by different accounting 
procedures, and would need to be adjusted for risk, industry, and other characteristics. 
Stock-market-based measures, on the other hand, reflect a firm's expected future 
economic performance, and are less susceptible to manipulation.145 According to 
Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997), accounting measures are retrospective, noisy, 
unidimensional, easily manipulated, ignorant of risk-taking differences, and 
imperfectly comparable because of idiosyncratic industry- and country-specific 
practices. However, stock-market-based measures are also noisy, and suffer from an 
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information asymmetry between managers and stockholders.146 Stock market data, 
obviously, are available only for listed firms. 
 
Accounting data are unable to consider long-term impacts, but stock market data in 
principle reflect the present value of all future costs and revenues. This may be one 
reason why the studies based on stock market data tend to be more positive on the 
relationship between firms' environmental and economic performance. To a large 
extent, benefits are expected to arise from future customer requirements and from 
reductions in future liabilities, which are not yet reflected in accounting figures. 
 
The present study argues that it is not appropriate to directly relate environmental 
performance to either accounting performance or stock market performance. Both 
types of studies suffer from a fundamental problem that is illustrated in Figure 6. 
What the studies ought to measure is the relationship (a): the link between 
environmental performance and environmental profit. Schaltegger and Figge (1998) 
refer to this very point when they note that environment-oriented business analysis 
cannot explain the overall commercial success of a firm; it can only analyse whether 
the firm's environmental performance has the general effect of increasing or reducing 
enterprise value.147 
 
However, in all studies that directly correlate environmental performance with 
economic performance – regardless of whether economic performance is measured 
through accounting or stock data – the dependent variable is not environmental profit 
but profit. The basic point remains the same even if profit is replaced by some other 
indicator. Instead of link (a), the studies examine link (b). Stock market studies based 
on the event study methodology avoid this particular problem but suffer from other 
problems as will be discussed later. 
 
The implication of this is that the problem of confounders becomes serious. Because 
economic performance is a multicausal issue, the causal effect of any one factor 
cannot be that great. Moreover, it seems reasonable to believe that, at least in many 
cases, the magnitude of the non-environmental costs and benefits surpasses that of 
environmental costs and benefits. The contribution of environmental profit to overall 
profit is thus likely to get lost in the noise of all the other factors affecting profit. To 
get to the impact of environmental performance on economic performance, one 
should control for the effects that private non-environmental costs and benefits have 
on profit. However, in many of the studies, especially the earlier ones, little or no 
attempts were made to this end. It is very difficult to control for all the non-
environmental factors affecting economic performance – in fact, the task is impossible 
because the determinants of economic performance are not exhaustively known. 
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Figure 6 Links addressed in empirical studies on environmental and economic 
performance. Instead of link (a), many studies address links (b) or (c) 
 
Furthermore, many of the studies contain conscious or subconscious assumptions with 
the consequence that environmental costs become a proxy for environmental 
performance and the studied relationship is in fact link (c) in Figure 6. Sometimes 
environmental performance is measured through cost-based measures. Often, 
potential private benefits from environmental performance are ignored. Occasionally, 
there are explicit assumptions that by definition rule out some or all win-win 
possibilities. For example, in Sjöblom's (1994) data environmental investments were 
defined to be such that they do not fulfil general economic investment criteria.148 
Brännlund et al. (1995) imposed weak disposability of pollution, thus effectively 
assuming negative impacts.149 Since Hetemäki (1996) did not a priori restrict shadow 
prices to be negative as was done in previous similar studies, he allowed for win-win 
situations resulting from cost savings in his model. However, potential benefits arising 
from customer preferences for environmentally friendly products were still not 
included in his model.150 
 
As noted, a stock-market-based study utilising the event study methodology can help 
overcome the problem of confounders. If the event window is short and other 
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simultaneous events are ruled out, the impact of environmental performance on 
economic performance can be isolated and the relationship (a) in Figure 6 seized. But, 
since the use of the event study methodology requires that a single event can be 
identified, and since only new information will be reflected in share prices, its 
applicability to measuring the impacts of regular day-to-day activities may be 
reduced.151 For example, Konar and Cohen found that firms experiencing the largest 
stock price impacts upon the release of pollution information were not necessarily 
those with the highest quantities of pollutant emissions, because the market was 
already aware of the level of pollution of the largest emitters.152 Cormier et al. (1993) 
criticise event studies on the basis that much of the environmental information may 
reach the markets before formal announcements, which makes establishing an event 
date speculative. And, the short-term shifts in share values revealed by event studies 
do not necessarily imply the existence of a long-term impact.153 
 
Moreover, the event study methodology is based on the efficient market hypothesis. If 
this hypothesis holds, stock prices represent the present value of future cash flows, 
and thus measure the economic performance of a firm. However, if the hypothesis 
does not hold – for example, if the stocks do not trade frequently enough – stock 
prices rather represent investors' perception of future stock price development, which 
may or may not correctly reflect the economic performance of a firm. Davidson and 
Worrell (1990) note that it is possible that customers and investors react to different 
stimuli.154 Then, a perception that good environmental performance positively affects 
share price can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If, for any reason, a 
widespread belief emerges among investors that environmental performance and stock 
market performance are positively related, news of good environmental performance 
will translate into a higher share price. If this is the case, the only fact proven by 
studies relating environmental performance to increased share price is that investors 
believe there to be a positive relationship. Kvale (1996) has noted that according to 
the Thomas theorem, even empirically false beliefs may have real social 
consequences.155 
 
If the measurement of economic performance is not straightforward, neither is the 
measurement of environmental performance. The two most common ways of 
measuring environmental performance in the reviewed studies are based on emissions 
data from the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), and some kind of third-party 
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environmental rating, usually that of the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) that 
has been available on certain U.S. firms.  
 
Measuring environmental performance through TRI emission data can be considered 
to give a correct, albeit limited picture of the true physical impact of a firm on the 
natural environment. However, all of the studies using TRI data commit the crucial 
flaw of simply summing up various emissions by weight, even though the toxicity and 
the volumes of the emissions differ widely. This is perhaps done because no 
established valuation method for the different environmental impacts exists. But, as 
Helminen (1998) notes, "it must be recognised that also a decision not to value 
chemicals with strikingly different properties is indeed valuation."156 
 
Reputation indices or environmental ratings risk being subjective. They also are often 
proprietary and thus hard to evaluate. Some other ways of measuring environmental 
performance, such as reductions in emissions, environmental costs, and environmental 
disclosures, were already critically discussed in section 2.1. 
 
Selecting the appropriate research unit is also not simple in studies relating 
environmental and economic performance. The analysis is complicated by the fact 
that legal, physical, and economic entities are often different. Environmental 
performance data are usually available on physical entities, such as plants. It would be 
better not to aggregate environmental performance data across physical entities unless 
the scope of the environmental problem – local, regional, or global – matches the 
scope of the aggregation. Depending on the country and issue, environmental 
regulations may also be issued at the plant level.  
 
Economic performance data, by contrast, are usually available on economic entities 
and reported on legal entities. More often than not, these are different from the 
physical entities. Plant-level economic performance data would match the 
environmental performance data best, but are seldom available. Company-level 
economic performance data may be unreliable because corporations may influence 
them, for example, for taxation reasons, or because the financial health of the parent 
corporation may affect environmental performance investments in individual 
companies. Corporate-level economic performance data, on the other hand, are 
problematic because a large share of the economic performance may relate to non-
polluting activities, or foreign units whose environmental performance is unknown. 
 
The questions of sample size and sample selection arise with many studies. The early 
studies were based on very small samples. Moreover, the case studies suffer from a 
self-selection bias. Cases abound of firms who voluntarily undertook environmental 
performance improvements that turned out to be profitable. However, if only 
expectedly profitable activities are voluntarily undertaken, the selection is biased. 
Palmer et al. (1995) argue that it would be easy to assemble a matching list of case 
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studies where costs were increased and profits were reduced because of environmental 
improvements.157 Walley and Whitehead (1994) point out that firms, eager to 
demonstrate their commitment to environmental protection, have been active in 
making the success stories known.158 It is also worth noting that most of the previous 
studies include only large firms in their samples, and the stock-market-based studies, 
necessarily, cover only listed companies. 
 
Causality considerations would also deserve more attention. Alternative explanations, 
like reversed causation, reciprocal causation, or causation by a third factor have not 
always been ruled out. For example, not all studies have included the possibility of a 
feedback link from economic performance to environmental performance. Christmann 
(2000) notes that causality cannot be established on the basis of the case studies since 
their sampling does not vary on the dependent variable.159 
 
It is usually considered that cause must precede effect in time. However, the direction 
of causation may not be definitely proven even if one measures subsequent instead of 
prior or concurrent profitability. This is because knowledge of the cause can precede 
the effect in time even if the actual cause does not. In other words, a firm may have 
knowledge of good economic prospects for the next couple of years, which may 
encourage it to undertake certain environmental performance improvements. 
 
When environmental performance activities are undertaken, adaptation at the firm 
level occurs to soften the eventual adverse economic impacts. Thus, the studies show 
before-after comparisons and not with-without comparisons: opportunity costs are not 
taken into account. This criticism is often directed at case studies. For instance, 
Palmer et al. (1995) note that even if investment in environmental performance paid 
for itself, opportunity costs of forgone return are still there, because the money could 
have been spent somewhere else with a 20 per cent return rate.160 However, this 
problem can hardly be overcome since the impacts cannot be observed ceteris paribus. 
 
One significant aspect that has received scant attention in previous empirical studies is 
the possible non-uniformity of the relationship between environmental and economic 
performance. If there are factors affecting the relationship, it is possible that certain 
findings hold only for a subgroup of the sample but are cancelled out in the total 
sample. Studying aggregate samples would in such cases lose information. Already in 
1978, Ingram found that whether firms' social responsibility disclosures had a market 
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160  Palmer, K, Oates, W E & Portney, P R. 1995. Tightening environmental standards: the 
benefit-cost or the no-cost paradigm? Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. 
Pages 119-132. 
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impact was conditional on the market segment. Thus, Ingram noted, rather than 
conduct studies on a general cross-section of firms, it was important to analyse the 
impacts on market segments or segments identified by firm-specific characteristics.161  
 
Nevertheless, empirical research on firms' environmental and economic performance 
has allowed little scope for the possible non-uniformity of the link to emerge. Some 
potential factors affecting the relationship have been explicitly proposed; several 
others can be inferred from the literature. The most common ones are industry and 
firm size, but others include firm and industry growth rate, environmental 
performance, economic performance, environmental issue, abatement method, plant 
vintage, consumer contact, capital intensity, industry concentration, production 
process, R&D intensity, and social pressure. However, the approach has been 
fragmented and unsystematic, and in very few cases the factors affecting the 
relationship have been the actual focus of investigation. Studies classified under 
"other quantitative studies" in the present review have paid the most attention to the 
possible non-uniformity of the link, and they have also tended to find variation in the 
relationship between firms' environmental and economic performance. 
 
Finally, methodologies that are based on discovering linear relationships may not be 
suitable if the relationship is in fact curvilinear in its form. 
 
In sum, general methodological sophistication has increased dramatically over the 
many years that the firm-level relationship between environmental and economic 
performance has been investigated. Yet, several problems remain that decrease the 
confidence with which the results of previous empirical studies can be viewed. 
 
3.3.3 Gaps and expected contribution 
 
Building on previous literature, the present study attempts to fill certain gaps and pay 
special attention to some problems that have emerged.  
 
On the theoretical side, a systematic and consistent theoretical model is lacking that is 
able to accommodate the arguments of both sides as well as the conflicting empirical 
evidence. The model should also be explicitly developed to address the firm-level 
relationship between environmental performance, instead of environmental 
regulations, and economic performance. To accomplish this, the following extensions 
are made to previous theory: 
 
- The traditional neoclassical framework needs to be extended to take into account 
the possibility of private market benefits to firms from environmental 
performance. 
 
                                                 
161  Ingram, R W. 1978. An investigation of the information content of (certain) social 
responsibility disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, volume 16, 2. Pages 270-285. 
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- The Porterian framework needs to be extended to take into account that the 
relationship may not be constant across environmental performance levels, which 
means that it should be considered a function of environmental performance. 
 
- The Porterian framework also needs to be extended to take into account that the 
relationship may not be uniform across cases, wherefore a systematic analysis of 
the conditions on which the relationship may depend is required. Such work is 
only now starting to emerge, exemplified by Reinhardt (1999b).162 
 
On the empirical side, the study attempts to improve upon some of the previous 
studies in a few respects regarding data and methodology. 
 
First, the study allows for possible reciprocal causality between environmental and 
economic performance, possible non-linearity of the relationship, as well as possible 
non-uniformity of the relationship. The latter receives special focus. 
 
Second, even if past correlations between environmental and economic performance 
could be appropriately measured, they are of little value for predicting impacts under 
future circumstances unless there is also some insight into the mechanisms producing 
the correlation. Speaking about social performance and economic performance, 
Ullman (1985) noted that "rather than accumulating studies and trying to control for 
an increasing number of variables, another research direction is advisable … what 
should be looked for is the missing element that, when included in the model, would 
help to explain the varying nature of the relationships … thereby making it possible to 
forecast the circumstances under which correlations and their directions can be 
expected."163 The present study places special emphasis on identifying and 
understanding the mechanisms affecting the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance. 
 
Third, environmental performance is measured through actual physical emission data, 
but these are not aggregated across emissions. Moreover, studies have been consistent 
in showing that regulations are the most important driving force of improved
                                                 
162  Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. 
163  Ullman, A A. 1985. Data in search of a theory: a critical examination of the relationships 
among social performance, social disclosure, and economic performance of U.S. firms. 
Academy of Management Review, volume 10, 3. Pages 540-557. 
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environmental performance.164 The present study is of interest since, through 
overcompliance, it is able to abstract from the impacts of regulation.165 
 
Fourth, impacts of environmental performance on economic performance are 
measured indirectly through overcompliance and management perceptions. The 
measurement relies on observed as opposed to stated behaviour. This approach avoids 
the problems of accounting and stock-market-based studies, and is able to examine 
isolated impacts on environmental profit (link a in Figure 6, above). It is also able to 
take into account both short-term and long-term impacts on economic performance. 
Moreover, since managers have access to more information than investors or analysts, 
problems of information asymmetry are avoided. 
 
Fifth, the sample is inclusive. Both ends of the compliance continuum, non-complying 
and overcomplying plants, are present. The sample includes both listed and unlisted 
companies, and both small and large firms. The panel data set in the statistical module 
is relatively long and wide, with 9 years and 108 plants. Finally, since most of the 
previous studies are based on U.S. data, Finnish data are of interest and new. 
  
Overall, the expected contribution of the present study is to improve both theoretical 
and empirical understanding of the firm-level relationship between environmental and 
economic performance. The three main gaps in the previous knowledge of the subject 
that the present study focuses on are the following: 
 
- The relationship may not be constant across environmental performance levels, 
which means that it needs to be considered a function of environmental 
performance. 
 
- The relationship may not be uniform across cases, which means that the 
determinants of environmental profit need to be identified. 
 
- The relationship may not be static across time, which means that changes in the 
determinants of environmental profit over time need to be discussed. 
 
                                                 
164  See, for example, Baylis, R, Connell, L & Flynn, A. 1998b. Company size, environmental 
regulation and ecological modernization: further analysis at the level of the firm. Business 
Strategy and the Environment, 7. Pages 285-296. 
165  Dasgupta et al. (2000) argue that there must be other abatement incentives than 
conventional enforcement to explain the fact that many plants in developing countries 
comply with environmental regulations even if enforcement is weak or nonexistent. What 
the present study grasps through overcompliance, Dasgupta et al. thus seize through 
focusing on compliance under weak enforcement. Dasgupta, S, Hettige, H & Wheeler, D. 
2000. What improves environmental compliance? Evidence from Mexican industry. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 39. Pages 39-66. 
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4 A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
The preceding literature review pointed out that more attention ought to be paid to the 
possibility that the firm-level relationship between environmental and economic 
performance is not constant across environmental performance levels. For example, 
firms that have derived net economic benefits from improving their environmental 
performance may perhaps not continue to do so up to zero pollution or the socially 
optimal level of pollution.166 Thus, the relationship may change as a function of 
environmental performance. This would explain why fears of future competitiveness 
impacts persist even though firms seem to have largely been able to adapt to the 
present levels of environmental protection.167 Furthermore, the link between 
environmental and economic performance is not likely to be uniform across sectors, 
firms or pollutants, which may partly explain the lack of systematic empirical 
findings.  
 
This chapter develops mathematically an environmental profit curve that represents 
the relationship between environmental performance and economic performance at 
the firm level. The curve is developed by extending the traditional neoclassical 
environmental economics framework to account for environmental private benefits. 
The result is a formal argument that the firm-level relationship between environmental 
performance and economic performance takes the form of an inverted U-shaped 
function of environmental performance. The chapter further shows how changes in 
determinants of environmental profit – either between cases or between time periods – 
are reflected in the environmental profit curve. 
 
Note that throughout the chapter, for simplicity, the graphical presentations are based 
on linear marginal abatement cost and marginal private benefit curves. However, the 
mathematical treatment uses general functional forms. The results thus do not assume 
linearity but hold more generally. The basic points illustrated in the graphical 
presentations are also not changed even if the marginal abatement cost and marginal 
private benefit curves are nonlinear, as they probably are. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
166  Nehrt (1998) notes that this is why one should not expect to find a positive linear 
relationship but indeed an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution reduction and 
cost reduction or sales enhancement. Nehrt, C. 1998. Maintainability of first mover 
advantages when environmental regulations differ between countries. Academy of 
Management Review, volume 23, 1. Pages 77-97. 
167 UNCTAD 1996. The relationship of environmental protection to international 
competitiveness, job creation and development. Background paper No. 21 for the 
Commission on Sustainable Development, Fourth Session, 18 April - 3 May, New York. 
Pages 4-5. 
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4.1 Socially optimal level of environmental performance 
 
First, the standard treatment for determining the socially optimal level of 
environmental performance is presented.168 To improve its environmental 
performance, a firm may invest in pollution abatement technology (the so-called end-
of-pipe solution) or switch to cleaner inputs or processes (so-called pollution 
prevention).169 These alternatives may involve fixed and variable abatement cost 
elements. A firm may also reduce pollution or resource use by reducing output. In this 
case, the cost of the environmental performance improvement is the opportunity cost 
of forgone profits.170 
 
A firm's costs of environmental performance improvements are commonly described 
in terms of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve. It is defined as a measurement 
of the change in economic costs incurred by a firm when improving environmental 
performance using the least-cost method of abatement at some point in time.171 Here it 
is assumed that the costs of output reduction are already incorporated in the MAC 
curve. The shape and position of the MAC curve is source- and pollutant-specific, but 
a typical curve increases with improving environmental performance as in Figure 7. 
According to Cropper and Oates (1992), nearly all cost studies have shown the MAC 
functions to exhibit the typical textbook shape: "They are low and fairly flat over 
some range and then begin to rise, often quite rapidly. Both the first and second 
derivatives of these abatement cost functions are positive – and rapidly increasing 
marginal abatement costs often set in with a vengeance."172  
 
The counterpart of MAC in the establishment of socially optimal environmental 
performance levels is the marginal social benefits (MSB) curve. It measures the 
additional gains to society from improved environmental performance. These gains 
include, for example, improved health and ecological conditions, and typically 
decrease with increasing environmental performance.173 Whereas the regulated firms 
carry the costs of environmental performance improvements, the benefits mostly 
accrue to society at large. Usually the firm directly experiences only part of the social 
benefits of environmental performance improvements, for example, in the form of 
improved worker health or quality of natural inputs. It is just this asymmetry that has 
                                                 
168 See, for example, Baumol, W & Oates, W. 1988. The theory of environmental policy. 
Second edition. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
169  Jorgenson, D & Wilcoxen, P. 1990. Environmental regulation and U.S. economic growth. 
RAND Journal of Economics, volume 21, no. 2. Pages 314-340. 
170  Akashi, K & Yabe, M. 1994. A note on the optimal level of pollution: Integrated approach 
to abatement and output reduction. Research paper No. 12. National Research Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, Tokyo.  
171  Callan, S & Thomas, J. 1996. Environmental economics and management: theory, policy 
and applications. Irwin. Page 112.  
172  Cropper, M L & Oates, W E. 1992. Environmental economics: A survey. Journal of 
Economic Literature, volume 30, June. Pages 675-740. Page 730. 
173  Callan, S & Thomas, J. 1996. Environmental economics and management: theory, policy 
and applications. Irwin. Page 110.  
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resulted in the debate that environmental regulations might harm economic 
performance at the firm level.  
 
Thus, MAC MAC e= ( ) and MSB MSB e= ( ) , where environmental performance 
e ≥ 0 . Recall that environmental performance was defined so that the smaller the 
harmful environmental impact caused by a firm the better the environmental 
performance. The objective function for society is to maximise welfare W, that is, the 
sum of producer and consumer surplus  
 
[ ]MaxW MSB e MAC e de
e
E
{ }
( ) ( )= −∫
0
                (4-1) 
 
The necessary condition for locating the maximum is obtained by setting W '= 0 , that 
is, MSB e MAC e( ) ( )− = 0 .174 Thus, the socially optimal level of the decision variable 
environmental performance, es*, satisfies MSB e MAC es s( *) ( *)= . 
 
The sufficient condition for the maximum is obtained by setting W es' ' ( *) < 0 , that is, 
MSB e MAC es s' ( *) ' ( *)− < 0. Since MSB is a decreasing function of e and MAC is 
an increasing function of e, MSB es' ( *) < 0 and MAC es' ( *) > 0 . The second order 
condition, therefore, holds and es*, where MSB = MAC, is the socially optimal level 
of environmental performance. 
 
Hence, the familiar condition for Pareto-efficiency – a situation where it is impossible 
to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off  – is obtained by 
equating marginal abatement cost with the marginal social benefit from environmental 
performance improvements. This is illustrated in Figure 7 by the intersection T.  
 
The MAC curve was defined through the costs of environmental performance 
improvements using the least-cost method. In other words, the MAC curve organises 
pollution abatement alternatives in the order of increasing costs. It is possible that the 
MAC curve can take negative values in the beginning, as in Figure 7. The 
interpretation for the negative MAC values is that the firm is wasting resources or that 
the pollution generated disturbs the firm's own production processes. 
                                                 
174  Throughout, derivatives are noted by primes and partial derivatives by subscripts. 
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Figure 7 Determining the socially optimal level of environmental performance 
(es*) 
 
Theoretically, firms implement environmental performance improvements in the order 
prescribed by the MAC curve. In practice, however, this may not happen, due to lack 
of information, for instance, and firms can lie above their theoretical MAC curve.175 
Situations where firms suddenly discover cost-saving environmental performance 
improvements can thus be explained by the firms having implemented their previous 
environmental performance improvements “in the wrong order”. Another possible 
explanation is that the MAC curves shift in time with changing technology and 
regulations. 
 
Being the Pareto-optimal solution, es* represents an efficient allocation of resources 
for environmental performance in society. Nevertheless, the solution may create 
resistance in individual firms. This is because in practice the criterion applied in cost-
benefit analysis is usually the compensation criterion, meaning that those made better 
off by a policy could potentially compensate those made worse off.176 In reality, such 
compensations are seldom implemented, which gives rise to distributional impacts 
                                                 
175  For further reasons why rational economic agents may have overlooked cost-saving 
environmental investments, see Panayotou, T & Zinnes, C. 1994. Free-lunch economics 
for industrial ecologists. In: Socolow, R, Andrews, C, Berkhout, F & Thomas, V (editors). 
Industrial ecology and global change. Cambridge University Press. Pages 383-397. See 
also Gabel, H L & Sinclair-Desgagné, B. 1993. Managerial incentives and environmental 
compliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24. Pages 229-240. 
176  Formally, consider two allocations, x and x'. According to the compensation criterion, x' is 
potentially Pareto preferred to x if it is possible to reallocate x' so that everyone prefers the 
reallocation to the original allocation x. Varian, H R. 1992. Microeconomic analysis. Third 
edition. New York, W. W. Norton & Company. 506 pages. Page 405. 
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even though the solution is efficient. Hence, while society benefits, individual firms 
may lose.  
 
The standard treatment described above emphasises only the private costs of 
environmental performance improvements and assumes no environmental private 
benefits for firms. For the location of the social optimum this makes no difference, but 
for the private optimum it does. Without environmental private benefits, firms have an 
economic incentive not to exercise pollution control in the absence of regulations if 
pollution control has a positive cost. R in Figure 7 marks the level of environmental 
performance chosen by a firm under this view. The discrepancy between the socially 
optimal level of environmental performance and the level preferred by the firm is 
shown in the figure. 
 
4.2 Privately optimal level of environmental performance 
 
As already discussed, more recognition has recently been given to the possibility that 
firms may derive direct private benefits from environmental performance. If there are 
private economic benefits to be gained from environmental performance 
improvements, environmental performance investment decisions become more like 
other investment decisions for firms, with the present value of required costs 
compared to the present value of the flow of expected benefits. With environmental 
private benefits above environmental costs, firms have a private optimum for 
environmental performance exceeding R in Figure 7. Hence, it pays for the firm to 
improve its environmental performance to some extent, regardless of regulation and 
regardless of the social benefits. It thus becomes interesting to see where this private 
optimum of the firm is located. For this purpose, it is necessary to derive an 
environmental marginal private benefits (MPB) curve and integrate it in the standard 
treatment presented above.  
 
The potential environmental private benefits can be divided into two groups. The first 
group consists of instances where the cost of an environmental performance 
improvement is negative. As discussed above, such instances may exist at the lowest 
levels of environmental performance. Alternatively, these efficiency benefits are 
interpreted as the firm moving towards its theoretical MAC curve. The second group 
consists of cases where the cost of an environmental performance improvement may 
also be positive, but where corresponding market benefits are obtained that can at 
least partly offset the cost. The MPB curve accounts for this type of environmental 
private benefits that accrue in the markets through customer preferences and, thus, 
demand. 
 
Traditional microeconomic analysis assumes perfect competition with homogeneous 
offerings and many price-taking sellers. For example, Figure 4 in section 3.1.1 is 
based on this assumption. In such a case, the price is an exogenous parameter for the 
firm. Figure 5 in the same section removes the assumption of many price-taking 
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sellers, but keeps that of homogeneous offerings. The price and quantity of an offering 
may change, but there is no differentiation. 
 
With differentiation, however, an offering enters a new private market with less 
intense competition. This increases the seller’s price-setting freedom.177 In effect, 
when price elasticity is reduced, the demand curve becomes more steeply downward-
sloping. Allowing for differentiation thus allows for a downward-sloping demand 
curve that can explain the environmental private benefits. Since differentiation is, in 
practice, a crucial element of competitive strategy, the following treatment applies to 
such imperfect (monopolistic) competition. 
 
Let price = p, quantity = q, and environmental performance = e. The firm's cost 
function is c(q,e), and it faces an inverse demand function p(q,e). Let pe > 0 and pee < 
0, signifying that the marginal private benefit from environmental performance 
provision is a downward-sloping curve as in Figure 8, panel b, below. Also, let ce > 0 
and cee > 0, corresponding to the upward-sloping shape of the marginal abatement cost 
curve as in Figure 8b. 
 
The firm's profit maximisation problem is  
 
Max p q e q c q e
q e
π
{ , }
( , ) ( , )= −                  (4-2) 
 
The first order conditions for profit maximisation are 
 
πq q qp q p c= + − = 0                   (4-3) 
πe e ep q c= − = 0                  (4-4) 
 
Condition 4-3 tells us that, at the profit-maximising level of output, the marginal 
revenue from producing one more unit of the good must equal the marginal cost of 
producing the extra unit. Similarly, condition 4-4 shows that, at the profit-maximising 
level of environmental performance, the marginal revenue from improving 
environmental performance must equal the marginal cost of environmental 
performance provision. 
 
The sufficient condition for the private optimum for environmental performance is 
 
πee ee eep q c= − < 0                   (4-5) 
 
                                                 
177 Mathur, S S & Kenyon, A. 1997. Creating value: shaping tomorrow's business. Oxford, 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 451 pages. 
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Since pee < 0 and cee > 0, the second order condition holds, and ep*, where MPB(e) = 
MAC(e), is the privately optimal level of environmental performance. Figure 8 
illustrates graphically the determination of q, e, and p. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 The determination of quantity (panel a), environmental performance 
level (panel b) and price (panel c) in the case of a profit-maximising 
firm with environmental differentiation. Panel b also shows the MAC 
and MPB curves 
 
In Figure 9, the MPB curve is inserted in Figure 7. Two alternative situations are 
drawn in the figure. If the full value of social benefits does not accrue to the firm from 
the markets, the MPB curve lies below the MSB curve and the privately optimal level 
of environmental performance ep*1 is lower than the socially optimal level. On the 
other hand, if environmental private benefits exceed social benefits, the MPB curve 
lies above the MSB curve and the privately optimal level of environmental 
performance ep*2 is higher than the socially optimal level. The MPB curve could also 
be equal to the MSB curve, in which case the private and social optima would 
coincide. If the MPB curve takes the value of zero, that is, if no environmental private 
benefits are obtainable in the case analysed, the private optimum lies at point R. 
 
In a situation where the private benefits from environmental performance exceed the 
social benefits, the profit maximisation objective of a firm leads to too high 
environmental performance from the social point of view. Such a situation is 
theoretically possible if, for example, customers overvalue certain investments in 
environmental performance. However, in such a situation there must be some other 
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party experiencing private costs from the environmental performance improvement; 
otherwise an increase in environmental private benefits for a firm would also increase 
the social benefits by the same amount.   
 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that such cases are exceptions and that the rule is 
a situation where environmental private benefits fall short of social benefits. Both 
theory and empirical evidence support this assumption. Theoretically, because 
environmental quality is a public good and there is a failure in incorporating its value 
in the market system, private costs and benefits regarding the environment are only a 
subset of the full costs and benefits. In practice, since environmental problems are 
being felt in society, the level of environmental performance selected by unregulated 
firms must, in general, be too low and not too high. From now on, the present study 
will focus only on the situation represented by the curve MPB1. Note that even if the 
conflict between the firm’s preferred level of environmental performance and the 
social optimum is not removed in this situation, it is nevertheless reduced compared to 
the point R where no environmental private benefits were accounted for. 
 
Figure 9 Determining the privately optimal level of environmental performance 
(ep*) 
 
Figure 9 discloses an interesting notion concerning the role of technology. 
Technological development shifts the MAC curve down. If there is sufficiently 
widespread diffusion of a technological innovation, this pushes the private optimum 
to the right.178 But, at the same time, it also pushes the social optimum to the right. In 
other words, if environmental performance becomes less expensive, firms provide 
                                                 
178  Milliman, S R & Prince, R. 1989. Firm incentives to promote technological change in 
pollution control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 17. Pages 247-
265. 
Environmental
performance
C
os
ts
, b
en
ef
its
MSB
MA
C
T
es*
R
MPB 1
MPB 2
ep*1 ep*2
V1
V2
 71
more of it, but society also demands more of it: the social optimum escapes away.179 
The straightforward implication of this would be that in principle technological 
development cannot solve the underlying conflict between the social and private 
optima. If a solution is to be found, it must come from the markets and customer 
preferences. However, this statement must be qualified depending on the exact shapes 
of the MAC, MPB and MSB curves. There may well be thresholds or other 
irregularities that invalidate the above speculation. 
 
4.3 Environmental profit and marginal environmental profit  
 
Ignoring the social benefits, a firm's net benefit from environmental performance is its 
environmental profit. Environmental profit represents the firm-level link between 
environmental performance and economic performance. Some information on the 
environmental profit function can be obtained indirectly through examining the 
marginal environmental profit function.  
 
Marginal environmental profit (MEP) is obtained by subtracting marginal abatement 
costs from marginal private environmental benefits. Formally, marginal 
environmental profit 
 
MEP e MPB e MAC e( ) ( ) ( )= − .                (4-6) 
 
Since the slope of the marginal environmental profit curve 
 
MEP e MPB e MAC e' ( ) '( ) '( )= − <− + 0                 (4-7) 
 
marginal environmental profit is a decreasing function of environmental performance, 
with the horizontal intercept at MEP e( ) = 0 . 
 
The slope of the marginal environmental profit curve is simultaneously the second 
derivative of the environmental profit function. We know that if f''(x) is negative for 
all x, then the primitive function f(x) must be a concave function.180 Correspondingly, 
the environmental profit function is concave and takes the form of an inverted U-
shaped function of environmental performance.181  
 
                                                 
179  Downing and White use the term “ratcheting” to describe the authorities making the 
appropriate adjustments in regulations as the marginal conditions change. Downing, P B & 
White, L J. 1986. Innovation in pollution control. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 13. Pages 18-29. 
180  Chiang, A. 1984. Fundamental methods of mathematical economics. Third edition. 
Singapore, McGraw-Hill. Page 243. 
181 The environmental profit curve should not be confused with another inverted U-shaped 
curve relating environmental and economic variables, that is, the environmental Kuznets 
curve that depicts the suggested relationship between per capita income and environmental 
quality. 
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Figure 10 illustrates the environmental profit curve and the marginal environmental 
profit curve. The environmental performance of a firm with regard to a pollutant 
determines where on its environmental profit curve or marginal environmental profit 
curve the firm is located. To repeat, these curves incorporate the isolated costs and 
benefits resulting from environmental performance, even though these are in most 
instances likely to be dwarfed by the non-environmental costs and benefits of 
business. The curves thus show the direction of the link between environmental 
performance and economic performance, but not its relative magnitude.  
 
Figure 10 Environmental profit curve and marginal environmental profit curve. 
Note that maximal environmental profit may lie above, below, or at 
zero. An example of a possible location of the socially optimal level of 
environmental performance (es*) is inserted in the picture 
 
The marginal environmental profit curve is not only useful to derive the 
environmental profit curve. Marginal values are also convenient to examine. Knowing 
one point on the environmental profit curve is not sufficient to tell whether the value 
is high or low, or whether the firm has passed its private optimum for environmental 
performance or not. By contrast, knowing one point on the marginal environmental 
profit curve suffices to determine whether the firm is located in the win-win area or 
not. 
 
Based on Figure 10, it can be established that improving environmental performance 
is profitable for a firm up to the privately optimal level of environmental performance 
ep*. At this point, marginal environmental profit equals zero and total environmental 
profit is maximised. Any further investments in improving environmental 
performance would decrease profit, but any fewer investments would leave profitable 
opportunities unused. The area up to the point ep* represents a win-win area where 
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improving environmental performance benefits both the firm and society, and the 
drive for profit coincides with sustainable development objectives.182 Only in the win-
win area do profit-maximising firms voluntarily undertake environmental 
performance improvements.  
 
The fact that there is a turning point in the environmental profit curve renders 
understandable the conflicting empirical evidence of the profitability of environmental 
performance improvements. Positive cases can be found in firms that are in the rising 
portion of their environmental profit curve, and negative cases in firms that are in the 
falling portion of their environmental profit curve. It may be difficult for firms to 
perceive their entire environmental profit curve at once; what is usually perceived is 
only the region around the current location. 
 
An example of a possible location of the socially optimal level of environmental 
performance is inserted in Figure 10 to enable a further analysis of the different 
outcomes. The social optimum is located based on the assumption discussed earlier 
that, in most cases, the socially optimal level of environmental performance is higher 
than the privately optimal level.  
 
Environmental performance improvements occurring between the private optimum 
ep* and the social optimum es* represent a win-lose situation: society gains when a 
firm moves towards the socially optimal level of pollution, but the individual firm 
loses as it is exceeding its private optimum for environmental performance. 
Environmental performance improvements beyond the social optimum es* represent a 
lose-lose situation. The level of environmental performance is too high both from the 
firm's and society's perspective. How the latter is possible is explained by a 
misallocation of resources. Elsewhere employed, the resources needed to achieve the 
high environmental performance would have produced more environmental or other 
benefits.  
 
Table 4 summarises some key points on profit, environmental profit, and marginal 
environmental profit. A summary of environmental profit under various competitive 
assumptions is shown in Appendix I. 
                                                 
182  These results are in line with those of van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen who modelled 
pollution and productivity and also found an inverted U-shaped relationship peaking at the 
optimal level of pollution abatement. They note that such a figure is useful in assessing the 
possibility of win-win policies: an increase in abatement can have a positive effect on net 
production only if initial abatement was suboptimal. Van Ewijk, C and van Wijnbergen, S. 
1995. Can abatement overcome the conflict between environment and economic growth? 
De Economist, volume 143, 2. Pages 197-216. 
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Table 4 Summary of key points on profit, environmental profit, and marginal 
environmental profit 
 
Concept Notation Technical 
description 
Economic description Graphical 
form 
Profit π  
Function of 
several variables, 
one of which is 
environmental 
performance 
Measure of overall 
economic performance 
N-dimensional 
surface with 
unknown shape 
Environmental 
profit EP 
Subset of profit; 
function of 
environmental 
performance 
Measure of the impact 
of environmental 
performance on 
economic performance 
Concave curve 
Marginal 
environmental 
profit 
MEP 
Partial derivative 
of profit and first 
total derivative of 
environmental 
profit; function of 
environmental 
performance 
Measure of the impact 
of environmental 
performance on 
economic performance 
at the margin 
Curve with a 
negative slope 
 
4.4 Impacts of changes in MAC and MPB curves 
 
The chapter has until now described the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance in terms of the passage of a firm along its environmental profit 
curve (point moving on curve). This discussion addressed the need, identified from 
previous literature, to consider the possibility that the relationship is not constant 
across environmental performance levels. 
 
However, two other important gaps in the previous literature were the possible non-
uniform and non-static properties of the relationship. The environmental profit curve 
was determined based on the costs of environmental performance improvements, 
represented by the MAC curve as well as the market benefits available from such 
improvements, represented by the MPB curve. Factors that cause shifts in the 
underlying MAC and MPB curves – in effect, determinants of environmental profit – 
are immediately reflected in the marginal environmental profit curve and thus in the 
environmental profit curve itself (curve moving in space). Consequently, the 
determinants of environmental profit influence the location of the privately optimal 
level of environmental performance and the size of the win-win area. 
 
Case-specific differences in determinants of environmental profit produce variation in 
the relationship between environmental and economic performance across cases. And, 
time-specific changes in these determinants produce variation in the relationship over 
time. For example, the recently observed increase in corporate environmentalism may 
be explained, even without any fundamental change in the profit maximisation 
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objective of firms, by a shift in customer preferences and the resulting MPB curve. 
The following discussion applies equally to changes in MAC and MPB curves 
between cases or across time. 
 
In general terms, the single most obvious source of changes in the MAC curve is 
technology. Improved environmental technology reduces ce and thus shifts the MAC 
curve down, and the privately optimal level of environmental performance increases. 
Similarly, the single most important source of changes in the MPB curve is 
preferences. Increased customer preferences for the environment increase pe, shift the 
MPB curve up, and the privately optimal level of environmental performance again 
increases. Both these results are straightforward and are illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 Impacts of an increase in environmental preferences (panel a) and an 
improvement in environmental technology (panel b) on the privately 
optimal level of environmental performance  
 
Introducing regulations brings one more important source of shifts in the 
environmental profit curve into the picture. It is obvious that economic instruments 
such as environmental taxes directly affect the costs and benefits of environmental 
performance. For example, an emission tax may change both the shape and location of 
the cost curve. However, command-and-control instruments also affect costs through 
fines or other sanctions from non-compliance.  
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4.5 Discussion  
 
The objective of the chapter was to theoretically derive and present the firm-level 
relationship between environmental and economic performance. The chapter does not 
claim to break new theoretical ground in the sense that it is entirely based on standard 
procedures. Nevertheless, the resulting environmental profit curve is an original and 
useful tool that helps to clarify thinking about the firm-level relationship between 
environmental and economic performance.  
 
Environmental profit represents the contribution of one particular element, 
environmental performance, to profit. It should be re-emphasised that the 
environmental profit curve incorporates any and all private costs and benefits that 
relate to environmental performance. Hence, by definition, there can be no trade-offs 
between environmental profit and "non-environmental profit". Put differently, there 
may well initially have been trade-offs between environmental performance and some 
other product attributes, but these are already counted in the costs and benefits of 
environmental performance. The isolation of costs and benefits to components that 
relate to environmental performance and components that do not is important. It 
guarantees that when environmental profit is maximised, total profit is also 
maximised, ceteris paribus. Such isolation can, of course, only be made in the 
abstract.  
 
The chapter suggests that the relationship between environmental performance and 
economic performance is a polluter- and pollutant-specific, inverted U-shaped 
function of environmental performance. It shows that win-win situations are 
conceivable, but present only under certain circumstances and not necessarily 
permanent. The size of the win-win area is determined by the shape and location of 
the environmental profit curve. This, in turn, is determined by the underlying cost and 
benefit curves.  
 
The chapter devoted some discussion to how determinants of environmental profit 
cause variation in the relationship between environmental and economic performance 
across cases and over time. Next, the empirical examination of such determinants 
follows. 
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5 A STATISTICAL APPROACH 
 
The preceding theoretical module suggested that there is likely to be variation in the 
firm-level relationship between environmental and economic performance, caused by 
determinants of environmental profit that vary from case to case. In the literature 
review, this issue was also identified as a significant gap requiring further analysis. 
These notions give raise to the empirical question: What are the determinants of 
environmental profit?  
 
In the present study, this empirical question has been divided in two parts. The first 
part, addressed in this chapter, is to identify the locus of variation in the relationship 
between firms' environmental performance and economic performance. Determinant 
identification efforts, to be undertaken in the case-study module, below, can be guided 
in the right direction if the relative importance of the sources of the variation is 
ascertained first. This is done through statistical analysis, using overcompliance of 
Finnish manufacturing plants with effluent discharge regulations as an empirical 
example. 
 
Three questions will be posed to the statistical data. The first question is whether the 
empirical data show any signs of such systematic non-uniformity of the relationship 
as suggested by the theoretical module. The second question is, if there is evidence of 
non-uniformity, what is the relative importance of the sources of this non-uniformity? 
The third question is, at the level identified as the most important source of non-
uniformity, which cases have exhibited the most and the least perceived win-win 
situations? 
 
5.1 Overcompliance as perceived win-win situation 
 
We cannot observe environmental profit or win-win situations from large-scale 
statistical data, but we can observe the decision to overcomply that coincides with a 
perceived win-win situation. Thus, win-win potential in the present module is 
measured through overcompliance with environmental regulations. 
 
It is a crucial question whether overcompliance is a valid indicator of perceived win-
win situations. The answer is that overcompliance is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for perceived win-win situations. Assuming that the profit maximisation 
assumption holds, all overcompliance situations are perceived win-win situations, but 
all perceived win-win situations are not overcompliance situations. For example, if a 
perceived win-win situation is not implemented, overcompliance fails to materialise. 
Or, all aspects of environmental performance are not even regulated, wherefore there 
cannot be overcompliance. 
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It is also important to note that regulatory strictness, which affects the possibilities for 
overcompliance, may vary between plants. On the one hand, there are valid reasons 
for differences in regulatory strictness between two plants: their socially optimal 
levels of environmental performance may differ, for example, because of a different 
receiving water body. On the other hand, the permit limits may not represent the 
socially optimal level of pollution. This may be due to less than perfect information, 
transaction costs of regulation, and the political economy of regulation, like the 
influence of lobbying. Because the social optima are not known, it is not possible to 
separate the two effects in the present data and estimate whether for some plants the 
permits were further removed from the social optimum than for others. The presence 
of overcompliance, nevertheless, remains a valid indicator of a perceived win-win 
situation, but the reverse logic does not apply to the lack of overcompliance.  
 
It is worth noting that even though the data will show that overcompliance has been 
widespread, the conclusion cannot be drawn based on the analysis in the present study 
that effluent discharge regulations have been too lax. Neither can it be concluded that 
the environmental performance of firms has been "good enough" from society's 
perspective. Such conclusions would require a study that compares the social costs 
and social benefits of environmental performance levels. The present study compares 
– indirectly through overcompliance – the private costs and private benefits of 
environmental performance levels. Thus, it cannot comment on the appropriateness of 
environmental regulations or of plants' environmental performance at all.  
 
 
Figure 12 The relationship between marginal environmental profit, 
overcompliance, perceived win-win situation, and true win-win 
situation 
 
Perceived win-win situations may coincide more or less with true win-win situations. 
Figure 12 illustrates the relationship between marginal environmental profit, 
overcompliance, perceived win-win situation, and true win-win situation. Although 
Negative marginal environmental profit:
private benefits < private costs
MARGINAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROFIT
The isolated net economic impact for a company
of a change in environmental performance
Positive marginal environmental profit:
private benefits > private costs
 = WIN-WIN SITUATION
Positive expected marginal environmental profit:
expected private benefits > expected private costs
 = PERCEIVED WIN-WIN SITUATION
OVERCOMPLIANCE
Environmental performance
is better than required by law
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less than a perfect indicator, on a large scale overcompliance is perhaps the only way 
to empirically observe perceived win-win situations from actual behaviour. 
 
The above discussion of overcompliance as a sufficient indicator of a perceived win-
win situation relied on the profit maximisation assumption. But can it safely be 
assumed that this assumption holds in the case of Finnish manufacturing plants and 
their compliance with effluent discharge regulations? Environmental performance 
improvements can, in principle, occur for a variety of reasons. One such reason is 
regulation. This reason can be ruled out here since, as noted, overcompliance cannot 
be mandated by regulation. Plants may overcomply in the anticipation of future 
regulations, but this is still voluntary. Overcompliance could be mandated by 
voluntary agreements between the government and business, but no such agreements 
have been in existence which could have influenced the data in the present study.183 It 
could also be urged by participation in environmental management schemes such as 
the European Union Eco-Management and Audit Scheme  (EMAS) or the ISO 14001 
standard that promote continuous improvement, but the impact of these schemes has 
been felt in Finland only after the research period of the statistical module of the 
present study.  
 
Another possible reason are ethical considerations that, in general, can be important 
motives for environmental performance improvements. However, in this specific case 
ethical considerations are likely to play a less significant role. This is because no 
activity that could result in water pollution may be carried out without a prior permit 
where environmental authorities specify effluent discharge limits that have been 
individually determined for that particular case. Overcompliance for ethical reasons 
would amount to a commentary by managers that ordinary compliance with these 
plant-specific effluent discharge limits would somehow be unethical. This may not be 
a convincing assumption on a large scale. If, on the contrary, many believe that 
emissions within legal limits are not especially harmful,184 there would be no ethical 
reason to overcomply.  
 
The remaining reason for overcompliance is that it is perceived to be good for the 
business. This motive corresponds to the profit maximisation assumption. The 
business benefits can be anticipated to arise from two main sources: from increasing 
the expected value of the operations, or from reducing the risk surrounding that 
expectation.185 
 
                                                 
183  COWI. 1997. Study on voluntary agreements concluded between industry and public 
authorities in the field of the environment. Final report and annexes. Prepared for the 
European Commission Directorate General III.01 - Industry. 
184  A confidential study in 1995 reported that this was a common belief among manufacturing 
firms. The study was conducted in EU countries prior to Finland's joining the EU.  
185  Reinhardt, F L. 1997. Environmental quality and economic advantage: A framework for 
understanding corporate environmental management. Harvard Business School Working 
Paper 97-071. 35 pages. Page 2. 
 80
Finally, overcompliance may not always be the result of a conscious strategy. It can 
also be unintentional. For example, investments in wastewater treatment are often of a 
bulky nature, or effluent discharges may be reduced as a by-product of a process 
change that has nothing to do with environmental objectives. Such cases do not 
present problems for the present study – they are excellent examples of win-win 
situations originating through the cost curve.  
 
5.2 Model and hypotheses  
 
The empirical model of factors affecting compliance is illustrated in Figure 13. Based 
on the theoretical module, because the MAC and MPB curves are source- and 
pollutant-specific and may shift in time, non-uniformity might be found between 
industries, firms, pollutants, and years. The unobserved individual factors behind the 
various measured groups of effects are not addressed at this stage. The objective is 
solely to identify the locus of variation, no matter how it was created.186 Once the 
main sources of variation are identified, the next chapter will turn to seeking an 
understanding of the individual factors that produce the variation.  
 
This approach was selected since there was incomplete a priori knowledge of the 
possible individual effects. Nominal measures of industry membership and so on are 
used to capture all of the unobserved individual effects, even if it is not yet known 
what they are. A few factors that may affect the relationship between environmental 
and economic performance have been suggested in literature, as discussed in section 
3.3.2. However, explicit and systematic work on such factors was so limited that a 
gradual approach was judged necessary. This was considered all the more important 
because the mechanisms producing variation in compliance may be rooted deep in the 
business logic of the various plants and industries. Collecting manifest characteristics 
of firms – inevitably in a somewhat random manner in the absence of an established 
theory – and correlating them with compliance might not reveal much of the 
underlying mechanisms. By contrast, such hypothesis testing on a subject for which 
theory is not yet well developed risks resulting in premature rationalisation and 
oversimplification.187  
                                                 
186  This approach draws from the award-winning paper by Rumelt (1991) who used variance 
components estimation to find the locus of variation in business-unit returns. See Rumelt, 
R P. 1991. How much does industry matter? Strategic Management Journal, volume 12. 
Pages 167-185. 
187  Daft, R L. 1985. Why I recommended that your manuscript be rejected and what you can 
do about it. In: Frost, P & Cummings, L L (editors). Publishing in the organizational 
sciences. Homewood, Ill., Richard D Irwin, Inc.  
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Note that in the empirical model firm effects are approximated by plant effects. The 
economic concept of a "firm" refers to an autonomous competitive unit with a single 
offering, and is not synonymous with a "company".188 The closest empirically 
observable approximation in this case was judged to be a plant. Whereas companies 
may operate within several industries, plants are defined to be production units that 
are usually owned by one company, located on one site, and produce goods of mainly 
one particular type.189  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 The empirical model of factors affecting compliance  
 
The empirical model translates into the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: There is variation in compliance between industries  
H2: There is variation in compliance between plants 
H3: There is variation in compliance between pollutants 
H4: There is variation in compliance between years 
 
                                                 
188  See, for example, Mathur, S S & Kenyon, A. 1997. Creating value: shaping tomorrow's 
business. Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemann. 451 pages. Page 73; or Rumelt, R P. 1991. 
How much does industry matter? Strategic Management Journal, volume 12. Pages 167-
185. 
189  Statistics Finland. 1995. Standard Industrial Classification. Annex 3: Summary. 124 
pages. Page 84. 
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5.3 Data 
 
The empirical data consist of annual compliance situations with regard to effluent 
discharges in Finnish chemical forest industry, chemical industry, metal industry, and 
food industry plants.  These industries are both environmentally and economically 
important in Finland. A compliance situation is created each time a plant faces an 
environmental standard (in this case, an effluent discharge limit that can be expressed 
as kg/a) to comply with. An attempt was made to cover all compliance situations 
during the research period 1988-1996. First, all plants with compliance situations in 
the studied industries were identified. Then, all compliance situations for the 
identified plants were listed.  
 
In the Finnish environmental regulatory system, activities that may have significant 
environmental impacts fall under the environmental permit and notification scheme.190 
All plants in the selected four industries whose effluents were covered by this scheme 
were identified from the Industrial Waste Water Register and the VAHTI database of 
the Finnish Environment Institute, a research institute under the Ministry of the 
Environment. The resulting list covered all plants in the selected industries on 
mainland Finland that discharge liquid effluents into a water body. Plants discharging 
their effluents to a municipal sewage system were not covered by the data. Four 
"plants" – a prison metal workshop, an airport, an arms depot, and a hazardous waste 
treatment facility – were dropped from the list as they were judged not to represent 
manufacturing plants in the sense of the present study. Plants that had ceased to emit 
liquid effluents into a water body during the study period were also dropped. Finally, 
one plant was dropped from the analysis because its situation was a very particular 
one and its extreme compliance values would have had undue influence on the 
results.191 The final sample consisted of all plants in the selected four industries that 
discharged effluents into a water body in January 1997. 
 
The detailed industry classification of the plants was taken from the Industrial Waste 
Water Register. This classification was preferred to the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) especially as it provided a more detailed classification scheme for 
chemical forest industry: eight subgroups according to production technology, as 
opposed to only two (pulp production and paper and paperboard production) in SIC 
                                                 
190  The discussion of the environmental regulatory system in Finland refers to the system that 
was in place during the research period of the present study. The environmental regulatory 
system was amended in early 2000 to make it compatible with the European Union 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) directive. 
191 The plant does not discharge effluents; yet analysis of a nearby ditch shows high pollutant 
values. Neither the plant nor the authorities know where the pollutant load originates from. 
Outliers that occur as the result of an extraordinary event should be deleted from the 
analysis if the analyst decides that they do not represent a valid observation in the 
population. See Hair, J F, Anderson, R E, Tatham, R L & Black, W C. 1995. Multivariate 
data analysis with readings. Fourth edition. London, Prentice-Hall International, Ltd. 745 
pages. Page 58. 
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1995.192 This more detailed classification may be relevant for the purposes of the 
present study.193  
 
Effluent discharges. Annual effluent discharge data for 1988-1996 were retrieved for 
the selected plants for all pollutants that could be expressed as kg/a.194 The VAHTI 
emission database was obtained from the Finnish Environment Institute for this 
purpose. The emission figures in VAHTI are reported by plants as part of their 
monitoring obligations under the environmental permit and notification system. As 
the VAHTI database was still in the development process when the study began, 
specific measures were taken to ensure the quality of the data. Before the final 
statistical runs, the data were updated to reflect the status of VAHTI as of February 
1999. In addition, the effluent discharges of each plant were graphically examined to 
detect possible errors. Suspect values were rechecked from the original discharge 
reports of the plants to the authorities. This procedure led to correcting or excluding 
roughly 0.3 per cent of the observations. 
 
Permit limits. The Water Act of 1961 in Finland includes a ban on polluting water 
bodies. Obtaining a permit from the Water Rights Court is therefore a precondition for 
carrying out activities that may result in water pollution. When deciding whether to 
grant a permit to an industrial plant to emit effluents into a water body, the authorities 
conduct a weighing of interests and a weighing of costs. (This does not, however, 
constitute a cost-benefit analysis on a national economic basis.) The permit is granted 
if the damages caused are relatively small compared to the benefits obtained, and if it 
is not otherwise possible to eliminate the discharge at a reasonable cost. The permit 
usually contains provisions specifying, inter alia, effluent discharge limits and 
monitoring and reporting requirements.195  
 
Those of the plants that were holders of a Water Rights Court effluent discharge 
permit were identified and their effluent discharge permits for the period 1988-1996 
were traced and studied at the archives of the Finnish Environment Institute. For some 
plants with minor effluent discharges, prior notification or a permit from a local 
authority may suffice. Such permits may also include effluent discharge limits, but 
they are not covered in the present study, only Water Rights Court effluent discharge 
permits. There is one exception, however: a plant that held permits from the Finnish-
Swedish Border River Commission was included in the study. In this case, the lack of 
a Water Rights Court effluent discharge permit was due not to the nature of the 
effluent discharges but to the geographic location of the plant. In three cases, effluent 
                                                 
192  Statistics Finland. 1995. Standard Industrial Classification. Annex 3: Summary.  
193  Also McGahan and Porter (1997) note that SIC industries primarily err in being too broad; 
data with finer industry classification would better bring out the influence of industry. 
McGahan, A M & Porter, M E. 1997. How much does industry matter, really? Strategic 
Management Journal, volume 18. Pages 15-30. 
194  Including, for example, Al, AOX, BOD, COD, Hg, Cd, P, Cr, N, Cu, Pb, Ni, Fe, Zn, and 
25 others. 
195  Kuusiniemi, K. 1993. Environmental law. In: Pöyhönen, J (editor). An introduction to 
Finnish law. Helsinki, Finnish Lawyers' Publishing. 
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discharge data for two or three chemical forest industry plants were aggregated 
because the plants were treated as an entity in Water Rights Court permit decisions. 
The detailed sector for these cases was coded as "other forest industy integrates".  
 
Effluent discharge standards and effluent discharge targets were compiled from the 
permit decisions and entered into the database containing the effluent discharge data. 
Effluent discharge standards are limit values that must not be exceeded under any 
circumstances. To provide plants with a reasonable margin for unexpected situations, 
effluent discharge standards may be set so that average effluent discharges under 
normal circumstances and careful operation of the effluent treatment plant remain 
somewhat lower than the standard limit. Effluent discharge targets, which are stricter 
than effluent discharge standards, are guideline values that may be temporarily 
exceeded. But, if effluent discharge targets are exceeded in a manner that cannot be 
considered temporary, the plant must notify the authorities and take measures to 
reduce the effluent discharges. To be conservative, when discussing permit limits and 
compliance, the present study always refers to limits that include both effluent 
discharge standards and effluent discharge targets.196  
 
All time-based effluent discharge limits were collected and expressed as kg/a. Limits 
expressed as kg/d were translated into kg/a using calendar days unless otherwise 
indicated in the permit decision. When effluent discharge limits changed during a 
year, a weighted effluent discharge limit was calculated for the year using the old and 
new permit limits weighted with their respective numbers of days in force. To 
determine these, the date of legal validity was established for all permit limits. The 
appeal period for the Water Rights Court decisions is two months. The appealed 
decisions were followed through the appeal process in the Water Court of Appeal and 
eventually the Supreme Administrative Court. The decisions by the Ministry of the 
Environment to postpone certain compliance deadlines were also taken into account. 
Finally, 57 plants were contacted by telephone to confirm details that could not be 
learned from the permit decisions. 
 
Compliance. A compliance indicator was calculated from effluent discharge and 
permit data for all compliance situations. Those cases were excluded where regulating 
a particular pollutant had began or ceased during a year, and the plant thus operated 
under no discharge limit for part of the year. As all plants do not emit all pollutants, 
the 108 plants, 39 pollutants, and 9 years produced 2195 compliance situations in the 
final database.  
 
Compliance was expressed as the percentage share of the actual effluent discharges in 
the permitted effluent discharges. Thus, compliance values exceeding 100 per cent 
indicate non-compliance. However, compliance values below 100 per cent do not 
                                                 
196 Effluent discharge targets have been established for only ca. six per cent of the compliance 
situations in the data. Moreover, in half of these cases, there are no simultaneous effluent 
discharge standards. In the ca. three per cent of the compliance situations where both 
effluent discharge standards and targets exist, the targets range from 32 to 96 per cent of 
the standards. 
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automatically indicate overcompliance. The daily effluent discharges of a plant may 
fluctuate because of climatic conditions, variations in the quality of the raw material, 
and so on. If the effluent discharge measurement periods are short, effluent discharges 
must on the average be below permitted levels to ensure that permit limits are not 
exceeded.197  
 
The resulting variables in the final database and their measurement scales are shown 
in Table 5.  
 
Table 5  Variables in the final database 
 
Variable name Variable label Data type/ 
measurement scale 
Independent variables 
  CRUDSECT Crude industry classification (4 levels) Nonmetric/Nominal 
  DETASECT Detailed industry classification (34 levels) Nonmetric/Nominal 
  PLANT_# Plant identification code (108 levels)  Nonmetric/Nominal 
  POLL_ID Pollutant identification code (39 levels) Nonmetric/Nominal 
  YEAR Year (9 years) Metric/Interval 
  EMITTED Amount of pollutant emitted, kg/a Metric/Ratio 
  PERMITTE Amount of discharges permitted, kg/a Metric/Ratio 
Dependent variable 
  COMPLIAN Compliance (EMITTED/PERMITTE * 100%) Metric/Ratio 
 
Appendix II contains the detailed data description. An examination of the data in 
Appendix II reveals that there is, indeed, notable variation in COMPLIAN. For 
example, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of COMPLIAN is 2.36. This 
variation in compliance is investigated in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
5.4 Methods  
 
The data were analysed with the statistical software system SPSS® version 8.0. Before 
selecting the methods to be employed, the data needed to be examined for potential 
violations of the assumptions that several statistical techniques rely on: normality, 
homoscedasticity, linearity, and absence of correlated errors.  
 
The high positive values for skewness and kurtosis for the dependent variable 
COMPLIAN (see Appendix II) suggest that the variable does not follow a normal 
distribution but is both substantially right-skewed and peaked. This is confirmed by 
the histogram in Figure 14, and by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a Lilliefors 
significance correction that indicates significant departure from normality. The shape 
of the distribution may be understood against the fact that there is a restriction in the 
range of variation of the variable: the values cannot go below zero and should not – 
but sometimes do – exceed 100.  
                                                 
197  See also Brännlund, R & Löfgren, K-G. 1996. Emission standards and stochastic waste 
load. Land Economics, volume 72, 2. Pages 218-230. 
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Figure 14 Histogram of the variable COMPLIAN. The horizontal axis is 
truncated. The vertical line of 100 per cent compliance is inserted for 
reference 
 
According to Hair et al. (1995), normality and homoscedasticity for data that 
represent proportions are best achieved using the arcsin transformation, where the 
new variable equals two times the arcsin of the square root of the original variable 
expressed as a proportion.198 Indeed, the arcsin transformation achieves normality for 
the variable COMPLIAN. However, all of the non-compliance observations will be 
missing in the new variable, because for them √(x/100) > 1 and the arcsin cannot be 
calculated. This would amount to a loss of 10 per cent of the data and introduce a 
definite bias to the results. If the data are rescaled so that no observations are missing, 
the resulting transformed variable is no longer normal.  
 
Several other common transformations were experimented with, but none was able to 
remedy the nonnormality of the variable COMPLIAN. As normality is the most 
fundamental one of the assumptions of parametric statistical techniques, it was 
necessary to turn to non-parametric techniques. Although non-parametric techniques 
are not free from assumptions either, they do not place requirements for the 
                                                 
198  Hair, J F, Anderson, R E, Tatham, R L & Black, W C. 1995. Multivariate data analysis 
with readings. Fourth edition. London, Prentice-Hall International, Ltd. 745 pages. Page 
70. 
COMPLIAN
470,0403,3336,7270,0203,3136,770,03,3
300
200
100
0
 87
underlying distributions. The downside of non-parametric techniques is that they are 
considered less powerful than parametric techniques.  
 
The power of a statistical test, calculated as 1-β, relates to the probability that 
statistical significance will be indicated if it is present. Beta (β) is the probability for a 
Type II error: failing to detect a statistically significant relationship even though it 
exists. When power is reduced, the probability for a Type II error increases. At the 
same time, however, the probability for a Type I error (α) decreases. In practical 
terms, α is the probability that statistically significant relationships are claimed when 
in fact there are none.199 It was considered better to select tests that tend to understate 
the relationships rather than the opposite. With hindsight, it can be said that 
differences between groups were detected even with the less powerful non-parametric 
techniques. 
 
The median test was used to test for differences in compliance between groups. Albeit 
less powerful than the commonly used Kruskal-Wallis test, the median test was 
preferred since it does not assume equal variances between groups – a restriction of 
the Kruskal-Wallis test that would be violated in this case. The median test assumes 
only that the observations are independent and random, and detects differences in both 
location and shape of the distribution between groups. The median tests were 
conducted separately for each year to prevent serial correlation from violating the 
independence assumption.  
 
The median test first calculates an overall median for the sample, ignoring group 
membership.  A 2 x k contingency table is then created from the counts of values in 
the k groups that are greater or not greater than the overall median. If the groups do 
not differ from each other, the overall median will split each group evenly. The 
contingency table is tested by the chi-square test that compares the observed 
frequencies of the two categories to those that would be expected if the null 
hypothesis of no difference between groups were true. The alternative hypothesis is 
two-tailed. The formula for the chi-square statistic is  
 
2
2
1
χ = −
=
∑ ( )o eei iii
k
                   (5-1) 
 
where oi is the observed value for the ith category, ei is the expected value for the ith 
category, and k is the total number of categories. In other words, the chi-square is the 
sum of the squared differences between the observed and expected values, divided by 
the expected values.200  
 
                                                 
199 Hair, J F, Anderson, R E, Tatham, R L & Black, W C. 1995. Multivariate data analysis 
with readings. Fourth edition. London, Prentice-Hall International, Ltd. 745 pages. Pages 
10-12. 
200  SPSS Inc. 1998. SPSS Base 8.0 Applications guide. 372 pages. 
 88
Statistical inference like the above is inappropriate if a census has been conducted of 
the entire population.201 In the present study, an attempt was made to include all 
compliance situations in the sample. However, in this case, inferential analysis is 
nevertheless warranted since inference is made from the sample not to the tangible 
population but to a so-called superpopulation. This approach may be useful in 
situations such as this one where the population includes a limited number of research 
units and observations are collected from all or nearly all of them. In addition to the 
real research units, the idea of a superpopulation includes also potential, non-existing 
research units.202 
 
After examining differences between groups with the median test, the next stage was 
to assess the relative importance of the identified sources of variation in compliance. 
The appropriate method for this is variance components estimation. It is a procedure 
that can be utilised for estimating how much each random factor in a model 
contributes to the overall variance of the dependent variable.203 The random effects 
assumption in variance components estimation does not relate to random sampling. It 
means that each observed random effect is considered to have been randomly drawn 
from a population of possible effects about which inferences are to be made.204  
 
As will be shown in the Results section, the median test results suggested conducting 
variance components estimation with data aggregated at the plant level. The plant-
level data did not initially satisfy normality, either. However, the selected variance 
components estimation method, MINQUE (minimum norm quadratic unbiased 
estimator), is robust to moderate departures from normality, and can also 
accommodate unbalanced data.205 A logarithmic transformation of the plant-level data 
was able to correct the skewness of the distribution. Some positive kurtosis remains 
even after the transformation (kurtosis = 1.481 with a standard error of 0.167), as is 
shown in Figure 15. This was considered a moderate departure from normality, and a 
new variable, LOGCOMP (N=855) was created and used for variance components 
estimation.  
 
                                                 
201 Hair, J F, Anderson, R E, Tatham, R L & Black, W C. 1995. Multivariate data analysis 
with readings. Fourth edition. London, Prentice-Hall International, Ltd. 745 pages. Page 
10. 
202  Lehtonen, T. 1990. Tilastotieteen jatkokurssi. Helsingin kauppakorkeakoulun kuvalaitos. 
196 pages. Page 50. 
203  See, for example, SPSS Inc. 1997. SPSS Advanced Statistics 7.5. 579 pages; or Rumelt, R 
P. 1991. How much does industry matter? Strategic Management Journal, volume 12. 
Pages 167-185; or Hsiao, C. 1986. Analysis of panel data. Econometric Society 
Monographs No. 11. Cambridge University Press. 246 pages; or Wetherill, G B. 1981. 
Intermediate statistical methods. London, Chapman and Hall. 390 pages; or McGahan, A 
M & Porter, M E. 1997. How much does industry matter, really? Strategic Management 
Journal, volume 18. Pages 15-30. 
204  McGahan, A M & Porter, M E. 1997. How much does industry matter, really? Strategic 
Management Journal, volume 18. Pages 15-30. 
205  SPSS Inc. 1997. SPSS Advanced Statistics 7.5. 579 pages. Page 44. 
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Figure 15 Histogram of the logarithmic transformation of the variable 
COMPLIAN with plant-level data. The vertical line of 100 per cent 
compliance is inserted for reference 
 
The design of the random-effects model was partly nested and partly crossed. The 
mathematical model corresponding to the empirical model in Figure 13 (without 
pollutant effects, as the estimation was conducted at the plant level) is  
 
lyp d c c d c p d c y yc yd c yp d c( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))= + + + + + + +µ α β γ δ ζ η ε              (5-2) 
 
where lyp d c( ( )) is the logarithm of compliance, the αc are industry effects with the crude 
industry classification, the βd(c) are industry effects with the detailed industry 
classification, nested within crude industries, the γp(d(c)) are plant effects nested within 
detailed industries, the δy are year effects, the ζyc are crude industry - year interaction 
effects, the ηyd(c)  are detailed industry - year interaction effects, and the εyp(d(c)) are 
random disturbances. The residual can also be interpreted as the interaction term 
between the plant and the year. But, since there was no replication in measurement, 
the error term is pooled with this interaction.  
 
However, it is not the equation 5-2 that will be estimated but the individual variance 
components as in the equation 5-3:  
 
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σα β γ δ ζ η ε2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2l = + + + + + +                (5-3) 
 
The variance components model is based on several assumptions regarding the 
random effect parameters and the residual term. The random effect parameters (that 
LOGCOMP (plant-level data)
2,671,831,00,17
300
200
100
0
Std. Dev = ,39  
Mean = 1,60
N = 855,00
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is, the αc,βd(c) and so on) are assumed to have zero means and finite constant 
variances. They are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated, and uncorrelated with 
parameters from different random effects. The residual term is assumed to have a zero 
mean and finite constant variance, too, and to be uncorrelated with any random effect 
parameters and with residual terms from different observations. Based on these 
assumptions, observations are correlated from the same level of a random factor.206  
 
The selected MINQUE estimation method requires a set of prior values for the 
variance components. Uniform prior values were used, implying that all random 
effects and the residual have equal impact on the observations. A system of linear 
equations is then established based on the prior values and the data, and solved to 
obtain the MINQUE estimates.207 
 
Finally, the 2195 compliance situations were coded in three categories: non-
compliance, ordinary compliance, and overcompliance. Non-compliance is 
straightforward, since at any time, values of COMPLIAN that exceed 100 represent 
non-compliance. However, for reasons already discussed, there is no similar natural 
cut-off point for overcompliance. The solution was to compute annual median values 
for COMPLIAN and use those as the cut-off point for overcompliance. The cut-off 
points are listed in Table 6; values of COMPLIAN below the cut-off points are taken 
to represent overcompliance. In other words, the overcompliance code was awarded to 
plants that not only emitted less than 100 per cent of the permitted amount of 
effluents, but that also outperformed an average plant that year. Values of 
COMPLIAN that represent full compliance with the regulations but that are not 
particularly low (that is, do not belong to the lowest 50 per cent) were coded as 
ordinary compliance.  
 
Table 6 Annual cut-off points below which values of COMPLIAN were coded 
as overcompliance 
 
Year  
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
Cut-off 57.7 55.5 47.6 34.7 36.0 31.0 37.0 38.1 32.9
 
For every plant, the share of each compliance category over the entire research period 
was calculated and recorded in the variables OVERCOMP, ORDICOMP, and 
NONCOMPL. The share of overcompliance situations, ordinary compliance 
situations, and non-compliance situations in the 108 plants is shown in Appendix III. 
These three variables were then used to cluster the plants based on their compliance 
performance.  
 
Cluster analysis is a technique whereby cases are grouped into clusters based on 
variables specified by the researcher. The clusters are formed so that there is high 
within-cluster homogeneity and high between-cluster heterogeneity. In other words, 
                                                 
206  SPSS Inc. 1997. SPSS Advanced Statistics 7.5. 579 pages. Pages 43-44. 
207  SPSS Inc. 1997. SPSS Advanced Statistics 7.5. 579 pages. Page 177. 
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the cases that belong to the same cluster are more like one another than they are like 
cases belonging to other clusters.208 The cluster analysis is a suitable technique for 
classifying the plants for the purposes of the present study since the objective is not to 
make any inferences to a population; of interest are only the plants in the sample and 
how they fall into different groups based on their compliance behaviour. 
 
The two main clustering algorithms are hierarchical clustering, and nonhierarchical or 
K-means clustering. The K-means clustering with Euclidean distances was used. 
According to Hair et al. (1995), nonhierarchical clustering algorithms have several 
advantages over hierarchical clustering algorithms if there is some practical, 
objective, or theoretical basis on which the initial cluster seeds needed in 
nonhierarchical clustering can be selected.209 In the present study, both the number of 
clusters and the initial cluster seeds could be naturally established. Moreover, the 
sensitivity of the Euclidean distance measures to the scale of the variables was of no 
concern since all the variables were measured on a similar scale.  
 
5.5 Results 
 
Three questions were posed at the outset of the chapter. The first question was 
whether there is such variation in compliance as suggested by the theoretical module. 
It was hypothesised that there is variation in the dependent variable, compliance, 
according to several independent variables: industry (measured at two levels), plant, 
pollutant, and year. Table 7 shows the relevant median test results.  Note that Table 7 
is a summary of 36 separately conducted tests that do not take into account the 
hierarchical structure of the data. 
 
The results in Table 7 indicate that there have been differences in compliance both 
between industries and between plants. By contrast, the results point to no persistent 
difference in compliance between pollutants. In other words, any important variation 
in the relationship between firms’ environmental and economic performance may not 
be found at the level of the various individual water pollutants. One explanation could 
be that customers do not, in general, perceive the environmental performance of a 
plant at such a highly detailed level. Another explanation could be that all the 
pollutants emitted by a plant are treated in the same effluent treatment facility. 
However, there may still be variation between water pollution and other 
environmental issues that is not revealed by this data. 
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421-423. 
209  Hair, J F, Anderson, R E, Tatham, R L & Black, W C. 1995. Multivariate data analysis 
with readings. Fourth edition. London, Prentice-Hall International, Ltd. 745 pages. Pages 
421-423. 
 92
 
Table 7 Annual median test results for COMPLIAN: significance level (α) of 
the chi-square statistic. The table summarises the results of 36 
separately conducted tests 
 
 CRUDSECT DETASECT PLANT_# POLL_ID 
1988 0.000*** 0.016* 0.019* 0.161 
1989 0.000*** 0.023* 0.017* 0.056 
1990 0.010** 0.092 0.027* 0.324 
1991 0.053 0.086 0.033* 0.037* 
1992 0.014* 0.000*** 0.003** 0.099 
1993 0.196 0.005** 0.001*** 0.598 
1994 0.421 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.230 
1995 0.996 0.010** 0.000*** 0.192 
1996 0.114 0.008** 0.001*** 0.081 
α ≤ 0.001  highly statistically significant (***)                                             All two-tailed tests 
α ≤ 0.01    statistically significant (**) 
α ≤ 0.05    almost statistically significant (*) 
 
Outside the median test results, the data point to a year effect that has produced more 
and more overcompliance over time. This is illustrated in Figure 16 that shows the 
distribution of COMPLIAN in 1988 and in 1996, at the beginning and the end of the 
research period. It is readily visible how the mass of the observations has shifted 
towards the left. This is in spite of the fact that permits have become stricter for many 
plants over those nine years – the mean value of PERMITTE was 21.5 per cent lower 
in 1996 than in 1988. Production has also increased at several plants at the same time.  
 
 
Figure 16 Histogram of the variable COMPLIAN in 1988 and 1996. The 
horizontal axis is truncated. The vertical line of 100 per cent 
compliance is inserted for reference 
 
Thus, the hypotheses H1 (there is variation in compliance between industries), H2 
(there is variation in compliance between plants), and H4 (there is variation in 
COMPLIAN in 1988
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compliance between years) received support. The hypothesis H3 (there is variation in 
compliance between pollutants) was not supported by the findings. 
 
Since, according to the median test results, there was no significant difference 
between the pollutants, the compliance-situation level data were aggregated at the 
plant level for the next analysis stage. This amounted to giving each pollutant an equal 
weight in calculating the plant-level average annual compliance. Notwithstanding the 
criticism towards aggregating environmental performance figures across pollutants 
that was presented earlier in the present study, this was considered acceptable for 
several reasons. First, the impetus for the aggregation originated from the data. 
Different pollutants can be treated equally since the data show that compliance has, 
indeed, been equal across pollutants. Second, the aggregation carries no statement as 
to the environmental importance of the various pollutants. The pollutants are given an 
equal weight from the perspective of firm behaviour, not from the perspective of 
environmental damage. Third, all aggregated values were measured in comparable 
units to start with, and no summing of pollutants that are measured in tons and others 
that are measured in grams thus occurred.  
 
The second question posed to the data concerned the relative importance of the 
sources of variation in compliance. Statistical significance figures, such as those 
reported in Table 7 tell that the result was likely not obtained by chance; they do not 
divulge the importance of the effect. (Power, and thus α, is not completely unrelated 
to the effect size, however.) Of particular interest was the question to what extent 
compliance is a plant issue and to what extent an industry issue.  
 
Variance components estimation was used to divide the total variation in compliance 
into industry factors (measured at two levels), plant factors, and year factors, however 
created. Moreover, as panel data were available, these could be further divided into 
time-invariant and time-varying components. This analysis followed closely much of 
Rumelt (1992).210 Table 8 shows the variance components attributable to different 
sources, and Figure 17 illustrates their relative importance. 
                                                 
210  Rumelt, R P. 1991. How much does industry matter? Strategic Management Journal, 
volume 12. Pages 167-185. 
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Table 8  Variance components estimated from plant-level data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 The relative importance of the sources of variation in plant-level 
compliance 
 
 
PLANT EFFECTS
Stable (39%)Fluctuating (41%)
YEAR EFFECTS (6%)
INDUSTRY EFFECTS 
(CRUDE CLASSIFICATION)
Stable (1%) Fluctuating (1%)
INDUSTRY EFFECTS 
(DETAILED 
CLASSIFICATION)
Stable (11%)
Fluctuating (1%)
Variance Estimates
1,165E-03
1,812E-02
6,423E-02
1,031E-02
1,207E-03
1,752E-03
6,602E-02
Component
Var(CRUDSECT)
Var(DETASECT(CRUDSECT))
Var(PLANT__#(DETASECT(CRUDSECT)))
Var(YEAR)
Var(CRUDSECT * YEAR)
Var(DETASECT * YEAR(CRUDSECT))
Var(Error)
Estimate
Dependent Variable: LOGCOMP
Method: Minimum Norm Quadratic Unbiased Estimation
(Weight = 1 for Random Effects and Residual)
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Figure 17 clearly shows that the most important sources of variation in compliance – 
and thus in perceived win-win situations – are plant-specific. The stable plant effects 
(39% of the total variation) are about three and a half times as important as the stable 
industry effects (11%), even when a detailed industry classification is used. If a crude 
classification in chemical forest industry, chemical industry, metal industry, and food 
industry is used, the stable plant effects (39%) are almost forty times as important as 
the stable industry effects (1%). In other words, the variation between plants within an 
industry is much larger than the variation between industries.  
  
There seem to be stable patterns in the data that account for 57 per cent of the 
variance in compliance. However, time-varying effects are also present, especially at 
the plant level. The fluctuating plant effects (41%, reported under error variance in 
Table 8) represent plant-specific year-to-year variations in compliance. The great 
fluctuating plant effects suggest certain randomness in compliance. However, this 
effect also contains the error variance, and the swings in compliance that may be 
caused by changes in effluent discharge standards during the research period (see the 
discussion at the end of this chapter). 
 
The year effects, in turn, refer to such annual fluctuations in circumstances affecting 
compliance that influence all plants and industries equally. The presence of a year 
effect (6%), and the minor share of fluctuating industry effects at both measurement 
levels (1% each) may indicate that developments in relevant circumstances have 
touched all industries almost identically. 
 
One purpose of the variance components estimation was to assist in determining 
where to focus attention in the case studies to ensure sufficient sampling from the 
level that produces the most variation.  Based on the results, it appears that the most 
useful level for seeking the mechanisms that cause variation in compliance are 
individual plants. Therefore, the third and final statistical question was posed directly 
at the plant level: which plants have had a tendency towards overcompliance, which 
plants have had a tendency towards non-compliance, and which plants have had a 
tendency towards ordinary compliance over the research period? The cluster solution 
is shown in Table 9 and illustrated in Appendix III.  
 
Table 9  Final cluster centers and number of plants in each cluster 
 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Description Plants with a 
tendency towards 
overcompliance 
Plants with a 
tendency towards 
non-compliance 
Plants with a 
tendency towards 
ordinary compliance 
Plants 44 15 49 
Cluster center 
  OVERCOMP 
  ORDICOMP 
  NONCOMPL 
 
77.19 
19.78 
  3.03 
 
30.87 
24.38 
44.75 
 
28.49 
64.73 
  6.78 
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The cluster centers in Table 9 contain the mean of each variable in each cluster. The 
interpretation of the cluster results is straightforward since clustering was entirely 
based on the compliance performance. Of the 108 plants, 44 fall into cluster 1. For 
these plants, the distinct majority of the compliance situations represent 
overcompliance and there is very little non-compliance. Roughly the same number of 
plants (49) fall into cluster 3. For plants in this cluster, ordinary compliance is 
dominant. However, quite a lot of overcompliance and some non-compliance can also 
be observed in this cluster. The remaining 15 plants fall into cluster 2. Here, the 
compliance situations are much more evenly spread between the three types of 
compliance, but non-compliance nevertheless constitutes the majority of the 
compliance situations.  
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
In the analysis presented, overcompliance with effluent discharge regulations 
portrayed an empirically observable example of perceived win-win situations. The 
key findings were that there is persistent variation in compliance; that the most 
significant sources of this variation occur at the plant level as opposed to the industry 
level; and that a year effect has been present. These findings have practical 
significance for the study of the relationship between firms' environmental and 
economic performance. They lend strong support to the proposition that the 
relationship must be studied at a disaggregated level. Moreover, disaggregation to 
different industries is not sufficient, because at least in manufacturing, plants within 
an industry may differ from one another much more than industries. However, the 
findings also suggest that disaggregation to different environmental issues such as 
water pollution may suffice and that there may be no need to disaggrate the various 
individual pollutants. 
 
If, as it seems, the relationship between environmental and economic performance 
varies significantly between plants and firms, environmental issues are truly a 
question of competitive strategy that firms must approach from their own particular 
circumstances. And, variation in the relationship over time suggests that it may not 
need to be taken as given but one may also actively try to influence it. 
 
Three questions immediately arise concerning the reliability and validity of the above 
empirical analysis. The first question is whether overcompliance is an appropriate 
indicator of a perceived win-win situation. The overcompliance indicator was already 
discussed at the outset of the chapter. It was noted that overcompliance is not without 
problems but probably the best available empirical measure for the purposes of the 
present study. Especially, because of variation in the strictness of the effluent permits 
against which overcompliance is measured, overcompliance is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for perceived win-win situations. 
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The second question is whether effluent discharges are a suitable empirical example 
for the purposes of the present study. The third question is whether the measurements 
and analyses have been properly conducted. These two questions will be explored 
below. 
 
Are effluent discharges a suitable example for the empirical illustration of the 
relationship between firms' environmental and economic performance? As noted, 
discharges of effluents during the production process provide only a limited picture of 
the environmental performance of a firm. It would be more ideal to consider all 
environmental media, and the whole life-cycle of a product or service. Because of 
both practical and theoretical problems211, such ideal measurement of environmental 
performance was not possible. The statistical data should be considered an empirical 
example of one aspect of environmental performance. If, as hypothesised, the 
relationship between firms’ environmental and economic performance is issue-
specific, beginning with the quantitative illustration of only one such issue does not 
present a major problem. 
 
There are several reasons why effluent discharges should constitute a good empirical 
example for the purposes of the present study. Any activities in any industries that 
may result in water pollution must have an environmental permit, and the permit 
provisions are such that compliance indicators can be calculated. Water pollution has 
been an important environmental issue and much of environmental protection 
investments during the research period has gone to addressing this issue. There have 
been no significant economic instruments or voluntary agreements in operation during 
the study period that would affect the compliance data.212 Regulations in other 
countries cannot have affected the compliance data, either, because the rules of the 
multilateral trading system have not allowed trade measures that are based on non-
product-related processes and production methods.  
 
However, effluent discharges possibly suffer from not being considered an "output" 
by many customers.213 They may thus not produce benefits through the demand curve 
to a similar extent than a product-related environmental issue. Issues such as 
                                                 
211  The life-cycle approach is not without problems either. For example, Schaltegger (1997) 
criticises current life-cycle assessment techniques for the lack of site-specific data that 
could attend to "actual impacts in the real world with geographical and time dimensions". 
See Schaltegger, S. 1997. Economics of life cycle assessment: Inefficiency of the present 
approach. Business Strategy and the Environment, volume 6. Pages 1-8. 
212  The effluent permits do specify compensation payments and water protection charges, 
however. 
213  Two kinds of characteristics, inputs and outputs, relate to offerings. Outputs are those 
characteristics that influence customer choice, either consciously or subconsciously. Inputs 
are used to produce outputs, but inputs themselves do not directly influence customer 
choice. This distinction is important, because only the outputs position an offering in the 
eyes of customers. Firms must manage inputs, such as costs and resources, but for 
customers, only the outputs matter. Mathur, S S & Kenyon, A. 1997. Creating value: 
shaping tomorrow's business. Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemann. 451 pages. 
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recycling, biodiversity conservation, and so on, may be more important for some 
plants in the sample than are effluent discharges. In any case, the result that there were 
no differences in compliance between different pollutants cannot be directly extended 
to different environmental issues. This question will be further addressed in the case 
studies, below, where it will be examined how effluent discharges relate to other 
aspects of environmental performance.   
 
Concerning the quality of the data, the most serious limitation is the absence of 
specific effluent discharge values and specific permit limits. Whereas absolute 
effluent discharge data report the total amount of discharges in a period, specific 
effluent discharge data report discharges per volume of output. Absolute permit limits 
regulate pollutant loads in a time period, and specific permit limits per volume of raw 
material or final product. A simultaneous examination of both kinds of data would be 
best, as specific figures are better at describing the eco-efficiency of a plant, but 
absolute figures are better at describing a plant's environmental impact. The 
compliance calculations in the present study are based on the absolute effluent 
discharges and permit limits only.  This is because although specific permit limits are 
common in some industries, for most of the compliance situations in the present 
sample they did not exist.  
 
This limitation in the data has implications that need to be kept in mind in the 
interpretation of the results. Absolute effluent discharge data are sensitive to 
fluctuations in output levels. From one perspective, this might not be a problem. 
Output reduction is, indeed, one of the available means for reducing pollution. For the 
receiving water body, it is only the absolute effluent discharges and their relation to 
the carrying capacity that matters. Specific effluent discharges fail to take into account 
the scale effects of production. From another perspective, however, there may be a 
problem. Finland experienced a severe recession during the research period. This may 
mean that some of the overcompliance situations in the data are "artificial" since 
effluent discharges were reduced only because production was reduced. In those cases 
where both absolute and specific effluent discharge limits for a plant exist, one is 
perhaps binding when the other is not. For example, specific limits may become 
binding if production is less than a certain percentage of capacity. The absence of 
specific permit limits in the data may therefore produce false overcompliance 
situations at times when capacity utilisation is low. 
 
Some other aspects of the data also require further discussion. A tightening of the 
permit limits results in worsened compliance figures if the plant's environmental 
performance remains the same. Thus, environmental performance that once was 
overcompliance may become ordinary compliance or even non-compliance later. 
When technologies and preferences change, the socially optimal level of 
environmental performance also changes, which may be reflected in the performance 
level required of a plant. The legal requirements are thus a moving target, and 
compliance is measured against this moving target at any point in time. 
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The permit data in the present study only capture requirements that are expressed as 
effluent discharge limits per time period. The permits specify how the effluent 
discharge values are to be measured: for example, as annual averages, 3-month 
moving averages, or monthly averages. The shorter the measurement period the 
stricter the requirement for the invariability of the effluent flow. The present study, 
however, records all effluent discharge limits as if they were to be measured as annual 
averages. High and low effluent peaks are thus averaged over the year. The 
implication of this is that overcompliance and non-compliance situations that survive 
till the annual data must have been significant or persistent.  
 
The existence of extreme cases is likely to be restricted in the sample. On the one 
hand, some plants with serious compliance problems may have been required to 
switch to a "dry" production process or join the municipal sewage system, in which 
case they drop out of the data. On the other hand, if a plant successfully implements 
pollution prevention and no longer discharges effluents or emits a particular 
substance, the related compliance situations may drop out of the sample, too, or never 
enter it to start with. The sample may also be biased towards large polluters: many 
small plants discharge their effluents into the municipal sewage system and are thus 
not covered by the data, and there may be more missing data points in the effluent 
discharge database for plants with minor discharges.  
 
As always, the possibility of human error in data collection cannot be completely 
ruled out. However, measures such as graphical examination of the data were taken at 
each stage to reduce this possibility to a minimum. The data can thus be treated with 
reasonable confidence. 
 
To sum up, the objective of the chapter was to anchor the examination of the 
relationship between firms' environmental and economic performance to 
comprehensive empirical data on revealed behaviour. The questions posed to the data 
were few and simple, and the methods employed were selected to be conservative and 
such that their sophistication would not exceed the level warranted by the quality of 
the data. The results can be likened to a picture observed from far away: the main 
features are distinct and reliable enough, but all details are not discernible. This 
picture shows variation that needs to be explained and points to the sources of that 
variation. Chapter 6 will now turn to the ensuing question about how this variation is 
generated. 
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6 A CASE-STUDY APPROACH 
 
As noted, there is a gap in the previous knowledge concerning the possible non-
uniformity of the firm-level relationship between environmental and economic 
performance. The theoretical module showed that the relationship is, indeed, likely to 
be non-uniform, and the statistical module showed that the most important source for 
this non-uniformity is at the plant level. Thus, the naturally following question for the 
case-study module is: What are the determinants of environmental profit that produce 
such plant-level non-uniformity in the relationship? 
 
The qualitative case-study approach complements the theoretical and statistical 
analyses by providing rich data that offer a new perspective to the comprehension of 
the phenomenon. The qualitative module can be used to help interpret the findings of 
the quantitative module. Whereas the quantitative module addressed the what-
question, the present chapter attempts to answer the why-question. It also has a role in 
validating and triangulating previous results. When speaking of multi-method studies, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) state that strong claims on the viability of the findings of 
the qualitative module can be made if they converge both across cases and with the 
quantitative module.214 
 
Note that instead of environmental private costs and benefits, this chapter tends to 
speak of environmental costs and revenues. This is because in the context of the issues 
discussed in the chapter, the word "benefits" easily causes confusion since the same 
point can be regarded as a reduction in costs or an increase in benefits. However, it 
would be useful to keep apart the impacts occurring through the cost curve and 
through the demand curve. With the words cost and revenue no such confusion arises. 
Each point quite clearly represents an increase or decrease in costs, or an increase or 
decrease in revenues. This choice of words does not affect what was said in section 
2.2: that the concepts in the present study are broader than accounting concepts for 
expenses and revenues. 
 
6.1 Data and methodology 
 
Although the case selection, data collection and data analysis are here presented 
separately, in practice they were simultaneous and intertwined processes. This is 
typical of qualitative research, and must be kept in mind when reading the section.  
                                                 
214  Miles, M B & Huberman, A M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis. An expanded sourcebook. 
Second edition. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 338 pages. Page 31. 
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6.1.1 Selection of cases and informants 
 
Based on the results in chapter 5, a case was determined to be a plant. The purpose of 
the case studies was to generate theory that is grounded in empirical data, not to test 
any predefined hypotheses.215 This had important implications for the selection of the 
cases that was based on theoretical sampling.  
 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), theoretical sampling is “the process of data 
collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and 
analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges”.216 The cases are thus not randomly selected 
but hand-picked according to a sampling strategy. Major sampling strategies are to 
replicate previous cases, to extend emerging theory, to fill theoretical categories, or to 
provide polar examples.217  
 
The research design involved multiple cases. This is regarded as beneficial for 
understanding the researched phenomenon, and for developing a good picture of 
locally grounded causality.218 Replication logic is central to sampling in this kind of 
studies: each case should be selected to produce either literal or theoretical replication, 
and cases should be sampled for each of these two purposes. Literal replication refers 
to cases that predict similar results, theoretical replication to cases that produce 
contrary results but for a predictable reason.219  
 
The main sampling dimension in the present study was the dependent variable, 
compliance. In addition, some independent variables were used as sampling 
dimensions. The statistical analysis in the previous chapter showed that, together, the 
stable plant-level factors and stable industry-level factors (detailed classification) 
accounted for 50 per cent of the variance or 84.7 per cent of the explained variance in 
compliance or 87.7 per cent of the stable patterns in the data. An initial sampling 
frame was thus developed based on combinations of these dimensions and 
compliance. It relied on the sampling strategy of providing polar examples. The logic 
of this sampling strategy is that the phenomenon of interest is likely to be most easily 
perceived in the extremes. Thus, plants belonging to the ordinary compliance cluster 
were not sampled. The sampling frame contained cases that either displayed polar 
                                                 
215  See, especially, Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. 
Strategies for qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages, and 
Eisenhardt, K M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, volume 14, 4. Pages 532-550. 
216  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. Page 45. 
217  Eisenhardt, K M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, volume 14, 4. Pages 532-550. 
218  Miles, M B & Huberman, A M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis. An expanded sourcebook. 
Second edition. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 338 pages. Page 26. 
219  Yin, R K. 1989. Case study research. Design and methods. Revised edition. Newbury 
Park, Sage Publications. Pages 53-54. 
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examples of compliance within an industry (detailed classification) or polar examples 
of compliance between industries. However, flexibility was retained to incorporate 
new significant sampling dimensions that might arise during the study.  
 
The exact number of cases to be studied could not be predetermined. In theoretical 
sampling, data collection and analysis is continued until a saturation point is reached 
where new cases do not introduce any new information.220 The study ended up 
containing eleven cases: two from the chemical forest industry, two from the chemical 
industry, four from the metal industry, and three from the food industry. King et al. 
(1994) emphasise the importance of sufficient variation in the dependent variable in 
the sample when the dependent variable has been used as a sampling dimension.221 
Six of the plants represented the overcompliance cluster and five the non-compliance 
cluster. There is no correct answer to the question how many cases are "enough". 
However, to avoid idiosyncrasy, but to keep the number of replications manageable, 
Eisenhardt has suggested that the optimal number of cases would be between 4 and 
12.222 
 
The case in the present study is a plant, but one cannot interview a plant – interviews 
must be conducted with natural persons. This gives rise to the question about how to 
select the informant or informants. As a starting point, it was considered important to 
pick several informants for each case, in order to obtain different perspectives on the 
issues and to allow within-case triangulation of data. In selecting the informants, 
variation can be sought on two dimensions: functional responsibilities (horizontal 
variation) and managerial level (vertical variation). There are also potential 
informants outside the plants themselves. Table 10 shows the sampling frame for 
informants, containing the upper limit of variation that was sought for one case.  
 
Table 10 Sampling frame for informants for one case 
 
 General Environ- 
mental 
Technical / 
Production
Marketing  Outside 
plant 
Top 
management 
Plant 
director 
    
 Middle 
management 
and / or  non-
managerial 
 
 Environ-
mental 
manager 
and / or 
environ-
mental 
staff 
Technical / 
production 
manager 
and / or 
technical / 
production 
staff 
Marketing 
manager 
and / or 
marketing 
staff 
 
Regulatory 
authority 
responsible 
for the firm 
 
 
                                                 
220  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. 
221  King, G, Keohane, R O & Verba, S. 1994. Designing social inquiry. Scientific inference in 
qualitative research. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 247 pages. Page 134. 
222  Eisenhardt, K M. 1998. Lecture at Helsinki University of Technology, April 29-30. 
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For each case, interviewees were sampled from the sampling frame. It was ensured 
that the general management, environmental, technical / production, and marketing 
functions were all represented in each case. However, the fact that the four functions 
were sampled did not necessarily mean that four persons were sampled. Often, one 
person was responsible for more than one function. For example, the plant director 
could also be responsible for marketing, or the production manager for environmental 
issues. In the two smallest plants, all of the four functions were carried out by the 
owner-manager himself. Sometimes more than one person was responsible for one 
function: for example, marketing responsibilities could be divided based on the 
customer segment or geographic market area. Thus, depending on the size and 
organisation of the case plant, sampling the four functions translated into one to six 
interviewees. The regulatory authority was interviewed for each case; however, this 
meant only five interviews since the same official typically supervises several plants.  
 
There was a total of 40 interviews. Table 11 summarises the number of persons 
interviewed at the plants and in the regulatory agencies, as well as the interview 
hours.  
 
Table 11 Summary of number of persons interviewed and interview hours 
 
 Plant 
 
Number of 
persons 
Interview 
hours 
 A 1 1 h 20 
 B 2 2 h 
 C 2 2 h 50 
 D  5 7 h 40 
 E 1 2 h 10 
 F 4 5 h 30 
 G 3 4 h 
 H 3 4 h 
 I 6 6 h 15 
 J 5 6 h 30 
 K 3 4 h 30 
 Authorities 5 2 h 20 
 Total 40 49 h 05 
 
The cases allow comparisons along several dimensions: between overcomplying and 
non-complying plants; between plants in different industries; between small and large 
plants; between single-plant and multi-plant companies; between plants with various 
types of ownership; between plants within the same corporation; and between plants 
selling intermediate and final products to industrial or consumer clients. The cases 
provide literal replication for each of these characteristics, even if not for each 
combination of characteristics. To preserve the anonymity of the participating plants, 
a detailed summary of their characteristics cannot be presented. 
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6.1.2 Data collection 
 
The data came from two main sources. First, the water permits of the 108 plants and 
phone calls with 57 of the plants (collected for the statistical module), and archival 
data such as environmental reports and newsclippings were used, together with 
previous literature, to design an interview guide and some initial propositions.  
 
The collection of the water permits and the phone calls were described in chapter 5. 
The task of collecting and studying the permit limits from more than 300 Water 
Rights Court permit decisions and the eventual associated decisions from higher 
courts of appeal was time-consuming. However, the information gained from the 
permit documents also served to develop a general understanding of the 
environmental situation of the plants with regard to water pollution. This is because 
the Water Rights Court decisions contain information on the history, products, 
processes, effluent discharges, and environmental control technologies of the plants, 
and on the opinions of the firms, local inhabitants, and environmental authorities 
concerning the environmental impacts of the plants.  
 
Second, semi-structured interviews in the case plants were used to gradually develop 
propositions and organise them into a model of factors affecting environmental profit. 
Throughout data collection and analysis, related literature was used as a springboard 
for ideas, and to confirm or contrast the findings. This literature is scattered in suitable 
places in the Results section of the present chapter. 
 
A decision needed to be made on the extent to which the data collection should be 
planned and structured before entering the field. According to Miles and Huberman 
(1994), prior instrumentation of data collection helps to avoid data overload and focus 
data collection on relevant and useful data and increases the reliability of data 
collection. Moreover, prior instrumentation is the only way to guarantee cross-case 
comparability. However, there are also drawbacks associated with prior 
instrumentation. It may cause the researcher to overlook important issues arising from 
the field if they are not included in the predesigned instrument. It may also force the 
prior assumptions and categorisations of the researcher on the informants. The 
desirable amount and nature of prior instrumentation in a study thus depends on the 
type of study and sample and on the research questions.223 
 
In the present study, multiple cases were involved and comparability between them 
was of utmost importance. At the same time, the focus of the case studies was on 
exploratory theory building rather than on hypothesis testing, and all the relevant 
issues were not necessarily known beforehand. The flexibility to accommodate 
completely new issues and ideas that may emerge during data collection therefore had 
to be retained. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the data collection method. 
They may combine the strengths of both a structured interview and an open interview 
                                                 
223  Miles, M B & Huberman, A M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis. An expanded sourcebook. 
Second edition. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 338 pages. Pages 35-36. 
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by facilitating an analysis across the cases while at the same time allowing rich data to 
be collected. Because of this choice, explicit pilot studies were not necessary. 
 
At the substantive level, the research questions in the case-study module were the 
following: 
 
- Why do firms within a detailed industry differ in compliance?  
- Why do detailed industries differ in compliance?  
 
At the conceptual level, the same questions read as:  
 
- Why do firms within a detailed industry differ in perceiving win-win situations?  
- Why do detailed industries differ in perceiving win-win situations?  
 
However, interview questions are not the same as research questions. To take the step 
from research questions to interview questions, it was necessary to determine (i) what 
information is needed to answer the research questions and (ii) what interview 
questions would bring out such information.  
 
Already before embarking on data collection the researcher needs to have an idea 
about how the data will ultimately be analysed. Mäkelä (1990) suggests dissecting the 
analytical operations into small steps as a means of increasing the transparency and 
credibility of qualitative data analysis.224 Following his example, the data in the 
present study can be analysed by 
 
- first, listing each statement that describes the relationship between environmental 
performance and economic performance  
- then, listing all categorisations or distinctions used to support the argument that 
the relationship is positive, negative, or neutral  
- next, classifying the categorisations or distinctions 
- finally, reconstructing the system of classifications or distinctions behind the 
individual statements. 
 
To achieve this, the task of the interview questions was to ensure that the data contain 
statements about the relationship between environmental performance and economic 
performance, and arguments to support the assessments made about the nature of the 
relationship.225  
                                                 
224  Mäkelä, K. 1990. Kvalitatiivisen analyysin arviointiperusteet. In: Mäkelä, K (editor). 
Kvalitatiivisen aineiston analyysi ja tulkinta. Helsinki, Gaudeamus. 285 pages. Pages 42-
61.  
225  On designing interview questions, see, for example, Kvale, S. 1996. InterViews. An 
introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 326 
pages; or Wärneryd, B (editor). 1986. Att fråga. Om frågekonstruktion vid 
intervjuundersökningar och postenkäter. Stockholm, Statistiska centralbyrån. 264 pages; 
or Payne, S L. 1951. The art of asking questions. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press. 249 pages. 
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A semi-structured interview protocol was developed that contained an outline of the 
themes to be covered in the interviews, a handful of structured questions, and tentative 
headings for observations. The interview protocol was written in Finnish and will not 
be reproduced here, but its contents will be shortly outlined. 
 
The interview protocol was divided into three sections. In the first section, open-
ended questions ("Tell me about …") were asked that served both to warm up and to 
establish some facts about the nature of the business. Depending on the respondent, 
these questions concerned topics such as the plant's history, production, ownership, 
structure, size, products, markets, strategies, economic performance, customers, 
competitors, and relations with environmental authorities. As the last question of this 
section, the interviewees were asked to describe environmental issues, if any, that 
related to their business. 
 
In the second section, questions were asked about the impacts of environmental 
measures on the costs, revenues, and overall economic performance of the plant. The 
interviewees were asked to consider all measures with an effect on the plant's effluent 
discharge performance, regardless of whether the primary motivation behind the 
measure was environmental or not. Questions were asked both about measures that 
had already been implemented and about measures that would need to be taken if the 
plant were to improve its environmental performance.  
 
For each question, the interviewees selected an answer among five alternatives,226 
after which a detailed, open-ended discussion followed about why they had answered 
as they did. The respondents were asked to provide tangible examples to support their 
argument. They were also asked to consider whether and why their answers would 
have been different for some other environmental issue than water pollution. 
 
As expected, answers to questions in the second section varied between plants. The 
third section of the interview protocol was geared towards further investigating the 
specific circumstances of each plant that may have affected the answers. The 
interviewees were given a sheet with 10 unfinished sentences and asked to continue 
discussion from those sentences. The sentences followed the construction "We can / 
cannot benefit from voluntarily improving our environmental performance with 
regard to effluent discharges because our technology…" (because our plant…; 
because our firm…; because in our industry…; because our customers…; because our 
competitors…; because our permit limits…; because water pollution issues…; 
because nowadays…; because…) 
 
Similar to the second section, the third section thus included both a structured choice 
element (can / cannot benefit) as well as open-ended discussion to justify the 
selection. Note that the choice between can and cannot benefit had to be made from 
                                                 
226  No impact; moderate impact, positive or negative; significant impact, positive or negative. 
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scratch with each new sentence: some characteristics of the case could encourage 
voluntary improvements while others could discourage them at the same time. 
 
Again, the questions were formulated around effluent discharges to fortify the bridge 
between the statistical and case-study modules of the study. However, water pollution 
issues were constantly compared to other environmental issues; such comparisons 
could be used as a vehicle for bringing out any issue-specific factors affecting the link 
between environmental and economic performance. 
 
Finally, the interviewees were asked to describe their past and present compliance 
with effluent discharge permit limits. The information given about compliance in 
1988-1996 was used to triangulate the statistical and case-study data. The information 
given about compliance after 1996 was used to give perspective to those interview 
answers that dealt with present-day issues. 
 
Interviews with the regulatory authorities focused on the plants' permit limits, 
historical and present compliance, and attitude to environmental protection and 
relations with environmental authorities. 
 
The case plants were originally approached by telephoning the plant's highest ranking 
manager, explaining the reason for the interviews and asking for permission to include 
the plant as a case in the study. All managers that were contacted gave their 
permission, after which they were asked to supply the names of the other persons to 
be interviewed, and an interview date or dates were set up.  
 
The plant interviews were all personally conducted by the researcher, face-to-face, on 
the plant premises, between November 1999 and February 2000. One interview 
typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Some written material was collected 
during the interviews, too, and occasionally there was a site visit. A field diary 
containing memos, impressions, and interpretations was kept during the field research. 
One of the regulatory authorities was interviewed face-to-face and four by telephone. 
 
To motivate the respondents, the interviews started by explaining the purpose of the 
study. To ensure that the respondents felt comfortable about answering, it was 
guaranteed that the participating plants and persons would remain anonymous in the 
study. Tape-recording was used only if the informant agreed to it, which they all did. 
It was brought up that the study was financed by an independent research foundation 
and as such was not commissioned by any particular interest group. It was also 
emphasised that the starting point for the study was that sometimes environmental 
performance improvements had a positive effect, sometimes a negative effect, and 
sometimes no effect on economic performance, wherefore there were no single 
"correct" answers to the questions posed but anything experienced by a plant would 
be a correct answer in their specific case. The interviews were conducted using the 
respondents' terminology and language; research terms such as environmental profit 
were not used in the interviews. 
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6.1.3 Data analysis 
 
In principle, qualitative data analysis in multiple case studies consists of two steps. 
The first step is a within-case analysis where each case is examined as a separate 
entity: What explains the compliance performance of the plant? What kind of 
environment-related costs and revenues did the plant face, and why? The second step 
is a cross-case analysis where a comparison of similarities and differences of the cases 
helps to find something that goes beyond one case and is more generally true.  
 
In practice, the two steps are intertwined, and the whole analysis process is iterative. 
The holistic picture is updated with the addition of each case, and the new 
understanding gained reflected back to the individual cases. New cases are added until 
the situation is achieved where new cases do not bring additional information. 
Available literature can also be utilised throughout the process. This is illustrated in 
Figure 18. Miles and Huberman (1994) summarise the iterative nature of the analysis 
process: "You construct this evidential trail gradually, getting an initial sense of the 
main factors, plotting the logical relationships tentatively, testing them against the 
yield from the next wave of data collection, and modifying and refining them into a 
new explanatory map, which then gets tested against new cases and instances. This is 
the classic procedure of analytic induction."227 
 
 
Figure 18 The iterative process of data analysis 
 
                                                 
227  Miles, M B & Huberman, A M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis. An expanded sourcebook. 
Second edition. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 338 pages. Page 261. 
Time
Propositions
Data
>300 permits
57 phone calls
Case 1 Case 2 + 
cross-case
Case 3 + 
cross-case
... Case 11 + 
cross-case
Final
model
Literature
Initial model
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Recall that a data analysis plan was established already prior to the interviews and the 
interview protocol was designed with a view to that kind of data analysis. Coding data 
and developing propositions thus proceeded according to the data analysis plan. 
Instances relating to the link between a plant's environmental and economic 
performance were identified and coded as positive, negative, or neutral. The same 
instances were further coded with one or more codes that described the basis for 
assessing the relationship to be positive, negative, or neutral.  
 
It is typical of qualitative research that there is a large amount of data and a problem 
with the analysis is to sort out the essential information from the vast data mass. 
Following Wolcott (1990), the critical task in qualitative research is not to accumulate 
data, but to get rid of most of the data one accumulates.228 This is where the ideas of 
theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation step in to rationalise the highly time-
consuming transcribing and note-taking phase. Glaser and Strauss (1967) write that 
after theoretical saturation, the researcher begins to see quickly whether a piece of 
data points to a new aspect. If it does, the incident should be coded and compared, but 
if not the incident should not be coded "since it only adds bulk to the coded data and 
nothing to the theory".229  
 
Accordingly, in the early stages of the analysis, ten interviews from six plants were 
fully transcribed and coded, but as saturation approached, only new information was 
picked up from subsequent interview tapes. This analysis stage was assisted by the 
ATLAS.ti computer programme that has been designed for the qualitative analysis of 
large bodies of data.230 It should be noted that although computer programmes such as 
ATLAS.ti are useful for qualitative analysis, they do not conduct the actual 
intellectual work; they only facilitate tasks such as coding, annotating, searching, 
retrieving, comparing, and linking data segments. 
 
Finally, propositions relating the positive, negative, and neutral instances to 
environmental profit were developed. The propositions were organised into a model 
that reconstructs the underlying system of factors affecting the relationship between 
environmental and economic performance, and the avenues through which the factors 
influence environmental profit. The final model consisted of six main factors, 20 
lower-level factors, and a view on how they are linked to each other and to 
environmental profit. These will be explained and discussed in the Results section of 
the present chapter. 
 
Once the final model was thus arrived at, it was re-applied to each case to ensure 
within-case consistency and local explanatory power. To this end, a second round 
through the whole data mass was taken where each case was coded with the newly 
established determinants of environmental profit. A fundamental difference between 
                                                 
228  Wolcott, H F. 1990. Writing up qualitative research. Qualitative Research Methods 
Volume 20. Newbury Park, Sage Publications. 94 pages. Page 35. 
229  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. Page 111. 
230  See www.atlasti.de for more information on the program. 
 110
the two rounds through the data lies in the approach to saturation. In the first round, 
saturation was sought within the data as a whole, but in the second round, within each 
case.  
 
It is critical in a case-study analysis to ascertain that the results hold consistently for 
each case and for each factor. Within each case, the explanation rule must be able to 
cover all aspects of the phenomenon, and there must be no evidence that contradicts 
the explanation rule. Across cases, the explanation rule must hold for each individual 
case, not for some unreal "average" case. Nevertheless, the cases may still vary in 
their details.231  
 
Thus, the main analysis rule followed was the requirement of absolute explanation. 
According to Alasuutari (1994), in qualitative research, no exceptions to the 
explanation rule are allowed. This is in sharp contrast with quantitative research 
where results apply with a particular probability and usually at best cover the 
behaviour of a significant majority. The absolute explanation is a feature that makes 
qualitative research attractive for the present research problem. In a quantitative study, 
exceptions are disturbances that dampen the results, but in a case study, one can get 
valuable insights by focusing on the exceptions. When encountering disconfirming 
evidence, a qualitative researcher is forced to modify the explanation framework or 
raise abstraction level until all the exceptions can be accommodated.232 As King et al. 
(1994) note, such modifications then require the collection of new data to test the new 
version of the explanation framework through replication.233 
 
Table 13, below, illustrates which factors surfaced in which of the eleven cases. 
However, for confidentiality, the table does not reveal the details of whether and why 
a particular factor was promoting or hindering win-win situations in each instance.234 
To elaborate on this issue for reporting purposes without breaking the confidentiality, 
a crude scoring system was applied to the data. In each case, if a factor was conducive 
to the creation of a win-win situation, it was awarded the score 1. If it hindered the 
creation of a win-win situation, it was awarded the score -1. If the factor was present 
in the case, but had a neutral effect on the creation of a win-win situation, it was 
awarded the score 0. The score 0 was awarded also in situations where the factor in 
some respects promoted but in some respects discouraged win-win situations and 
where it was impossible to say which effect predominated. Recall that already the 
original data analysis plan included coding instances relating to the link between a 
plant's environmental and economic performance as positive, negative, or neutral.   
 
                                                 
231 Yin, R K. 1989. Case study research. Design and methods. Revised edition. Newbury 
Park, Sage Publications. 
232  Alasuutari, P. 1994. Laadullinen tutkimus. Tampere, Vastapaino. 281 pages. Pages 31-33. 
233  King, G, Keohane, R O & Verba, S. 1994. Designing social inquiry. Scientific inference in 
qualitative research. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 247 pages. Pages 21-22. 
234 For some details on the empirical manifestations of the determinants of environmental 
profit, see Appendix IV. 
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Hence, average scores above zero denote circumstances that have generally been 
favourable to the creation of win-win situations, and average scores below zero denote 
circumstances that have generally prevented win-win situations. Note that this scoring 
system is, indeed, rough and does not capture the richness of the data that was 
available to the researcher. For example, the scoring system is unable to recognise any 
weighting between the factors. Note, too, that Figure 19 and Figure 20 include only 
that part of the interview data that relates to water pollution, since the compliance 
status to which the scores are compared refers to water pollution only. 
 
Figure 19 addresses the issue of how well the case analysis results are able to explain 
the compliance behaviour of each individual plant. It contains the average score for 
the six overcomplying plants and the five non-complying plants in the sample. The 
figure shows that the results hold consistently: all of the overcomplying plants have 
scores above zero, and all of the non-complying plants have scores below zero.  
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Figure 19 Average total scores for each plant in the sample. Average scores 
above zero denote circumstances that have generally been favourable 
to the creation of win-win situations, and average scores below zero 
denote circumstances that have generally prevented win-win 
situations. The figure shows that the case analysis results hold for each 
individual plant in the sample 
 
Figure 20, in turn, examines how well the case analysis results hold for each 
individual factor. It shows the average scores per lower-level factor for the 
overcomplying plants as one group and for the non-complying plants as another 
group. The factors will be discussed in the Results section of the present chapter. The 
figure shows that the results are very consistent also across factors. The scores for 
non-complying plants have tended to be below zero, and the scores for overcomplying 
plants have tended to be above zero. Moreover, the non-complying cases have 
generally scored lower than the overcomplying cases on each factor, with one 
exception. The overcomplying cases have scored even lower than the non-complying 
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cases on management history. This, however, makes sense. As will be explained in 
the Results section, management history relates to the plant's absolute level of 
environmental performance and measures taken to achieve it. For the overcomplying 
plants, few low-cost abatement alternatives may remain on hand since they have 
already been exhausted in the past. 
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Figure 20 Average scores per lower-level factor for overcomplying and non-
complying plants in the sample. The factors are explained in the 
Results section of the chapter. Average scores above zero denote 
circumstances that have generally been favourable to the creation of 
win-win situations, and average scores below zero denote 
circumstances that have generally prevented win-win situations. The 
figure shows that the case analysis results hold for each individual 
factor 
 
Figure 20 also discloses that certain lower-level factors (location, spillovers, and 
pressure) have tended to promote win-win situations even for the non-complying 
plants. Similarly, certain lower-level factors (management history, physical history, 
size, distance, and benefit) have tended to hinder win-win situations even for the 
overcomplying plants.235 This might possibly imply something on the prevalence of 
certain conditions favourable and unfavourable to the creation of win-win situations. 
However, it must be stressed that the sample being a theoretical sample prevents any 
generalisation of this finding.  
 
Reporting qualitative data analysis in linear text is difficult since the analysis simply 
does not proceed in a linear manner. To explain the data analysis, it was already 
necessary to make reference in this section to the six main factors and the 20 lower-
                                                 
235 See also Appendix V which illustrates how it is indeed the overall combination of the 
determinants of environmental profit that is important. 
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level factors determining environmental profit. However, it should be emphasised that 
these factors emerged only as a result of the analysis. They were not established a 
priori and then operationalised and sought in the data. This is because the purpose of 
the case studies was to suggest theory, not to test theory. In fact, it would be plain 
wrong to attempt testing a theory or measuring the magnitude of the relationships in 
the model with the present data, since data collection was based on theoretical 
sampling.  
 
Table 12 lists the factors in the initial model, after an examination of some case data 
but prior to the case interviews, and those in the final model, after the case interviews 
and full data analysis (see also Figure 18). A comparison of the initial model and the 
final model shows how considerably the factors changed during the iterative data 
analysis process. The essence of all factors that were in the initial model is present in 
the final model. None of the initial factors thus proved to be completely irrelevant. 
However, the final model contains several factors that were absent from the initial 
model.  
 
Table 12 Factors in the initial model prior to case interviews, and those in the 
final model after the case interviews and iterative data analysis. The 
factors are explained in the Results section of the chapter 
 
Factors in the initial model Factors in the final model 
FIRM 
- Absolute level of environmental 
performance 
- Production technology 
- Economic performance 
- Firm size 
- Cost structure 
PRODUCT 
- Scope for environmental image 
differentiation 
- Scope for environmental content 
differentiation 
- Price elasticity of demand 
CUSTOMER 
- Direction of sales and customer segment 
COMPETITOR 
- Market structure 
- Benchmark for price 
- Benchmark for environmental 
performance 
REGULATION 
- Level of environmental performance 
required 
- Types of regulatory instruments used 
POLLUTANT 
- Sensitivity of issue 
- Technological solutions 
TECHNOLOGY 
- Issue 
- Management history 
- Physical history 
REGIME 
- Strictness 
- Instruments 
VISIBILITY 
- Location 
- Size 
- Issue 
- Champions 
- Spillovers 
- Distance 
- End product 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
- Ethical 
- Pressure 
- Benefit 
BENCHMARKS 
- Environmental performance 
- Price 
DISCOUNT RATE 
- Owners 
- Slack 
- Risk 
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that, typically, lower-level variables emerge fast from 
the data.236 Table 13 confirms this: the 20 lower-level factors of the final model were 
quite clearly identifiable from the interviews and the set of factors was remarkably 
similar from case to case. The saturation of these factors was thus achieved well 
before entering the last case plant.  
 
Table 13 The occurrence of lower-level factors in the eleven case plants. A 
shaded cell denotes that the factor surfaced in the case as affecting the 
relationship between environmental and economic performance. The 
factors are explained in the Results section of the chapter 
 
Case plant Lower-level 
factor 
Link to 
env. 
profit 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
Issue (tech.) C            
Mgmt history C            
Physical history C            
Strictness C            
Instruments C            
Location C,R            
Size C,R            
Issue (visib.) C,R            
Champions C,R            
Spillovers C,R            
Distance C,R            
End product C,R            
Ethical R            
Pressure R            
Benefit R            
Env. perf. R            
Price R            
Owners C,R            
Slack C,R            
Risk C,R            
C = factor is linked to environmental profit through costs 
R = factor is linked to environmental profit through revenues 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) continue to note that the integrating variables tend to appear 
later during the data analysis process.237 Indeed, the cross-case comparisons gradually 
allowed the main factors to emerge. A crucial difference between the initial and the 
final model is evident in Table 12 in the type of the main factors – six in each model – 
that integrate the lower-level factors. In the initial model, the main factors lack 
conceptual insight.  Rather than a theory, the initial model resembles a way of 
organising facts in logical groupings. Glaser and Strauss (1967) warn of the risk of 
slipping "from the true generation of formal theory to the simple ordering of a mass of 
                                                 
236  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. Page 36. 
237  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. Page 36. 
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data under a logically worked-out set of categories".238 In the final model, the main 
factors are more conceptual, abstract, and analytic. 
 
6.2 Results: determinants of environmental profit 
 
As has been noted several times, the relationship between environmental performance 
and economic performance is not a black and white issue. The proponents of a 
positive link admit that offsets against environmental costs cannot always be obtained. 
The proponents of a negative link admit that such offsets can sometimes be obtained. 
Heyes and Liston-Heyes (1999) note that there is no dispute over the existence of 
offsets against environmental costs, the dispute is over the significance of such 
offsets.239 The question is thus not whether, but when offsets are available; in other 
words, what determines environmental profit. 
 
The final outcome of the case studies was a model of factors affecting environmental 
profit. It consists of six main factors that together determine environmental profit:  
 
- technology - what measures can be taken to improve environmental performance 
and how much do they cost 
 
- regime - the "rules of the game", the system of economic and command-and-
control regulatory instruments under which the firm operates 
 
- visibility - the extent to which the environmental performance improvement is 
perceived by relevant stakeholders 
 
- willingness to pay - the extent to which customers are willing to pay for the 
environmental performance improvement 
 
- benchmarks - how the firm's offering compares to the competition after the 
environmental performance improvement 
 
- discount rate - how the firm weighs long-term vs. short-term costs and revenues 
 
Technology, regime, visibility, and discount rate determine the costs of an 
environmental performance improvement. Visibility, willingness to pay, benchmarks, 
and discount rate determine the revenues from an environmental performance 
improvement. These relationships are shown in Figure 21, together with the 20 lower-
level factors that affect the six main determinants of environmental profit. Note the 
agreement of the revenue-side determinants with Reinhardt's (1998) necessary and 
                                                 
238  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. Page 92. 
239  Heyes, A G & Liston-Heyes, C. 1999. Corporate lobbying, regulatory conduct and the 
Porter hypothesis. Environmental and Resource Economics, 13. Pages 209-218. 
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sufficient conditions for successful environmental differentiation: customer 
willingness to pay for environmental differentiation, credible information about the 
environmental and private benefits conferred by the product, and inability of 
competitors to replicate the environmental differentiation.240  
 
 
 
Figure 21 Determinants of environmental profit. The discount rate acts as a lens 
through which costs and revenues traverse 
 
Each of the six main factors in the model, and the 20 lower-level factors that they in 
turn depend on, will be elaborated in the following six sections. Selected quotations 
from the case interviews are incorporated in the discussion for illustration purposes: to 
show examples of how the factors were either promoting or hindering win-win 
situations in the case plants. The quotations are freely translated from Finnish, the 
language in which the interviews were conducted. 
 
6.2.1 Technology 
 
The technology factor captures the direct changes in production costs that a particular 
environmental performance improvement brings. Stakeholder costs relate to the 
visibility factor and will be discussed later.  
 
                                                 
240  Reinhardt, F L. 1998. Environmental product differentiation: implications for corporate 
strategy. California Management Review, volume 40, 4. Pages 43-73. 
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Technology is here understood broadly: all measures and solutions to improve 
environmental performance, be they installment of hardware, changes in operating 
practices, reduction of output, or suchlike. The costs of an environmental performance 
improvement can be negative (savings) or positive (cost increases). 
 
Factors affecting technology are the environmental issue in question, the plant's 
management history, and the plant's physical history. The issue matters because the 
set of available technological solutions is different for different environmental issues. 
The plant's management and physical history matter because they may place 
constraints to the feasibility of the available solutions for the plant in question. 
 
Issue. The costs, fixed and variable, of an environmental performance improvement 
depend on the type of measure that can be implemented. For example, some measures 
entail economies of scale, disadvantaging small plants. All this varies between issues. 
If pollution prevention through process innovations is possible, if materials can be 
recovered and recycled, inputs and waste reduced, cost savings are possible. By 
contrast, end-of-pipe solutions for pollution control and treatment only add to the 
costs. This has also been noted by several authors.241,242,243 Reinhardt (1999b) argues 
that if short-run cost savings can be realised through improved environmental 
performance, they are most likely to arise through reductions in quantities of 
purchased materials and services.244 Accordingly, cost savings are common in areas 
such as energy, waste, packaging, and water pollution. As noted by one plant 
representative, "investments to save energy are usually quite secure, and the price of 
energy does not usually go down". Another plant representative said that "before we 
used to invest in effluent treatment, and that cost us money. Now we invest in reducing 
water consumption and it saves us water, energy, and chemicals".  
 
Noise, on the other hand, is an example of an issue where costs savings are more 
difficult to obtain: "Of all our environmental issues, noise is such that there is no way 
to extract economic benefits from noise reduction, it just requires a lot of costs. We 
have had eight environmental projects, and the noise project was the only one where 
we could identify no economic benefits." 
 
The universe of available solutions for an issue, and their costs, changes with 
technological development. Technological development usually – but not necessarily 
– means better environmental solutions and lower abatement costs.  
                                                 
241  Porter, M E & van der Linde, C. 1995b. Toward a new conception of the environment-
competitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 9, 4. Pages 97-
118. 
242  Mahoney, M & Swaine, A. 1994. Executive commentary to Dechant, K & Altman, B. 
Environmental leadership: From compliance to competitive advantage. Academy of 
Management Executive, volume 8, 3. Pages 7-27. 
243  Klassen, R D & Whybark, D C. 1999. The impact of environmental technologies on 
manufacturing performance. Academy of Management Journal, volume 42, 6. Pages 599-
615. 
244  Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Pages 89-90. 
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Management history. The existing level of environmental performance of a plant 
affects the costs of environmental improvements. Because of increasing marginal 
abatement costs, the better the absolute level of environmental performance already is 
the more expensive are further improvements. Cairncross (1992) argues that the costs 
of environmental performance increase rapidly as firms become cleaner. Some 
environmental activities may be costless, but eventually a profit impact will be felt.245 
One plant manager said that "now that we are in compliance 99 per cent of the time, if 
we want to increase that to 99.9 per cent, the last one per cent is going to be 
extremely expensive. But if things are going all wrong, if you are in compliance, say, 
20 per cent of the time, it may not take more than changing your way of thinking to 
get it up to 40 per cent". Past activities that have been carried out to improve 
environmental performance thus determine where on its environmental profit curve a 
plant is situated: whether it has already passed the turning point of private optimum or 
not. 
 
This also depends on the measures taken to reach the present level of environmental 
performance. Certain environmental performance improvements are free or even carry 
a negative cost, some others are inexpensive, but some are costly. It was noted in 
chapter 4 that, in principle, plants ought to exhaust the least expensive options first, 
but that this may not happen because of imperfect information on abatement 
opportunities and their costs. Therefore, costless or inexpensive abatement 
opportunities can occasionally be found even at high levels of environmental 
performance. As one plant manager put it: "There are still a lot of measures out there 
that we could do for free, that are just between people's ears … if we could make our 
people think differently … if we do not succeed, authorities may require that we invest 
in some equipment to diminish this problem, but we could achieve the same result just 
by changing operating practices." 
 
If a plant has implemented environmental performance improvements in the order of 
increasing marginal abatement costs, inexpensive opportunities to improve 
environmental performance may already have been depleted. "We closed our water 
cycles already in the 1960's, because the pollutant in the effluent is [our raw 
material] and it was easily recoverable, thus it made sense to recover it. Now there 
are no easy measures left to improve our effluents, there is nothing significant left that 
could be recovered." Baylis et al. (1998b) note that when the options to minimise 
pollution without capital expenditure are exhausted, realising net savings from 
environmental investments becomes more difficult.246 
                                                 
245  Cairncross, F. 1992. UNCED, environmentalism and beyond. Columbia Journal of World 
Business, volume 27, 3&4. Pages 12-17. 
246  Baylis, R, Connell, L & Flynn, A. 1998b. Company size, environmental regulation and 
ecological modernization: further analysis at the level of the firm. Business Strategy and 
the Environment, 7. Pages 285-296. 
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Reinhardt (1999b) notes that many answers to questions about cost savings depend on 
the baseline that is chosen for comparison.247 In practice, plants may not even realise 
that the first, costless environmental performance improvements are indeed win-win 
situations. The environmental manager of one plant said that "we have this process 
where [our raw material] is recovered from emissions, but it cannot be considered 
savings because it has been like this from the beginning, the recovery has always been 
a natural part of the process". Because the very first environmental performance 
improvements are so evidently sensible business, plants may not recognise the early 
part of the rising portion of their environmental profit curve.  
 
Organisational and cultural factors also play a role. For example, the presence of an 
environmental management system can, in the best case, shift the entire cost curve 
down by making the search for and implementation of environmental performance 
improvements systematic and efficient. "Our environmental management system 
forces us to be disciplined. We have to be well-organised and research all options 
carefully, which has helped us to find opportunities for cost savings."  
 
Christmann (2000) studied the effects of firm resources and capabilities on win-win 
situations and found that capabilities for process innovation and implementation were 
complementary assets that were needed to achieve cost reductions from the 
implementation of environmental initiatives.248 Reinhardt (1999b) argues that 
sufficient flexibility and appropriate information and incentive systems are needed to 
realise cost savings.249 Kemp et al. (1992) write that technological opportunities for 
environmental innovation depend on the size and type of the knowledge base within 
an organisation, which in turn is shaped by the organisation's past activities.250  
 
Physical history. The physical conditions such as the selected production technology, 
the existing buildings and equipment, the age of the facilities, and their location, may 
constrain the feasible set of abatement options for a plant. Colby et al. (1995) note 
that, for these reasons, the distribution of environmental costs is uneven and may vary 
by several hundred per cent between competitors.251 For example, Lahti-Nuuttila 
(1997) writes that a plant's location affects the availability of different energy sources 
                                                 
247  Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Page 81. 
248  Christmann, P. 2000. Effects of "best practices" of environmental management on cost 
advantage: the role of complementary assets. Academy of Management Journal, August, 
forthcoming. 
249 Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Pages 99-100. 
250  Kemp, R, Olsthoorn, X, Oosterhuis, F & Verbruggen, H. 1992. Supply and demand factors 
of cleaner technologies: some empirical evidence. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 2. Pages 615-634. 
251  Colby, S, Kingsley, T & Whitehead, B W. 1995. The real green issue. Debunking the 
myths of environmental management. The McKinsey Quarterly, 2. Pages 132-143. 
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and thus the opportunities to reduce atmospheric emissions.252 One of the plant 
representatives noted that "we are so remote from any other industrial plants that it 
reduces our options to practice industrial ecology". 
 
Stevens (1993) argues that the more an industry is typified by large non-recoverable 
expenditures on plant and equipment the more it is inclined to experience increased 
costs due to environmental investments. This is especially the case if such investments 
cannot be timed to fit in the usual investment cycle.253 Thus, capital- and technology-
intensive industries with long investment cycles and high sunk costs may face more 
adjustment costs than labour-intensive industries. One plant representative noted that 
"our machinery is not as capital-intensive as in some other plants, it is easier for us to 
implement changes because they are a bit smaller in scale, we have small but frequent 
investments, someone else has seldom occurring large investments". By contrast, in 
another plant "we always remain prisoners of our technology, once we have selected a 
technology, we have to live with it. This industry is extremely capital-intensive, you 
cannot change the basic technology, just renew small parts of it".  
 
Whether the production facilities are new or existing may also matter. Dramatic process 
changes can usually be made with new facilities.254 When retrofitting existing 
technologies and facilities, only the less innovative and less cost-efficient end-of-pipe 
solutions may be available. In one plant, "our buildings are 100 years old, and this 
forces us to certain solutions, if we could start over from scratch we could implement 
these measures differently". In another plant, "we have constant problems with lack of 
space. The buildings were originally built for a production capacity that was half of 
what we are aiming at now, and to install some environmental equipment here is a 
problem." 
 
To sum up, technology affects the costs of investments in environmental performance. 
Win-win situations are more likely to arise if process changes to prevent pollution are 
possible; if the plant's environmental performance is not yet very high; if the plant has 
ignored inexpensive abatement opportunities in the past (failed to pick the "low-
hanging fruit"); if the plant has developed a systematic and cost-effective approach to 
environmental performance, for example, with the help of an environmental 
management system; if the production technology is not capital-intensive; if the 
investment cycles are short; if the plant's physical location does not constrain 
abatement options; and if the production facilities are relatively new or old enough to 
justify a complete rebuild. 
 
                                                 
252  Lahti-Nuuttila, K. 1997. Environmental performance of the Finnish pulp and paper 
industry. Paper presented at the 4th conference of the Nordic Business Environmental 
Management Network. June 5-7, Tuohilampi, Finland. 11 pages. 
253  Stevens, C. 1993. Do environmental policies affect competitiveness? The OECD 
Observer, 183. Pages 22-25. 
254  Shrivastava, P. 1995. Environmental technologies and competitive advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, volume 16. Pages 183-200. 
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Win-win situations are less likely to arise if only end-of-pipe solutions to control 
pollution are available; if the plant's environmental performance is already very high; 
if the plant has already exploited the inexpensive abatement opportunities (picked the 
"low-hanging fruit"); if the plant's organisational capabilities for implementing a 
systematic and cost-effective approach to environmental performance are weak; if the 
production technology is capital-intensive; if the investment cycles are long; if the 
plant's physical location constrains abatement options; and if the production facilities 
are relatively old but not old enough to justify a complete rebuild. 
 
6.2.2 Regime 
 
The regime factor captures regulatory costs that relate to an environmental 
performance level. Regime includes all the regulatory instruments that together create 
the "rules of the game" within which a plant operates: environmental taxes, charges, 
subsidies, quotas, bans, and the like.  
 
The impact of regime on environmental profit is through avoided costs, in other 
words, cost prevention. Improving environmental performance reduces the amount of 
environmental taxes and charges to be paid, as well as fines or other punitive 
measures from exceeding a quota or violating a ban. It can even postpone or cancel 
the implementation of new environmental regulatory measures. Factors affecting 
regime include both regulatory strictness and the types of regulatory instruments used.  
 
Regulatory strictness. For the purposes of the present study, regulatory strictness is 
best considered in relation to the plant's private optimum for environmental 
performance. If the regulations specify a level of environmental performance that is 
much higher than the plant's private optimum without the regulation, the plant will not 
perceive opportunities for a win-win situation. One plant representative that felt this 
was the situation noted that "the requirements are too strict, it is even difficult to find 
equipment in the market that is good enough for meeting the requirements with 
somewhat reasonable costs". If, on the other hand, the regulations specify a level of 
environmental performance that is much lower than the plant's private optimum 
without the regulation, win-win situations may be perceived. Reinhardt (1997) notes 
that firms with technological leadership may be in a good position to create and 
capture value from environmental performance, because regulators rely on these firms 
when assessing technological possibilities and appropriate regulatory limits.255 
 
Regulatory instruments. Apart from the actual strictness of regulations, many authors 
have stressed that the regulatory process and the instruments used significantly 
                                                 
255  Reinhardt, F L. 1997. Environmental quality and economic advantage: A framework for 
understanding corporate environmental management. Harvard Business School Working 
Paper 97-071. 35 pages. Page 29. 
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influence the costs of compliance.256 Repetto (1992) has argued that the costs of 
environmental protection are at least twice as high as they would need to be because 
cleanup and control responsibilities have not been allocated cost-effectively.257 
Brännlund et al. (1998) maintain that the Swedish pulp and paper industry would have 
achieved the same total emissions target but earned up to six per cent higher profits in 
1989 and one per cent higher profits in 1990 if emissions trading had been used 
instead of non-tradable individual permits.258  
 
Part of the emphasis given to this issue is perhaps due to the adversarial nature 
perceived in the U.S. environmental regulatory system. Porter and van der Linde 
(1995a) note that much of the environmental spending goes in the regulatory struggle 
itself.259 A co-operative, stable, predictable, innovation-enhancing regulatory 
framework has been called for to reduce the costs of environmental compliance and to 
increase opportunities for win-win situations. 
 
It is important to recognise the difference between the possibility for win-win 
situations under a certain regime, and the possibility for win-win situations when 
shifting from one regime to another. This is another example where the setting of an 
appropriate baseline for comparison is so crucial.260 For example, there are fewer win-
win situations under a regime without environmental economic instruments. One plant 
manager noted that "water is cheap, and, therefore, you cannot get anything, you 
cannot justify any investment by the fact that you would consume less water, because 
you would really have to consume it very much less before it would make any 
difference".  
 
Under a regime where there are environmental taxes and charges, more environmental 
performance improvements are win-win situations. The plant manager of another 
plant said: "I wish that the waste charges were higher, then we could have bought new 
equipment here, then it would have been profitable. If the waste charges were 700 or 
1000 marks per ton, and if we transport 1000 tons to a landfill each year, then 
something is bound to happen, but as long as the charges are not there we do not 
have to calculate that way…" However, the shift from one type of regime to another is 
not necessarily (but may be) a win-win situation for a plant. The same plant manager 
continued: "… but of course such waste charges cannot be implemented if someone 
has to pay them and competitors do not have to pay anything, that is the problem".  
                                                 
256  See, for example, Porter, M & van der Linde, C. 1995a. Green and competitive: Ending 
the stalemate. Harvard Business Review, September-October. Pages 120-134. 
257  Repetto, R. 1992. Environmental taxes and U.S. competitiveness. Columbia Journal of 
World Business, volume 27, 3&4. Pages 128-134. 
258  Brännlund, R, Chung, Y, Färe, R & Grosskopf, S. 1998. Emissions trading and 
profitability: the Swedish pulp and paper industry. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, volume 12, 3. Pages 345-356. 
259  Porter, M & van der Linde, C. 1995a. Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. 
Harvard Business Review, September-October. Pages 120-134. 
260  Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Page 98. 
 
 123
 
To sum up, the regulatory regime affects the costs of investments in environmental 
performance. Win-win situations are more likely to arise if the level of environmental 
performance required of a plant is not higher than the plant's private optimum without 
the regulation, and if the rules of the game already include economic incentives to 
improve environmental performance. 
 
Win-win situations are less likely to arise if the level of environmental performance 
required of a plant is higher than the plant's private optimum without the regulation, 
and if the rules of the game do not include economic incentives to improve 
environmental performance. 
 
6.2.3 Visibility 
 
The visibility factor captures the extent to which relevant stakeholders perceive the 
firm's environmental performance and changes in it. Visibility is simply about: Will 
anyone know? It is worth noting that "knowing" does not necessarily mean that the 
stakeholders perceive the environmental performance correctly. 
 
Visibility is linked to environmental profit both through costs and revenues. When it 
comes to costs, relevant stakeholders can be local inhabitants, employees, authorities, 
the general public, the media, and so on. When it comes to revenues, the relevant 
stakeholders are the customers.  
 
A problem follows from the central role of perceptions in environmental visibility. 
From the perspective of a firm, how its environmental performance is perceived is 
more important than what the environmental performance actually is. But, for the 
state of the environment, only actual deeds are important, not perceptions. It is 
possible that in some cases this disparity serves to point firms' environmental 
activities into directions that do not improve environmental quality.  
 
Visibility in the environmental context was first explicitly explored by Bowen 
(2000b). She found environmental visibility to be an important predictor of 
environmental responsiveness in firms, and developed a typology where visibility was 
considered both a characteristics of an organisation and of an issue, at both the 
corporate level and the operating unit level.261 
 
Visibility resembles the concept of outputs by Mathur and Kenyon (1997).262 
Something that is not visible cannot be an output, and characteristics that are not 
outputs do not enter the customer's mind when making a purchasing decision. 
                                                 
261  Bowen, F E. 2000b. Environmental visibility: a trigger of green organisational response? 
Business Strategy and the Environment, volume 9, 2. Pages 92-107. 
262  Mathur, S S & Kenyon, A. 1997. Creating value: shaping tomorrow's business. Oxford, 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 451 pages. 
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Visibility is affected by several factors: location, size, issue, champions, spillovers, 
distance, and end product.  
 
Location. The location – both in the biogeophysical and socio-economic sense – 
affects visibility. The biogeophysical location refers to the plant's location with 
respect to the surrounding natural environment. The carrying capacity of the 
surrounding environment and how "significant" and "treasured" the environmental 
resource is affect the visibility of the plant's environmental impacts. For one plant, 
visibility was enhanced by the fact that "our receiving water body is such a small 
creek, even the smallest disturbances are visible all the way to [a large town some 50 
kilometres away]". 
 
The socio-economic location refers to the plant's location with respect to the 
surrounding people. Local populations may differ in the amount of environmental 
damage they tolerate. Arora and Cason (1999) found evidence that community 
characteristics, such as race and gender, and economic characteristics, such as income 
levels and unemployment, may influence toxic releases in the United States. They 
found, however, no evidence that the propensity of communities to engage in political 
action influenced toxic releases.263 Afsah et al. (1996) concluded from a number of 
studies in different countries that "much of the variation in factories' environmental 
performance is explained by inter-community variation in income, education and 
bargaining power."264 One of the plant representatives in the present study said: "We 
are situated here in the middle of holiday resorts, we have been thinking that when 
you look at us from there, perhaps one day there will be a requirement that we must 
stop operating here, and this is one of the reasons why we have been paying attention 
to our environmental impacts". The situation was different for another case plant: "it 
is a small village, and all the inhabitants are employed by this plant, there have been 
no outsiders to put pressure on the plant". 
 
Size. Size affects visibility, large plants being generally more visible than small 
ones.265 Large plants may thus stand to gain more from undertaking environmental 
performance improvements, for example, by avoiding negative publicity.  In addition 
to size in terms of turnover, production, market share, or employment, size can also be 
considered in terms of pollution. A plant's size as a polluter can be compared to other    
                                                 
263  Arora, S & Cason, T N. 1999. Do community characteristics influence environmental 
outcomes? Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory.  Southern Economic Journal, 65. 
Pages 691-716. 
264  Afsah, S, Laplante, B & Wheeler, D. 1996. Controlling industrial pollution: A new 
paradigm. World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 1672, October. 
265  In addition to visibility, size may matter in the context of issue (technology) and slack. 
These are discussed under the appropriate headings. See also Bowen, F E. 2000a. Does 
size matter? A meta-analysis of the relationship between organisation size and 
environmental responsiveness. Paper presented at the International Association for 
Business and Society (IABS) Annual Meeting, Burlington, Vermont, March 16-19. 
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polluters of the recipient, or the carrying capacity of the recipient. Environmental 
impacts that are spatially concentrated, thus exceeding the carrying capacity of nature, 
are the first targets of regulators, environmental groups and customers.  
 
By contrast, small polluters may gain less from improvements because both their 
environmental impacts and eventual improvements may go unnoticed. According to 
one plant representative, "we cannot get any benefits from reducing our effluents, 
neither from authorities nor from customers … the river's condition would not be 
improved, because our emissions are insignificant compared to the river's flow and to 
the emissions of all the other emitters". For another plant, "the other emitters in this 
area are larger than us, this kills our motivation to further improve". Garber and 
Hammitt (1998) found that additional Superfund exposure increased the cost of 
capital for large chemical industry firms, but perhaps not for smaller firms. They 
proposed as one potential explanation for this finding that investors were less well 
informed about the relative Superfund exposure of smaller companies.266 
  
Issue. Environmental issues vary, not only in the availability of technological 
solutions but also in the visibility of the issues themselves. Some issues are uncertain 
and proceed slowly (climate change), some are not easily perceived by non-experts 
(the extinction of an insect species), others can be immediately perceived by anyone 
(noise, smell, dust). Bowen (2000b) found that the sensory visibility of issues played a 
role in the amount of local environmental attention a plant received.267 One plant 
representative noted that "there have sometimes been complaints when there has been 
foam on the river, even though it is not harmful or anything, but it is foam and 
everybody can see it, and they do not know what it is". Another plant representative 
declared that "it is our objective to improve our environmental performance so that 
our neighbours can perceive it, but when it comes to liquid effluents, we get no 
benefits from overcompliance, because it is not apparent to our neighbours". 
 
A distinction needs to be made between production externalities and consumption 
externalities. Production externalities are those that arise during the production of the 
product, consumption externalities those that arise during the use or disposal of the 
product. Production externalities may attract only local visibility, especially if the 
scope of the environmental issue is local. Consumption externalities, on the other 
hand, travel with the product and may thus be more visible to customers. "Packaging 
is more important to our customers than effluents, because the customers receive the 
packaging, and then they have to get rid of it." 
 
Champions. A visibility champion may actively promote the visibility of an 
environmental issue or the environmental impacts of a plant. Whether some issue or 
plant thus becomes "hot" may not be entirely dependent on the actual seriousness of 
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the physical environmental impact. Steger and Winter (1996) found that the most 
decisive determinant of the "take-off" of an environmental issue was the presence of a 
group or institution that is devoted to pursuing the issue.268 Kirchhoff (2000) notes 
that since high environmental performance is usually a credence good, that is, 
unobservable from the product itself, customers depend on methods such as 
advertising and labeling to form opinions on environmental performance.269 
 
Almost anyone can become a visibility champion: the plant itself, an information-
seeking customer, a competitor, the media, a non-governmental organisation, the 
regulator, an industry association, or investors. It is also possible that some party 
actively tries to reduce the environmental visibility of an issue or a plant.  
 
If a plant is to become an effective visibility champion, it has to be able to provide 
credible environmental information to the relevant stakeholders. For example, if the 
plant sells to a large number of constantly changing consumers, perhaps around the 
world, it is difficult to reach the customers with detailed, factual environmental 
information. Or, as noted by Reinhardt (1998), if the product accounts for a minor 
fraction of the customer's budget, or is peripheral to the customer's activity, attracting 
sufficient attention to provide this information is difficult.270 
 
By contrast, if the plant has few and stable customer relationships, maybe with 
industrial clients or otherwise large customers, providing information is easier. One of 
the plant representatives expressed this as follows: "It is a question of providing 
information … Not only is there the physical improvement, but even more critical is 
getting the message there. It requires time and financial resources, because 
influencing opinions is hard. With our large customers we can influence the decision-
maker, because he is a professional buyer and we are face-to-face, but on the retail 
side we cannot influence individual consumers the same way." 
 
Even plants with a high level of environmental performance may sometimes lack the 
motivation to become visibility champions for their own environmental performance.  
A plant may consider it best not to wake sleeping dogs, out of fear that by promoting 
the visibility of its good environmental performance in one issue, it may expose other 
aspects of its environmental performance, other plants in the company or corporation, 
or its environmental performance in other time periods to increased scrutiny. Welford 
and Gouldson (1993) point out that before championing their good environmental 
performance, firms need to ensure that there are no gaps or inaccuracies in the 
message and that the message is indeed able to confer competitive advantage in the 
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markets.271 One plant representative said: "Because of [another plant in the same 
corporation] we have kept a low profile, so that we do not put it in unfavourable light. 
And, anyway, it would be unwise to start emphasising environmental issues when no 
one has asked about them … then you should perform so well in all issues … it is not 
wise to elevate yourself to a high position where it is easy to shoot you down".  
 
For another plant, the reasons for not championing its environmental performance 
were less strategic: "We have done many things but we haven't been telling about 
them … Some firms make a lot of noise even when there is no reason, but for us it has 
been the contrary. We should have taken everything out of [a major environmental 
improvement that was implemented] but we did not. We have largely been a 
production unit, there have been no marketing people involved in this, there has been 
no such communications culture." 
 
A competitor can act as a visibility champion in two ways. It can publicise its own 
good environmental performance: "Competition is tough, we cannot afford to lag 
behind. If a competitor improves its environmental performance, it will not let it go 
unadvertised. This won't appeal to the general public, but we have gatekeepers in our 
distribution channel to whom it does." Or, a competitor can expose deficiencies in the 
environmental performance of other producers:  "If we work for [an industrial 
customer], they require that environmental issues are taken care of, they produce an 
expensive product to export markets, and they have themselves invested a lot last year 
in effluent treatment, they say that when the product is sold in the U.S., a competitor 
may say that look, this is the product of [the industrial customer], and their 
environmental issues are not taken care of, they cannot afford this at all, they have to 
perform so that no-one has anything to say against them." 
 
Media interest in the environmental performance of a plant or in an environmental 
issue is augmented by recent serious environmental incidents regarding the plant or 
the issue. Media interest in plants that belong to publicly traded firms is also 
heightened. The media as a visibility champion were perceived by several plant 
representatives to promote especially negative visibility: "Bad news always spread 
fast in the media and are remembered by people. If we exceed our emission quota, 
that is news, but if we overcomply by the same amount, that is not news."  
 
Campaigns by environmental or other non-governmental organisations also increase 
the visibility of an environmental issue. According to Elkington (1994), for their 
campaigns, environmentalists have picked "cascade targets", that is, firms or 
industries whose "distress resonates through an extended supply chain".272 In this way, 
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customer environmental attention is drawn to an increasing number of industries: 
targeting paper industry also affects the pulp and chemical industries as well as the 
forestry sector. One plant manager said that "the hot issues are chosen and promoted 
by non-governmental organisations. Once some issue has been taken care of, the 
fashion is over and attention shifts to the next topic. The old topic is forgotten but 
remains at an improved level." 
 
The authorities have several ways of promoting environmental visibility. They can 
launch campaigns that are explicitly aimed at informing stakeholders of an 
environmental issue. They can establish voluntary recognition systems, such as eco-
labels and environmental management systems, or mandatory labelling systems 
concerning, for example, energy efficiency. Environmental labelling in various ways 
can act as a vehicle for turning process-related environmental issues into product-
related issues and thus making them more visible for stakeholders. Kennedy et al. 
(1994) concluded that especially when no other policy instruments are available, there 
is a distinct role for public environmental information provision.273 
 
Spillovers. Visibility spillovers occur when a plant or an issue receives attention that 
originates somewhere else than in the current environmental performance of the plant 
or the present environmental seriousness of the issue. For example, compared to 
single-plant companies, multi-plant companies may gain reputational benefits at many 
sites from environmental performance improvements at one site, which may increase 
their incentive to improve environmental performance. In other words, reputational 
economies of scope exist.274 In addition to visibility spillovers between group plants, 
visibility can spill over from the plant's own history: "Of course the image of [our 
firm] is gone, and it is difficult to get it back … at that time people thought that we 
were the only ones polluting the river, and then we had a couple of larger accidents 
where a lot of fish were killed … It can never be repaired in people's minds even 
though the results show that we have really improved our performance a lot." 
 
Visibility can also spill over to or from a parent firm, or through a shared brand. 
Bowen (2000b) found that visible corporations were likely to pressure individual 
plants to improve their environmental performance, and that sharing the same name 
with a visible corporation made a plant more visible.275 One plant representative noted 
that "our plant did not face any such pressures, but we had to behave responsibly 
anyway, because we are part of [the parent corporation] and it operates in other 
industries as well, and there environmental pressures are important." 
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Spillovers can occur through physical location: the environmental image of all plants 
situated on one industrial site may go hand in hand. "We live in a symbiosis with the 
other plant on this site, the public cannot distinguish who is who. When there was a 
negative report about [the other plant] on TV they showed our main gate where [the 
name of our plant] stood in big letters." 
 
Finally, visibility spillovers are possible along a product's value chain, through links 
to other firms or industries, or by virtue of belonging to a certain industry or 
producing a certain product. "It is very much an issue in this industry, everybody is 
looking at us, [this kind of plants] are almost like swearwords." One interesting issue 
relating to spillovers – or the lack thereof – is how the firms and stakeholders perceive 
the firm's boundaries. A number of the plant representatives said that having 
concluded an outsourcing deal whereby an external firm took over the power plant, 
the plant no longer had any atmospheric emissions. 
 
Distance. Distance affects visibility: the further away the less visible. An obvious 
example is geographic distance. However, perhaps an even more important dimension 
that matters especially towards customers is value chain distance. Value chain 
distance refers to the number of steps between the plant and the point in the value 
chain where willingness to pay originates. Different motivations for willingness to 
pay are discussed in the next section.  
 
Two polar examples from one industry illustrate this point. A plant representative 
from the overcompliance cluster said that "we are near the consumer, there are no 
production steps after us, the consumer sees our brands, and we see the consumer as 
our end user." Another plant representative from the non-compliance cluster noted 
that "our product is invisible in the final product, we are anonymous … this is a long 
production chain and we are a small part at the beginning of the chain, the consumer 
won't know about it and neither will even the step before the consumer. Our product 
is far from the end user, there are many production steps between us and the final 
product, and our product constitutes only a small part of the final product that is 
purchased in a store." Baylis et al. (1998a) also found that customer-based motivation 
to improve environmental performance was higher in sectors that are close to end 
consumer markets than in sectors supplying intermediate products.276 
 
An extreme case is one where a product is sold to a customer who sells it under his 
own brand. In such a case the producing firm is not at all visible to the end customer. 
One plant manager described their situation: "If you look at [the product] where it 
says [the brand of the customer] on the package, very few people know where it has 
been produced, all the packages look the same and you cannot tell who has produced 
it. If it was our plant, there will be [two letters] after a certain number, and there are 
tens of such codes because the customer purchases the product from several 
                                                 
276  Baylis, R, Connell, L & Flynn, A. 1998a. Sector variation and ecological modernization: 
towards an analysis at the level of the firm. Business Strategy and the Environment, 7. 
Pages 150-161. 
 130
manufacturers. I have the code list but an ordinary end customer will know nothing 
about it. Since we do not sell the product directly ourselves but it goes through [the 
customer], improving environmental performance brings us no market benefits. No-
one knows where the product came from, all the information about who produced it 
and what was the environmental performance stops when the package leaves our 
factory gate." 
 
To an extent, distance is also a mental question. There may be more or less distance 
between a plant and the end user, but there may be more or less distance between a 
plant and its immediate customer as well. "We have all kinds of customers, big and 
small, and from all industries, in practice we do not even always know for what 
purpose our product is purchased." 
 
End product. The nature of an end product, and its intended use, affects visibility. In a 
similar manner than certain environmental issues may receive a disproportionately 
large or small amount of attention, certain products may be special targets while 
others escape visibility. "The consumer has never connected [our end product] with 
harmful environmental impacts in his mind, therefore, he is not receptive to messages 
about environmental improvements either." For example, disposable goods used in 
large quantities may attract the most environmental attention, but the case data do not 
shed much light on this issue. Bowen (2000b) found that having a large number of 
customers because of the nature of the product or service produced increased 
visibility.277 
 
To sum up, visibility affects both the costs and revenues of investments in 
environmental performance. Win-win situations are more likely to arise if the plant is 
located in an environmentally precious area and surrounded by people who do not 
tolerate harmful environmental impacts; if the plant is large; if the issue is easily 
perceived and its impacts directly felt; if some party acts as a visibility champion (for 
example, eco-labelling systems exist); if the plant is exposed to visibility spillovers; if 
the distance from the point where willingness to pay originates is small; and if the end 
product is such as to attract environmental attention. 
 
Win-win situations are less likely to arise if the plant is located in an environmentally 
unimportant area, with no local population; if the plant is a small-scale producer and 
polluter; if the issue is uncertain and difficult to perceive; if no-one acts as a visibility 
champion; if the plant is not exposed to any visibility spillovers; if the distance 
between the plant and the origination point of willingness to pay is large; and if the 
end product does not attract environmental attention. 
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6.2.4 Willingness to pay 
 
Willingness to pay (WTP) captures the weight that customers give to environmental 
considerations in their purchasing decisions. If visibility, above, is about whether 
anyone knows about the environmental performance improvement, willingness to pay 
refers to whether anyone cares about it. 
 
Willingness to pay for environmental performance affects revenues. Customer 
willingness to pay may manifest itself in the product price if a price premium can be 
obtained for high environmental performance. Or, customer willingness to pay may 
manifest itself in the sales volume if high environmental performance is a 
precondition for increasing market share or holding on to present customers.  
 
Willingness to pay is also reflected in the price elasticity of demand that describes the 
sensitivity of customers to changes in the product price and thus determines the ability 
of a firm to pass on environmental costs to customers. With inelastic demand, the drop 
in the quantity demanded resulting from a price increase remains small. The price 
elasticity of demand is affected by factors such as the market structure, the availability 
of substitutes, the presence of switching costs for customers, and the significance of 
non-price factors in competition.  
 
Customers have three kinds of motivations for their willingness to pay for 
environmental performance. Willingness to pay can be ethical, pressure-based, or 
benefit-based. In this context, ethical willingness to pay refers to willingness to pay 
where the driving force is the desire to improve environmental quality. The driving 
force for pressure-based willingness to pay is the need to respond to external 
pressures. The driving force for benefit-based willingness to pay is the desire to obtain 
the non-environmental benefits incurred by purchasing the environmentally preferable 
good or service. Willingness to pay arises at a point or points in the value chain based 
on one or more of these motivations. From there, it trickles down the value chain, 
backwards or upstream in the life-cycle chain or life-cycle net, until the distance 
becomes too big and visibility too low.  
 
In general, ethical motivations are to be expected from consumers only: "We sell 
business-to-business. It is professional, the volumes are large, and many issues are 
taken into account, but no ethical or emotional environmental issues. In consumer 
markets, the purchasing decisions are also based on emotions." Pressure-based 
motivations, by contrast, are more rare with consumers – no-one can boycott the 
consumer, but there may still be regulations that apply to consumers. Benefit-based 
motivations can arise anywhere in the value chain. 
 
Interestingly, several cases pointed to the possibility that those who are one step 
removed from the consumers, that is, those who sell to those who sell to consumers, 
are under the highest pressure to improve their environmental performance but also 
stand to gain the most from such improvements. The explanation is that consumers do 
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not have widespread willingness to pay for environmental performance even though 
they claim they do. Moisander (1996) notes that the relationship between consumers' 
pro-environmental attitudes and their specific consumption activities is complicated, 
and, according to several researchers, inconsistent.278 "Personally, I do not believe 
that the consumers would pay a penny more for environmental products, because our 
industry has studied consumer behaviour extensively, and even though the consumers 
say that they will pay, in a real situation they don't." But those who sell to consumers 
have to be prepared for eventual consumer willingness to pay anyway, wherefore they 
already take environmental action and also demand this from their own suppliers.  
 
Ethical motivations. Sometimes, but not always, customers are willing to pay for 
environmental performance improvements out of purely ethical reasons. For example, 
Rauscher (1997) writes that successful use of eco-labels for combating global 
environmental problems is possible only if consumers act irrationally or derive 
personal utility from saving the environment; otherwise consumers would choose to 
free-ride since their own contribution to the problem is so small.279  
 
The existence of ethical-based willingness to pay may vary according to several 
factors. One of them is the cultural difference between various geographic markets 
and various customer segments. Some customer segments such as young consumers or 
women may be particularly environmentally sensitive. Uusitalo (1986) found that 
willingness to pay for environmental performance in the form of higher prices was 
clearly higher among women than among men, but there were no differences between 
other background variables tested. Personal experiences of environmental damage and 
a concern for the state of the environment also correlated positively with willingness 
to pay. However, she noted that environmental purchasing behaviour could not be 
reliably predicted from background variables or attitudinal variables.280 One plant 
manager noted: "And if you think about [the end product that our product is part of], 
who buys it? Children! They do not care; if there would be an environmentally 
conscious customer segment, like well-educated urban women between 30 and 39 
years, that would be a different story."  
 
Another factor is the nature of the product. Products, and how they are consumed, 
differ in the scope that they provide for environmental differentiation. Reinhardt 
(1998) describes two polar examples: StarKist tuna, which is "an unglamorous source 
of cheap protein that is consumed in the home" failed in competing based on 
environmental differentiation, whereas Patagonia clothes that sport fashionable labels 
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and are worn in public succeeded.281 One study found that environmental 
considerations were a different purchasing criterion for daily items than for durable 
goods.282 
 
A third, important factor is the customer's wealth. The demand for a clean environment 
is generally considered to be income-elastic and to increase with increasing 
prosperity.283 Customers in affluent societies tend to be more environmentally conscious 
in their purchasing behaviour; within a country, green thinking can often be identified 
with the top end of the market.284 When economic times are good, customers are more 
willing to pay to protect the environment.285 "During the recession environmental 
issues were not on the foreground when factories were closed and people laid off … 
now the interest has risen again." Tanskanen (1997) found that, among twenty 
countries studied, willingness to pay for environmental quality was highest in the 
industrialised countries and lowest in the countries with economies in transition. 
However, willingness to pay did not solely depend on the standard of living in the 
country. For example, willingness to pay correlated positively with knowledge of 
environmental problems.286 
 
Still another factor affecting ethical willingness to pay is the environmental issue at 
stake. This point is closely linked to the discussion on the visibility of different issues, 
above, but is not quite the same thing. Some environmental issues – like forests, cute 
animals, or threats to human health – are more sensitive and arouse stronger feelings 
in customers than others. Halme (1996) notes that there was a difference between 
biodiversity conservation and solid waste management because biodiversity 
conservation was more of an emotional issue, and it was promoted by environmental 
organisations who tend to use methods appealing to emotions. By contrast, solid 
waste management was not such an emotional issue and it was promoted by 
authorities who do not tend to use methods appealing to emotions.287 
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With internationally traded products, customers may be more concerned about 
consumption externalities arising near them and affecting them directly than about 
production externalities arising in the producer country. On the other hand, it may be 
easier to protect the environment in another country: fewer economic impacts are 
directly felt and fewer changes are required in customers' own behaviour. 
 
Pressure-based motivations. Industrial or retail customers may be willing to pay for 
environmental performance because they themselves are under pressure to use 
suppliers with high environmental performance. Pressure-based willingness to pay is 
the channel through which environmental demands trickle down the value chain. "We 
obtained one order only because we had the ISO 14001 system and the others did not, 
even though our offer was not the least expensive one. That single order alone 
covered all the expenses of the ISO 14001 for that year. The customer was an 
international company and they wanted a supplier with the ISO 14001 system because 
they needed to show that they were using environmentally friendly suppliers." 
 
Such pressure may originate from the customer's own customers. Or, it may originate 
from the legal requirements the customer faces: "Packaging is what interests our 
customers, because they face packaging laws in their own country, and they have to 
report to their authorities how much packaging they receive and they have to dispose 
of it". The pressure may also originate from private initiatives that the customer 
participates in, such as Responsible Care in the chemical industry, or voluntary 
obligations that it has undertaken, such as the ISO 14001 environmental management 
system. "If our customer is industrial, perhaps he is committed to an environmental 
management system. If he is a public body, perhaps he is bound by public 
procurement requirements. For these kinds of customers the requirements have been 
explicitly defined. But if our client is the consumer, no-one pressures him, and what is 
important is subjective and varies from consumer to consumer." 
 
Benefit-based motivations. Benefit-based motivations for willingness to pay may arise 
both with consumers and with industrial customers. They appear if the improved 
environmental performance, which is a public good, is bundled with a private good in 
the product. For example, it may bring health or other benefits to the customer, or 
decrease the customer's costs. The customer may be willing to pay for the private good 
even if he is not willing to pay for the public good.288 Belz (1995) found that health 
benefits were on the foreground for customers buying products from organic farming; 
for many customers, the contribution of organic farming to environmental quality was 
of secondary importance.289  
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One of the case plants had developed a product that benefits the environment and also 
saves customers' costs: "The product is more expensive than the previous alternatives, 
but it has succeeded in the markets. In the consumer market it commands a premium 
of 100 per cent. However, the product was not developed for environmental reasons, 
and it is not marketed with environmental arguments." The representative of another 
case plant saw no opportunity to bundle health-related private goods with the plant's 
product: "The end products are unhealthy as such, if I am honest, so those who are 
really conscious consume them very little or not at all, and if you think about the main 
user groups of the products, they are not very conscious anyway." 
 
By contrast, willingness to pay is reduced if the environmental good is negatively 
bundled with a private good in the product: if the appearance, convenience, or 
functional quality of the product is weakened (or perceived to be weakened) or if 
there are trade-offs with other quality attributes. Both positive and negative bundling 
with private goods requires that the environmental issue is or can be made product-
related. 
 
To sum up, willingness to pay affects the revenues from investments in environmental 
performance. Win-win situations are more likely to arise if there are no substitutes; if 
there are switching costs; if the customer is a wealthy consumer from an 
environmentally conscious geographic market or customer segment; if the product 
provides scope for environmental differentiation; if the issue appeals to emotions; if 
the customer is under market or regulatory pressure to use environmentally friendly 
suppliers; or if the improved environmental performance lowers the customer's costs 
or increases customer value. 
 
Win-win situations are less likely to arise if there are substitutes but no switching 
costs; if the customer is poor and belongs to a geographic market or customer segment 
that is not environmentally conscious; if the product does not provide scope for 
environmental differentiation; if the issue does not appeal to emotions; if the customer 
is under no market or regulatory pressure to use environmentally friendly suppliers; or 
if the improved environmental performance increases the customer's costs or 
decreases customer value. 
 
6.2.5 Benchmarks 
 
Incorporating benchmarks on the revenue side of the model is necessary because in a 
purchasing situation customers assess each offering by comparing it to available 
alternatives. Two benchmarks are relevant in this context: the prices of competing 
offerings, and the environmental performance of competing offerings.  Section 3.1.3 
also showed how in an oligopoly the optimal level of environmental performance 
depends on the level selected by the other firms. 
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The non-environmental attributes of the offering, such as appearance, functional 
quality, or taste, also matter in a purchasing situation. Situations where changes in 
environmental performance change – improve or worsen – some of these other 
product or service attributes were discussed above under benefit-based motivations 
for willingness to pay. The relative importance of the different benchmarks is also not 
discussed separately under this heading since it is essentially the same point as 
willingness to pay. 
 
Environmental performance benchmark. The extent of environmental differentiation, 
which is a relative concept, is judged in the eyes of customers in relation to the 
environmental performance of competitors. "We have to be able to demonstrate 
constant improvement to maintain our good image, we must be able to show 
improvement in our environmental figures … if we stabilise at some level, when the 
others slowly make progress, we will be left behind, the comparison is always to our 
competitors." Competing products can either be similar products produced by other 
firms (intra-product substitution), or substitutes that are different products but fulfil the 
same need as the original product (inter-product substitution). 
 
The desirable environmental performance level of the competitors is a thorny question. 
On the one hand, if environmental performance is emphasised by too many 
competitors, its differentiating value erodes: "In the beginning environmental 
friendliness was something extra and you were perhaps rewarded for it. Soon it will 
have become a natural part of everyone's activities and you will be punished for 
failing to accomplish it." An industry-wide environmental programme reduces the 
cost barriers to environmental protection faced by the individual firms. However, 
while such a programme may improve the environmental legitimacy of the industry as 
a whole, no single firm can gain a differentiation advantage – except against inter-
product substitution – if all firms implement a similar programme.290 Reinhardt (1998) 
notes that one precondition for building a strategy on environmental differentiation is 
that the competitors cannot easily imitate the improved environmental performance.291  
 
On the other hand, there may also be problems if none of the competitors emphasise 
environmental performance. First-mover advantages are not inevitable but depend on 
the competitors following the path.292 And, customers may be reluctant to commit 
themselves to the new alternative product if there is only one supplier. The 
representative of one plant that had developed an environmentally friendlier product 
alternative noted that "when [our industrial retail customer] buys from several 
manufacturers, if they were to switch to [the new environmentally friendlier product], 
they would have only two or three possible suppliers to negotiate with, now that they 
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leadership: From compliance to competitive advantage. Academy of Management 
Executive, volume 8, 3. Pages 7-27. 
291  Reinhardt, F L. 1998. Environmental product differentiation: implications for corporate 
strategy. California Management Review, volume 40, 4. Pages 43-73. 
292  European Community. 1992. Industrial competitiveness and environmental protection. EC 
Commission Communication SEC(92)1986.  
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have this ordinary product they have hundreds of manufacturers to select from, they 
can buy anywhere and play the suppliers against each other."  
 
Price benchmark. Two situations can be distinguished when discussing the price 
benchmark. There may be price differentials due to differences in environmental 
performance between competitors. Or, there may be price differentials despite the 
similarity of environmental performance between competitors. Of course, there may 
also be price differentials that do not relate to environmental performance at all. 
 
Producers coming from different jurisdictions may be subject to different 
environmental process standards. If compliance with these standards results in cost 
increases, loss of cost competitiveness in international trade has been claimed. 
However, even if two producers implement the same level of environmental 
performance, they do not necessarily incur the same costs in this exercise. This is 
especially true in the case of inter-product substitution, but cost asymmetries are even 
possible with producers of similar products.293 One plant manager noted that "we can 
benefit from improving our environmental performance, and from lobbying for 
stricter regulations, because in this way we can force more costs on our competitors." 
 
Reinhardt (1999b) summarises the situation with regard to both benchmarks as 
follows. If there is customer willingness to pay for improved environmental 
performance, a firm can choose the strategy of environmental differentiation. In this 
case it would not wish for the competitors to imitate its good environmental 
performance. If, by contrast, there is no customer willingness to pay and a firm is 
subject to a regulatory requirement to improve its environmental performance, it 
would want all its competitors to face similar requirements so that they would have to 
match the good environmental performance and incur the related costs. If a firm 
considers that it can fulfil a requirement at a lower cost than its competitors, it may 
even actively lobby for stricter regulations or voluntary industry-wide initiatives to 
raise its rivals' costs.294 
 
To sum up, benchmarks affect the revenues from investments in environmental 
performance. Win-win situations are more likely to arise if competitors cannot imitate 
the good environmental performance, at least not with low costs, and if the prices of 
competing products are relatively high. 
 
Win-win situations are less likely to arise if competitors can imitate the good 
environmental performance, perhaps with smaller costs, and if the prices of competing 
products are relatively low. 
 
                                                 
293  Reinhardt, F L. 1999a. Market failure and the environmental policies of firms: economic 
rationales for "beyond compliance" behaviour. Journal of Industrial Ecology, volume 3, 1. 
Pages 9-21. 
294  Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to environmental 
management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Pages 45-77. 
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6.2.6 Discount rate 
 
Discounting is the process of aggregating the flow of costs and revenues over time. 
Environmental profit equals the discounted net stream of all costs and revenues, 
however indirect, that relate to environmental performance. Therefore, a discount rate 
enters the model. The discount rate factor captures the weight that the plant gives to 
short-term vs. long-term costs and revenues. The higher the discount rate the less 
weight is given to future costs and revenues and, usually, the less win-win situations 
there are.295 Kirchhoff (2000), too, notes that one should expect to see overcompliance 
where the discount rate is low.296 
 
In the present study, the term discount rate is used as an abstract concept, to refer to 
the idea of discounting. It does not refer to a concrete value as, for example, in 
finance. Consequently, the model should not be understood so that each plant would 
actually have a certain percentage discount rate in mind that it applies to environment-
related costs and revenues. To start with, the environment-related costs and revenues 
are usually not even quantifiable. Similarly, there may be no explicit discount rate 
calculations, but, either consciously or subconsciously, each plant must and does 
weigh short-term and long-term effects in its decision-making. Three factors influence 
the discount rate as understood for the purposes of the present study: owners, slack, 
and risk. 
 
Owners. Different owners may be satisfied with different short-term returns on their 
investment.  In this respect, one can contrast family-owned, state-owned, or publicly 
owned firms. For example, it has been suggested that the stock market as the critical 
financial institution may encourage short-termism by overestimating the discount 
factor.297 Whereas the owner-manager of one small enterprise said: "I haven't really 
followed the financial side so much, I just do my work and see then if I have money in 
the back pocket", the plant manager of a plant belonging to a multinational publicly 
traded corporation claimed that "in this corporation you have to be crazy to suggest 
an investment with a payback time over five years, men have been replaced for lesser 
reasons". 
 
This is also the place where some ethical considerations may enter the model. As 
explained in the introduction, the approach taken in the present study is that firms aim 
                                                 
295 Discount rate matters if there is an asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits over 
time. Typically, environmental costs need to be incurred before the environmental private 
benefits are realised. In this case a low discounting rate increases win-win situations 
because even long-term benefits are included in the calculations. Of course, if the 
circumstances were reversed so that environmental private benefits were to be obtained 
immediately but the costs were spread over a long period, a low discount rate would 
decrease win-win situations. Such instances may, however, be rare. 
296  Kirchhoff, S. 2000. Green business and blue angels. Environmental and resource 
economics, 15. Pages 403-420. 
297  Mathur, S S & Kenyon, A. 1997. Creating value: shaping tomorrow's business. Oxford, 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 451 pages. Pages 270-278. 
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to maximise expected profit. However, even if the organisations themselves are not 
ethical agents, the people working in them may still have ethical motivations. Ruud 
(1995) argues that individual employees have to follow the norm of profit 
maximisation even if it is not identical to their own preferences.298 One interviewee 
said: "You can promote [environmental issues] with your heart and then try to make 
up some arguments, it has to be camouflaged in something else, you cannot use 
ethical arguments to receive the investment funds from above." Petts et al. (1999) 
found that the operational climate in many small and medium-sized enterprises 
differed from the positive attitude of individuals to environmental issues.299  If a 
manager is in a position to exert considerable influence over the firm, such as the 
owner-manager quoted above, his personal values may become the organisation's 
values. 
 
Slack. Bowen (1999) has examined the role of organisational slack, in terms of time 
or money, in implementing environmental initiatives.300 Slack refers to the availability 
of excess resources. Hence, slack constitutes the feedback mechanism from economic 
to environmental performance. For example, it is often argued that small firms do not 
possess the financial, technological or human resources to examine all options to 
improve environmental performance, wherefore they must focus on meeting 
regulatory mandates instead of searching for innovative and profitable proactive 
solutions for the future.301,302  
 
Firms at the margin of survival may not be able to afford to incur environmental costs, 
even if short-term cost increases could be expected to bring long-term revenues. One 
plant representative noted that "we have had quite a few lay-offs recently, when there 
are enough other problems, when the survival of the whole operation is at stake, 
environmental issues are pushed to the background". Another said that "if we are not 
talking about big money, perhaps we could accept somewhat longer payback times for 
environmental investments, I mean, if there is extra money available, but if the times 
are hard or if we are talking about big sums, there is no special treatment for 
environmental investments."  
 
However, a lack of excess resources may not be entirely negative: "In a way it was a 
good thing that we had this financial crisis … since we had no possibility to invest in 
                                                 
298  Ruud, A. 1995. Corporate environmental decision-making: a rational choice? Centre for 
Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Working Paper 1995.2. 20 pages. 
Page 5. 
299  Petts, J, Herd, A, Gerrard, S & Horne, C. 1999. The climate and culture of environmental 
compliance within SMEs. Business Strategy and the Environment, 8. Pages 14-30. 
300  Bowen, F E. 1999. Does organisational slack stimulate the implementation of 
environmental initiatives? In: Wood, D & Windsor, D (editors). Proceedings of the Tenth 
Annual Meeting of the International Association of Business and Society. Pages 529-534.  
301  Bonifant, B C, Arnold, M B & Long, F J. 1995. Gaining competitive advantage through 
environmental investments. Business Horizons, July-August. Pages 37-47. 
302  Miller, R A. 1994. Executive commentary to Dechant, K & Altman, B. Environmental 
leadership: From compliance to competitive advantage. Academy of Management 
Executive, volume 8, 3. Pages 7-27. 
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a biological effluent treatment plant, we had to focus on the production process 
instead, and there we discovered savings that show directly on the bottom line".  
 
Even if the marginal environmental profit of some investment in environmental 
performance is positive, investing the same resources somewhere else could yield an 
even more positive result. Thus, in an opportunity cost sense, a win-win situation may 
still not be attractive for a plant if more lucrative alternative uses for the resources are 
available and the resources are scarce. "If you look at the payback time of [an 
environmental investment], it is long, there are lots of investment opportunities out 
there with a payback time of less than a year, and this is certainly not going to be less 
than a year, I would say it is in the order of five years … we have prioritised 
investments that increase capacity or improve product quality." 
 
Here, again, slack enters the picture. Because investment resources are limited, a 
positive net present value, corresponding to positive environmental profit in the case 
of environmental investments, is usually not a sufficient condition for implementing 
an investment. In principle, after deciding on the "must" investments, all other 
investment opportunities with a positive net present value are ranked in the order of 
descending net present value, and as many investments are implemented as the 
remaining investment budget allows, starting from number one.303 If, despite 
representing win-win situations, environmental investments are in general less 
lucrative than some other investments, they will not occupy the first places in this 
line. This is not to say, however, that all environmental investments are categorically 
doomed to the end of the line. The more excess resources the plant has the further 
along the line it gets before the investment budget is exhausted, and the more 
environmental investments fit in the implementation schedule. 
 
Risk. Reinhardt (1999a, 1999b) emphasises risk management as an important reason 
for overcompliance but also notes that risk considerations are difficult to separate 
from value considerations.304 In the present study, general risk management issues 
                                                 
303  Markandya, A & Pearce, D. 1988. Environmental considerations and the choice of the 
discount rate in developing countries. World Bank Environment Department Working 
Paper No. 3. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. 79 pages. 
304  Reinhardt, F L. 1999a. Market failure and the environmental policies of firms: economic 
rationales for "beyond compliance" behaviour. Journal of Industrial Ecology, volume 3, 1. 
Pages 9-21, and Reinhardt, F L. 1999b. Down to earth: applying business principles to 
environmental management. Boston, Harvard Business School Press. 291 pages. Pages 45-
77. Pages 11 and 175. 
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have been integrated with value creation issues throughout.305 However, risk emerged 
as a separate, important element affecting plants' time perspective in decision-making, 
and thus their discount rate. Plants anticipating important changes in the behaviour of 
customers, competitors, and regulators were already preparing adjustment to such 
changes, because "the one who shoots first, wins."  
 
Customer preferences for the environment can fluctuate both ways with time.306 
However, more often than not, it is anticipated that customers' willingness to pay for 
environmental performance will increase in the future. "We have to follow the 
developments, and preferably in the first row, not begin to change only after we have 
already lost something, this is why it already affects the way we work … in the future 
environmental issues will be important for our customers, but this is not the case 
today."  
 
To an extent, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy. As noted, to get ready for supposed 
future customer requirements, industrial customers are expressing such requirements 
towards their own suppliers already today. The same holds for predictions that 
competitors' environmental performance will improve in the future and thus alter the 
benchmarks against which a plant is judged. When all competitors improve their 
environmental performance to keep up with the others, the environmental 
performance of the whole industry improves. 
 
In addition to the market risks of changing customer and competitor behaviour, 
changes in the rules of the game may also pose a risk. Reinhardt (1998) notes that 
business strategy needs to take into account the behaviour of regulators "not just now 
but over the lives of the assets the firm is dedicating to the business".307 Generally, 
environmental regulation is expected to increase over time. "The requirements will 
                                                 
305  As discussed in chapter 5, one type of risk arises from the fact that managers may have 
incomplete control over emission levels, wherefore they may need to target an emission 
level lower than the permitted level in order not to violate the emission standard with a 
certain probability. Technically, this issue was taken into account by not declaring any 
level of compliance below 100 as overcompliance. Substantively, however, this issue 
serves to illustrate how risk management has been integrated with value treatment in the 
model. When facing this kind of risk, managers need to consider the probability of 
occasionally violating the standard and the magnitude of penalties from violation: formal 
penalties from regulators or informal sanctions from surrounding communities or the 
markets. Thereafter, managers need to decide whether to emit less than permitted on the 
average, or whether to face the possibility of non-compliance. A decision to emit less than 
permitted corresponds to a perceived win-win situation. This decision may be affected by 
several of the determinants of the model, such as the costs of emitting less than permitted 
(technology), the severity of regulatory consequences of violating the standard (regime), or 
the alertness of local populations or the markets to occasional non-compliance (visibility). 
306  For example Azzone and Bertelè (1994) discuss how an ecological cataclysm or an 
economic recession can affect the evolution of environmental expectations. Azzone, G & 
Bertelè, U. 1994. Exploiting green strategies for competitive advantage. Long Range 
Planning, volume 27, no. 6. Pages 69-81.  
307  Reinhardt, F L. 1998. Environmental product differentiation: implications for corporate 
strategy. California Management Review, volume 40, 4. Pages 43-73. 
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become stricter in the future, that is why we have to be awake all the time. A new hot 
environmental topic may appear any time, but it may be different from the previous 
ones."  
 
However, the riskiness of a plant's external world may also serve to shorten the time 
perspective of decision-making. One plant manager noted that "the world around us 
has changed a lot … uncertainty has increased and time frames have shortened … 
now we are exposed to global competition … before we could make large investments 
with long payback times since we knew that the world around us was quite stable … 
now we cannot foresee changes so well, if we were now to invest in an effluent 
treatment plant, we could not think that we have ten years to pay it back like we could 
think before." 
 
To sum up, the discount rate affects the present value of both the costs and revenues 
of investments in environmental performance. Win-win situations are more likely to 
arise if weight is given also to long-term considerations because owners do not require 
high short-term returns on investment; excess resources are available; customer 
willingness to pay is anticipated to increase in the future; competitors' environmental 
performance is anticipated to improve in the future; and environmental regulations are 
anticipated to tighten in the future. 
 
Win-win situations are less likely to arise if no weight is given to long-term 
considerations because owners require high short-term returns on investment; no 
excess resources are available; customer willingness to pay is not anticipated to 
increase in the future; competitors' environmental performance is not anticipated to 
improve in the future; and environmental regulations are not anticipated to tighten in 
the future. 
 
6.2.7 Summary 
 
Table 14 summarises the six main factors and the 20 lower-level factors by way of 
detailing how each factor can promote the creation of win-win situations. It is 
combinations of this net of factors that together determine the environmental profit of 
an environmental improvement.  
 
Reflecting back to the theoretical module in chapter 4, note that the determinants of 
environmental profit could produce shifts in the MAC curve or the MPB curve. This 
corresponds to the division of the determinants into cost-side and revenue-side factors 
in the case module. The results can be formally expressed as MAC = f(e, T, R, V, D) 
and MPB = f(e, V, W, B, D), and thus ep* = f(T, R, V, W, B, D), where e stands for 
environmental performance, T is technology, R is regime, V is visibility, W is 
willingness to pay, B is benchmarks, and D is discount rate. These equations capture 
both the non-constant properties and the non-uniform properties of the relationship 
between environmental and economic performance.  
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Table 14 Summary of factors that increase the potential for win-win situations 
 
Main 
factor 
Lower-level 
factor 
Win-win situations are more likely if 
Issue - process changes to prevent pollution are possible 
Management 
history 
- the plant's environmental performance is not yet very high  
- the plant has ignored inexpensive abatement opportunities in the 
past (failed to pick the "low-hanging fruit") 
- the plant has developed a systematic and cost-effective approach to 
environmental performance, for example, with the help of an 
environmental management system 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
Physical 
history 
- the production technology is not capital-intensive 
- investment cycles are short 
- the plant's physical location does not constrain abatement options 
- the production facilities are relatively new or old enough to justify 
a complete rebuild 
Strictness - the level of environmental performance required of a plant is not 
higher than the plant's private optimum without the regulation 
R
eg
im
e 
Instruments - the rules of the game already include economic incentives to 
improve environmental performance 
Location - the plant is located in an environmentally precious area and 
surrounded by people who do not tolerate harmful environmental 
impacts 
Size - the plant is large 
Issue - the issue is easily perceived and its impacts directly felt 
Champions - some party acts as a visibility champion (for example, eco-labelling 
systems exist) 
Spillovers - the plant is exposed to visibility spillovers 
Distance - the distance from the point where willingness to pay originates is 
small 
V
is
ib
ili
ty
 
End product - the end product is such as to attract environmental attention 
Ethical - the customer is a wealthy consumer from an environmentally 
conscious geographic market or customer segment 
- the product provides scope for environmental differentiation 
- the issue appeals to emotions 
Pressure-based - the customer is under market or regulatory pressure to use 
environmentally friendly suppliers 
W
ill
in
gn
es
s t
o 
pa
y 
Benefit-based - the improved environmental performance lowers the customer's 
costs or increases customer value 
Environ-
mental 
performance 
- competitors cannot imitate the good environmental performance, at 
least not with low costs 
B
en
ch
-
m
ar
ks
 
Price - the prices of competing products are relatively high 
Owners - weight is given also to long-term considerations because owners do 
not require high short-term returns on investment 
Slack - excess resources are available 
D
is
co
un
t r
at
e 
Risk - customer willingness to pay is anticipated to increase in the future 
- the competitors' environmental performance is anticipated to 
improve in the future 
- environmental regulations are anticipated to tighten in the future 
 
Two interesting issues that are not apparent from the results are the prevalence of the 
different determinants of environmental profit and their relative importance. As has 
already been noted, it is impossible for the present study to answer these questions 
since the study is based on theoretical sampling. However, it is possible to present 
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some impressions gained during the research, recognising that the impressions would 
need to be subjected to a separate test. Perhaps the three factors that came across the 
most strongly from the interviews were distance (visibility), pressure (willingness to 
pay) and risk (discount rate), of the latter especially the perception that customers will 
pay increased attention to environmental issues in the future. What is notable is that 
all three relate very closely to customer behaviour. 
 
The resulting model as a whole is new, even though references to literature supporting 
the findings were spread throughout the chapter. Not only does the literature provide 
support to the model; the model also offers a home and a systematic context for some 
previous stand-alone observations. Many of such observations were taken not from 
studies about the relationship between environmental and economic performance but 
from studies about other, related issues. Of the individual determinants, the most 
novel or surprising findings were perhaps the role of a number of factors relating to 
visibility (location, champions, spillovers, and distance), the discount rate as a lens 
through which costs and revenues traverse, and the role of pressure-based willingness 
to pay. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
 
This final section discusses the risks to the quality of the analysis presented above. 
Some of these risks are specific to the present study but most are typical of case 
studies. 
 
A common argument against case studies is that their results are not generalisable due 
to a small sample size. Indeed, statistical generalisation is not possible in the present 
case. It would not be possible even if the sample size were much larger, because the 
sample is a theoretical, not random sample. In the statistical sense, the sample is not 
representative of any population, wherefore the results cannot be generalised to a 
population of plants through statistical inference. This was never the intention, either. 
 
In qualitative studies, analytical generalisation to theoretical propositions instead of 
statistical generalisation to populations comes into question. A theoretical framework 
that describes the conditions under which a phenomenon is or is not likely to be found 
acts as the vehicle for generalising to new cases.308 Generalisation takes place through 
raising the abstraction level, not through finding average or typical relationships.309 
Lukka and Kasanen (1993) emphasise that case-study results are likely to be 
frameworks, models, or constructs that act as vehicles for the conceptual capture of a 
phenomenon. Results that manifest profound understanding of a problem have 
relevance also outside the primary data sample. For example, the competitive strategy 
framework by Porter does not assert anything substantive about the competitive 
                                                 
308  Yin, R K. 1989. Case study research. Design and methods. Revised edition. Newbury 
Park, Sage Publications. 
309  Alasuutari, P. 1994. Laadullinen tutkimus. Tampere, Vastapaino. 281 pages. Page 41. 
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situation of any group of firms. Yet, it can be used to analyse the competitive situation 
of any firm.310 The same logic applies to the results of the present study.  
 
Because no statistical generalisation is attempted, sample size requirements for 
quantitative studies do not apply as such. The adequacy of the sample does not depend 
on its size but on the theoretical sampling process: whether the sample provides 
sufficient variation and whether there is sufficient certainty that saturation has been 
achieved and data collection has not been stopped prematurely. Lukka and Kasanen 
(1993) note that the generalisability of the results depend on the depth of the insight, 
not on the size of the sample.311 In the present case, theoretical sampling included 
deliberately searching for disconfirming cases that would falsify the evolving 
explanation rule. Alasuutari (1994) notes that a meta-observation can manifest itself 
in the form of several variants in the raw data.312 Accordingly, saturation was declared 
when adding new cases did not yield any new factors even though they could still 
yield new empirical variants of the way a factor exhibited itself. 
 
Qualitative studies easily suffer from a gap between the data and the conclusions, 
which gives rise to a credibility problem. In the present study, this risk was further 
aggravated by the confidentiality requirement. However, the sensitivity of the topic 
gives a strong reason to believe that the data quality would have seriously suffered if 
confidentiality had not been guaranteed. There was thus a trade-off between being 
able to report the cases thoroughly, and having something interesting to report on in 
the first place. Although primary case data could not be presented in detail, an attempt 
was made to describe all the analytical steps in an explicit and transparent manner.  
 
Case interviewers are often suspected of a lack of objectivity, manifested by 
consciously or subconsciously leading questions. In the worst case, the interviewer 
can force his or her prior assumptions on the respondents. To avoid this, it is often 
recommended that the interviewer know as little as possible on the topic or the cases 
before entering the field. However, as noted by Dey (1993), "there is a difference 
between an open mind and empty head": prior assumptions and ideas do not need to 
present a problem if the researcher is fully aware of them.313 In the present study, 
consciously leading questions were shunned. For example, probes were sometimes 
used to lead the respondents towards a topic, but never towards particular answers 
about the topic. The threat of subconsciously leading questions may have been 
reduced by the fact that there was genuinely no preconceived idea about the most 
desirable answers to the interview questions. 
 
                                                 
310  Lukka, K & Kasanen, E. 1993. Yleistettävyyden ongelma liiketaloustieteessä. The Finnish 
Journal of Business Economics, volume 41, 4. Pages 348-381.  
311  Lukka, K & Kasanen, E. 1993. Yleistettävyyden ongelma liiketaloustieteessä. The Finnish 
Journal of Business Economics, volume 41, 4. Page 375. 
312  Alasuutari, P. 1994. Laadullinen tutkimus. Tampere, Vastapaino. 281 pages. Page 161. 
313  Dey, I. 1993. Qualitative data analysis. A user-friendly guide for social scientists. London, 
Routledge. 285 pages. Pages 63-64. 
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As in any study, however, scope for researcher impact cannot be fully denied. The 
fact that there was one interviewer only did not affect the quality of note-taking since 
all face-to-face interviews were tape-recorded, but it is in principle possible that 
another researcher would have analysed the data differently. In particular, it is worth 
noting that the researcher knew before the interviews whether a plant represented the 
non-compliance cluster or the overcompliance cluster. This information was 
necessarily revealed because one of the criteria in theoretical sampling was just this 
property. This required careful attention to avoid introducing any bias in data 
collection and analysis. However, the seriousness of this problem is reduced by the 
fact that the compliance information only related to effluent discharges during 1988-
1996. The case studies also covered many other environmental dimensions besides 
effluent discharges, and focused on present environmental performance. Of these, 
there was no prior information. 
 
Another typical problem is encountered with unreliable interview responses. The 
respondents may not know the answers to the interview questions, or they may not be 
willing to reveal the answers. Strategic responding is a considerable possibility in a 
study like the present one: the interviewees may be tempted to exaggerate their 
environmental performance to look good, or their environmental costs to avoid further 
requirements being placed on them. 
 
Several measures were taken to avoid strategic responding and to ensure the reliability 
of the data in the present study. Retrospective questions were avoided because of the 
memory problems and ex post rationalising associated with them. The interview 
situation and the interview questions were designed so as to establish confidence and 
to minimise the respondents' need for strategic responding.  As already explained, full 
confidentiality was guaranteed and the independence of the study from any interest 
group was brought up. Strategic responding was made difficult by designing the 
questions so that "correct" answers were non-existent and making this clear to the 
respondents. Consistency checks were applied throughout: the interview data were 
triangulated (i) between several respondents within a plant, (ii) between respondents 
within the plant and the regulatory authority responsible for the plant, and (iii) with 
the statistical data in chapter 5. In this context, it is also worth quoting Glaser and 
Strauss (1967): "even if some of our evidence is not entirely accurate this will not be 
too troublesome, for in generating theory it is not the fact upon which we stand, but 
the conceptual category (or a conceptual property of the category) that was generated 
from it."314  
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), theory building from case-study research is 
especially applicable when "little is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives 
seem inadequate because they have little empirical substantiation, or they conflict 
with each other or common sense." In such a situation, theory building from case 
                                                 
314  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. Page 23. 
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studies can help provide fresh perspectives on a topic. 315 In view of that, the objective 
of this chapter was to develop a new model that contributes towards theory building 
on the firm-level relationship between environmental performance and economic 
performance. This objective was accomplished. The resulting model is novel, 
grounded in empirical data, and clear and parsimonious with its six main factors. The 
model does not attempt to capture the entire complexity of the real world, only the 
most essential features necessary for understanding the phenomenon. One might 
consider it a limitation of the developed model that it portrays the issue as perceived 
by firms, not necessarily as it objectively speaking is. However, since firms are not 
run based on how the world is – they are run based on how they perceive the world to 
be – this may not be a limitation after all.  
 
 
                                                 
315  Eisenhardt, K M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, volume 14, 4. Pages 532-550. Page 548. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS  
7.1 Summary and key findings 
 
The main research question of the present study was what determines environmental 
profit? Environmental profit is a new concept that refers to the isolated net economic 
impact of environmental performance on a firm. It captures the stream of 
environment-related private costs and benefits that accrue to a firm over time and 
discounts them to the present. Environmental profit thus represents the firm-level 
relationship between environmental performance and economic performance. 
 
The debate on the firm-level relationship between environmental and economic 
performance is often framed as if it were an either-or issue. Some argue that improved 
environmental performance hurts economic performance; others maintain that 
improved environmental performance promotes economic performance. The present 
study shows that the correct question is not whether, but when improved 
environmental performance results in improved economic performance and thus in so-
called win-win situations.  
 
The review of the previous knowledge of the firm-level relationship between 
environmental and economic performance (chapter 3) revealed both an internal 
conflict within theoretical literature and an external conflict between theory and 
empirical evidence. A new approach that is able to integrate both positive and 
negative arguments about the relationship as well as accommodate the varying 
empirical evidence was, consequently, necessary. In particular, the three gaps 
identified in the previous theoretical knowledge that the present study focuses on are 
the following: 
 
- The relationship may not be constant across environmental performance levels, 
which means that it needs to be considered a function of environmental 
performance. 
 
- The relationship may not be uniform across cases, which means that the 
determinants of environmental profit need to be identified. 
 
- The relationship may not be static across time, which means that changes in the 
determinants of environmental profit over time need to be discussed. 
 
The results of the previous empirical studies on the firm-level relationship between 
environmental and economic performance range from a positive relationship to a 
negative relationship, no relationship, and an inverted U-shaped relationship. Several 
data and methodological problems were identified that partly explain the diversity of 
these findings. On the empirical side, the present study improves upon some of the 
previous studies, for instance, by circumventing the problem of confounders, allowing 
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for reciprocal causality, relying on comprehensive panel data of observed behaviour 
in an inclusive sample, and relaxing assumptions of a linear and uniform relationship. 
 
The study employs a portfolio design that includes three modules. The purpose of the 
first, theoretical module (chapter 4) was the theoretical identification of win-win 
situations. The module extends the traditional neoclassical framework by integrating 
in it the possibility for private market benefits from environmental performance. The 
resulting framework shows that the relationship, represented by an environmental 
profit curve, is indeed not constant, but an inverted U-shaped function of 
environmental performance (see Figure 10). Thus, win-win situations are theoretically 
plausible, but not all situations are win-win situations. They exist as long as a firm is 
situated in the rising portion of its environmental profit curve. However, after the 
turning point of the environmental profit curve, environmental performance 
improvements are no longer profitable for the firm. 
 
Moreover, the results of the theoretical module confirm that the relationship is not 
uniform across cases and static across time. The shape and location of the 
environmental profit curve, and, hence, win-win possibilities, are case-specific. They 
are affected by the determinants of environmental profit: factors that influence the 
costs of environmental performance and the benefits available from environmental 
performance. Such factors may cause environmental profit to differ between two 
cases. Also, some of the determinants of environmental profit change with time and 
some others can be actively changed, and environmental profit may differ for the 
same case between two time periods. Therefore, it is possible for a plant’s optimal 
path of environmental performance over time to be one of constant improvement, 
even if at any one time the environmental profit curve does exhibit the inverted U-
shape. 
 
The purpose of the second, statistical module (chapter 5) was the empirical 
identification of win-win situations. It is impossible to observe environmental profit 
or win-win situations from statistical data. However, it is possible to observe 
overcompliance with environmental regulations, which corresponds to a perceived 
win-win situation. A new database was assembled that combines data on actual and 
permitted effluent discharges into a compliance indicator for all regulated Finnish 
manufacturing plants in the chemical forest industry, chemical industry, metal 
industry and food industry during 1988-1996. The database contains a total of 2195 
compliance situations for 108 plants. An examination of the data showed that, 
empirically, perceived win-win situations do exist: overcompliance has been 
widespread, and it has increased over the research period in spite of the fact that the 
permits have become stricter.  
 
However, there is significant variation in compliance. If there are plants that always 
overcomply, there are also plants that never overcomply. This non-uniformity in 
overcompliance and perceived win-win situations was examined for systematic 
patterns suggested by the theoretical module. The results confirmed the existence of 
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non-uniformity in compliance between years, industries, and plants, but not between 
individual water pollutants, and identified stable patterns in this non-uniformity. 
 
Next, as there was evidence of non-uniformity of the relationship, the empirical 
question of identifying the determinants of environmental profit entered. As an 
opening step towards identifying the determinants of environmental profit, the main 
sources of such non-uniformity were examined. An analysis of the relative importance 
of the sources of non-uniformity showed that firm-level effects (approximated by 
plant effects) predominate all other effects (see Figure 17). Firm-level effects were 
about three and a half times as important as industry-level effects in explaining the 
variation in perceived win-win situations, even when a detailed industry classification 
was used. If a crude industry classification was used, firm-level effects were almost 
forty times as important as industry-level effects. Hence, the appropriate level for 
continuing the identification of the determinants of environmental profit is that of 
individual firms, and the plants with a tendency towards overcompliance and those 
with a tendency towards non-compliance were identified from the sample for further 
analysis.  
 
The purpose of the third, case-study module (chapter 6) was the empirical 
understanding of win-win situations. In order to elaborate on the factors affecting the 
costs of environmental performance and the benefits available from environmental 
performance, 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted in eleven plants that 
represented polar examples of compliance behaviour. As a result of the case-study 
module, six main determinants of environmental profit were discovered (see Figure 
21). These are 
 
- technology - what measures can be taken to improve environmental performance 
and how much do they cost 
 
- regime - the "rules of the game", the system of economic and command-and-
control regulatory instruments under which the firm operates 
 
- visibility - the extent to which the environmental performance improvement is 
perceived by relevant stakeholders 
 
- willingness to pay - the extent to which customers are willing to pay for the 
environmental performance improvement 
 
- benchmarks - how the firm's offering compares to the competition after the 
environmental performance improvement 
 
- discount rate - how the firm weighs long-term vs. short-term costs and revenues 
 
Altogether 20 lower-level factors affecting environmental profit were identified under 
the six headings. Each of these factors can either promote or hinder win-win situations  
(see Table 14). Together, they build a net that establishes whether a particular 
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environmental performance improvement in a particular firm results in a win-win 
situation or not. 
 
Overall, the expected contribution of the present study was achieved: to improve 
understanding of the firm-level relationship between environmental and economic 
performance, with a particular focus on the factors affecting this relationship. The 
findings shed light on both theoretical and empirical aspects of the relationship and 
help resolve a conflict in previous literature. They show that the firm-level 
relationship between environmental and economic performance takes the form of an 
inverted U-shaped function of environmental performance, and varies according to the 
six main firm-level determinants of environmental profit.  
 
King et al. (1994) write that all research projects in the social sciences should ideally 
satisfy two criteria. They should address topics that are "important in the real world", 
and they should make a specific contribution to the body of academic literature.316 
Accordingly, the rest of the chapter shortly outlines both the theoretical and practical 
significance of the findings. 
 
7.2 Theoretical significance of the findings 
7.2.1 Contribution to theoretical understanding 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the key findings of the three research modules can be 
recapitulated as follows:  
 
- The theoretical module found that the firm-level relationship between 
environmental performance and economic performance must be regarded as a 
case-specific, dynamic, inverted U-shaped function of environmental 
performance. 
 
- The statistical module found that the most important sources of the case-to-case 
variation in the firm-level relationship between environmental performance and 
economic performance (determinants of environmental profit) are to be discovered 
at the level of individual plants or firms. 
 
- The case-study module found that the six main determinants of environmental 
profit are technology, regime, visibility, willingness to pay, benchmarks, and 
discount rate. 
 
The findings are geared towards improving theoretical understanding about an 
underdeveloped substantive research area, not towards creating new general, formal 
                                                 
316  King, G, Keohane, R O & Verba, S. 1994. Designing social inquiry. Scientific inference in 
qualitative research. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 247 pages. Page 15. 
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theory.317 They extend previous theoretical understanding of the firm-level 
relationship between environmental and economic performance in a few important 
respects: 
 
- The findings accommodate arguments of both the negative and positive views on 
this relationship, thus helping to alleviate a long-standing controversy in literature. 
 
- The findings are explicitly applicable to the impacts of environmental 
performance rather than environmental regulations on economic performance, 
which has been relatively rare in previous literature. 
 
- The findings relax assumptions of a constant, linear, and uniform causal 
relationship from environmental to economic performance. They increase 
knowledge of how the relationship varies as a function of environmental 
performance, how environmental and economic performance are reciprocally 
related, and what mechanisms produce variation in the relationship across cases. 
 
7.2.2 Implications for further research 
 
The fact that there is no constant, uniform relationship waiting to be discovered 
between firms' environmental and economic performance has important implications 
for further research. First, the relationship needs to be regarded as a function of 
environmental performance. Any assessment of the economic impacts of 
environmental performance on firms must therefore establish the range of 
environmental performance over which the results are valid.  
 
Second, variation in the relationship between cases and over time must be 
acknowledged. Consequently, attention has to be paid to the factors that produce such 
variation. This needs to be done at a sufficiently disaggregated level. For example, 
had the present study been conducted at the crude industry level, only one per cent of 
the factors causing variation in overcompliance and perceived win-win situations 
could have been identified.  
 
The present study represents one step in a chain of steps that brings us closer to 
understanding the firm-level relationship between environmental performance and 
economic performance. As such, it opens two kinds of avenues for future work. One 
is to continue improving and refining the model or parts thereof. Based on the nature 
of the results, it is evident that environmental questions are not an independent island 
among business issues but they are tightly linked to various areas in business 
decision-making. This means that the relevant topic area to be covered is so vast that 
the present study cannot have exhausted it. For example, each of the six main 
                                                 
317  Glaser, B G & Strauss, A L. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. 271 pages. 
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determinants of environmental profit would deserve a separate in-depth examination. 
This might result in more precise characterisations of some of the lower-level factors.  
 
Another future research avenue could be to formally test the model or parts thereof, 
feeding the results back to further development of the model. The relative importance 
of the various determinants could also be examined. This research avenue would 
probably employ quantitative methods.   
 
Finally, the present study has only addressed the direction of the relationship between 
environmental and economic performance. Questions of magnitude, that is, the size of 
environmental profit compared to overall profit, are left for future research. 
 
7.3 Practical significance of the findings 
7.3.1 Implications for environmental strategy 
 
The results disclose a multitude of factors that impinge on the relationship between 
firms' environmental and economic performance. Different firms are unlikely to face 
all these factors in a similar manner. As a matter of fact, the results confirm that there 
is much more variation between firms within an industry than between industries. 
This means that selecting the appropriate level of environmental performance is, 
indeed, an issue of competitive strategy that each firm must approach from its own 
particular situation.  
 
A profit-maximising firm may or may not benefit from a proactive environmental 
strategy. Managers should therefore identify the circumstances under which they are 
operating, in the light of the model introduced in the present study, and design an 
appropriate environmental strategy that is in concordance with the opportunities 
presented by their situation. Managers need not, though, be powerless victims of their 
circumstances; they may also actively attempt to shape the conditions surronding their 
firm (see section 7.3.3). In addition to evaluating their own situation, firms should 
also consider how the model applies to their competitors, or to other participants in 
their value chain, such as suppliers and customers, in order to understand their 
situation and assess their possible reactions.  
 
For evaluating the particular situation of a firm, several questions directly arise from 
the results. These include questions about the firm (Are you exposed to reputational 
spillovers? Do you have excess resources available? How do environmental 
investments fit in your investment cycle?), its customers (Where in your value chain 
does environmental willingness to pay originate? What is your distance from that 
point? Are your customers under market or regulatory environmental pressure?), its 
competitors (Are there switching costs between your product and substitutes? Can 
competitors imitate your good environmental performance? At what cost?), its 
products (Does your product attract environmental attention? Can private goods be 
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bundled with environmental goods in the product?), the environmental issue (Is the 
environmental issue product-related? Can it be made product-related? Are there 
visibility champions?), and applicable regulations (Are economic instruments of 
environmental protection in place? Are they to be expected in the future?). The 
examples above represent only a fraction of the relevant questions to be asked.  
 
7.3.2 Implications for environmental policy 
 
From an environmental policy-making perspective, the main message of the results is 
that some, but not all, situations are win-win situations. By identifying conditions on 
which the win-win outcomes depend, the findings can help assess how widespread 
win-win situations are and where they can be expected. 
 
Different options arise for environmental policy-making depending on the outcomes. 
Where win-win situations are available, environmental policy can support voluntary 
approaches. However, like managers, authorities need not take the conditions 
affecting environmental profit as given. Where win-win situations are not directly 
available, environmental policy-making can attempt to influence the conditions so that 
they are more favourable to the creation of win-win situations. From the findings, 
several entry points for authorities can be identified (see section 7.3.3).  
 
It may not be possible to turn each and every situation into a win-win situation. Some 
trade-offs between firms' environmental and economic performance are likely to 
persist. But, this does not necessarily mean that society should renounce its 
environmental objective. The question becomes one of a political nature: to weigh the 
gains from improved environmental performance against the losses from reduced 
economic performance, and to choose which is more important to achieve from a 
sustainable development perspective in the particular case.  
 
7.3.3 Six ways to promote win-win situations 
 
Without knowledge of the factors affecting the relationship between environmental 
and economic performance, firms and policy-makers can do no more than react to 
impacts once they have materialised. However, with knowledge of such factors, it is 
possible not only to predict the impacts in advance, but to an extent also to manipulate 
them. Conditions that alleviate the negative links or strengthen the positive links 
between firms' environmental and economic performance may be consciously created 
and reinforced. This should help to reduce the potential for conflicting interests by 
bringing the privately optimal level of environmental performance closer to the 
socially optimal level of environmental performance.  
 
Six main ways to promote win-win situations can be inferred from the results. Ways 
and means available to achieve this include, but are not limited to those listed below: 
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- Improve technology. Firms can examine rigorously their abatement opportunities 
with existing technologies, as well as develop new environmental technologies. 
Authorities can spread information about abatement opportunities, facilitate the 
dissemination of technology, and create an environment that is conducive to 
technological innovation.  
 
- Pay attention to the features of the regulatory system. Authorities can create a 
regulatory system that is stable and predictable with appropriate transition periods, 
and where the use of economic instruments of environmental protection is 
carefully and gradually increased. Firms can cooperate with authorities by 
providing inputs to the process of designing the regulations.  
 
- Increase visibility. Firms can advertise their environmental performance efforts, 
disclose environmental information through environmental reporting, and 
participate in voluntary schemes that increase transparency such as the European 
Union Eco-Management and Audit Scheme. Authorities can organise information 
campaigns, establish voluntary agreements or other voluntary systems like eco-
labels or environmental management system certificates, or mandatory labelling 
systems that increase transparency about environmental performance, establish 
community right-to-know requirements, create environmental awards or other 
ways of publicizing good environmental performance, or publicize bad 
environmental performance. Consumers and local inhabitants can demand 
information about the environmental performance of firms and their products.  
 
- Increase willingness to pay. Both firms and authorities can increase environmental 
consciousness by educating customers on environmental issues. In addition, firms 
can bundle environmental performance with lower customer costs or added 
customer value in the product. Authorities can create environmental pressures on 
customers through, for instance, public procurement rules.   
 
- Watch the benchmarks. If there is willingness to pay for environmental 
performance, firms can attempt to protect themselves against imitation. If there is 
no willingness to pay for environmental performance, authorities can move in 
tandem with competitor countries in tightening environmental regulations, for 
example, through multilateral environmental agreements. Firms that are able to 
comply cost-efficiently can lobby for stricter regulations to raise rivals' costs. 
 
- Decrease discount rate. Investors can prolong their time perspective. Managers 
and policy-makers can guard the economic health of firms. 
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APPENDIX I 
Environmental profit under various competitive assumptions 
 
 
Table I-1 Summary of environmental profit under various competitive assumptions 
 
Market structure  
Perfect competition Monopolistic 
competition 
Oligopoly (duopoly) 
Discussed in section  3.1.1 4.2 3.1.3 
Environmental 
performance affects 
the firm's profit 
through 
costs costs and demand 
(note: if customer 
willingness to pay for 
environmental 
performance is zero, 
MPB(e) = 0 for all e 
and the case coincides 
with perfect 
competition) 
costs, demand, and 
intensity of price 
competition 
See figure I-1 I-2 I-3 
Location of the 
turning point of the 
environmental profit 
curve 
e > 0 if the MAC curve 
takes negative values in 
the beginning, 
otherwise e = 0 
e > 0 e > 0 at least for firm H 
 
 
 
Figure I-1 Environmental profit curve under perfect competition when the MAC curve 
takes negative values in the beginning (panel a) and when it does not (panel 
b) 
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Figure I-2 Environmental profit curve under monopolistic competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I-3 Environmental profit curves under a duopoly. Optimal levels of 
environmental performance differ between the two firms 
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APPENDIX II 
Description of the statistical data 
 
 
Table II-1 shows the breakdown of the 2195 compliance situations in the data by industry and 
year.  
 
Table II-1  Breakdown of observations by industry and year 
 
Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables EMITTED, PERMITTE and COMPLIAN 
are shown in Table II-2.  
 
Table II-2 Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables  
 
 EMITTED (kg/a) PERMITTE (kg/a) COMPLIAN (%) 
N 2195 2195 2195 
Dispersion    
Mean 960293.7 1933662.6 59.5 
Median 11086.9 30000.0 38.9 
Minimum 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Maximum 78798000.0 90000000.0 4904.1 
Distribution    
Std. Dev. 3986310.4 7277602.7 140.6 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
10.0 
0.1 
7.2 
0.1 
21.4 
0.1 
Kurtosis 
Std. Error 
148.9 
0.1 
63.3 
0.1 
665.8 
0.1 
 
YEAR * CRUDSECT Crosstabulation
Count
79 48 53 25 205
81 49 64 29 223
82 49 64 33 228
83 47 62 28 220
92 53 64 32 241
93 54 63 37 247
112 50 63 33 258
121 53 71 43 288
120 55 68 42 285
863 458 572 302 2195
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
YEAR
Total
Chemical
forest
industry
Chemical
industry
Metal
industry
Food
industry
CRUDSECT
Total
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Figures II-1 to II-5 show various boxplots of compliance observations. The shadowed box 
represents the interquartile range, containing the middle 50 per cent of the observations. The 
median value of the observations is indicated by a line across the box. The whiskers extend 
from the box to the highest and lowest values that are not statistical outliers. Outliers (1.5-3 
box lengths from end of box) and extreme values (more than 3 box lengths from end of box) 
are not shown because their high values would impose a different scale on the value axis and 
render the figures illegible. The horizontal line of 100 per cent compliance is inserted in each 
figure for reference. 
 
 
Figure II-1 Boxplot of compliance observations across different industries; crude 
classification 
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Figure II-2 Boxplot of compliance observations across different industries; detailed 
classification 
 
Figure II-3 Boxplot of compliance observations across different plants  
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Figure II-4 Boxplot of compliance observations across different pollutants  
 
 
Figure II-5 Boxplot of compliance observations across different years 
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APPENDIX III 
Plant clustering based on compliance performance 
 
Figure III-1 The share of overcompliance situations, ordinary compliance situations and 
non-compliance situations in 1988-1996 in the 108 plants in the sample. 
Overcompliance situations are represented by the black bars left to the 
category axis. Ordinary compliance situations and non-compliance situations 
are represented by the white and black bars, respectively, right to the 
category axis 
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Figure III-2 Clustering of the plants based on their compliance performance over the 
research period. To improve readability, the ORDICOMP dimension which 
can be calculated from the two other dimensions is not drawn in the figure 
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APPENDIX IV 
Empirical manifestations of the determinants of environmental profit  
 
 
The appendix shows how the abstract concepts of the six main determinants of environmental 
profit materialised in each of the eleven case plants. It serves to demonstrate the application of 
the requirement of absolute explanation: each determinant of environmental profit manifested 
itself in each case plant, even if through different empirical variants. For example, all plants 
stated that issues concerning customer willingness to pay for environmental performance 
affect the profitability of environmental performance improvements. For some plants it was 
the presence and for some plants the absence of customer willingness to pay that mattered, but 
for all plants the factor "willingness to pay" existed as a determinant of environmental profit. 
Note again that the six determinants of environmental profit were not preset but arose 
independently in each case.  
 
Because of confidentiality reasons, the amount of detail in the lists below is restricted. The 
lists contain a crystallisation of the key features of each case, not an exhaustive description. 
For each determinant of environmental profit, the cases where the determinant materialised as 
favourable conditions for win-win situations are presented first. The cases where the 
determinant materialised as unfavourable conditions for win-win situations are presented last. 
The cases where the conditions were in some respects favourable and in some other respects 
unfavourable for win-win situations are presented between these two extremes. Thus, the 
eleven cases are presented in a different order for each determinant, and it is not possible to 
identify the full combination of circumstances for any particular plant. 
 
Technology 
 
Technology-related reasons quoted by case plants why they could or could not achieve cost 
savings from environmental performance improvements, or why cost increases from 
environmental performance improvements were or were not significant: 
 
1. In one plant, cost savings were possible because several of the issues touching the plant 
provided opportunities for reductions in material and energy use. A key issue made it 
possible to replace a fundamental raw material with a less expensive alternative. A well-
functioning environmental management system was in place, making the search for 
environmental improvements cost-effective. The plant owned the physical facility that 
was needed for a profitable solution of a key issue. The plant had access to proprietary 
technological solutions. The production facilities were old but there was a way to achieve 
savings through remedying their environmental weakness. The investment cycle was 
relatively short and the production process was not as capital intensive as for some other 
plants in the industry. Sourcing arrangements were such that some solutions could be 
implemented relatively flexibly, but some others could not. 
 
2. In one plant, several of the issues provided scope for cost savings. An environmental 
management system helped to find cost-efficient solutions for environmental issues. Due 
to outsourcing arrangements, it was easy to switch a key component to an 
environmentally friendlier alternative. 
 
3. In one plant, there had been an accident after which new production facilities had to be 
built, which enabled the design of both cost-efficient and environmentally friendly 
solutions from scratch. Environmental expertise was available from the parent 
corporation. It was not possible to recover materials from the waste streams, but it was 
possible to obtain savings from packaging. A new solution was about to become 
commercially available that would enable the removal of one environmentally harmful 
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production step, thus also reducing costs. In another group plant, very short investment 
cycles and the application of an environmental management system facilitated 
environmental investments, but the lack of space restricted feasible solutions and physical 
location restricted energy source alternatives. 
 
4. In one plant, a suitable technological solution for the issues faced by the plant became 
commercially available. The timing of the investment coincided with the building of new 
production facilities. The new technological solution performed well, was more reliable, 
reduced risks, and saved personnel time, which was important as the plant was micro-
sized. 
 
5. In one plant, the environmental technology was old enough to have been fully 
depreciated, and now provided savings in operating costs. However, the production 
facilities were very old, which restricted the implementation of environmental solutions.  
 
6. In one plant, investments were typically large and expensive, and it took a long time to 
get the process back in control after changes in the production line. However, small 
environmental improvements could be implemented along with modernisation 
investments. 
 
7. In one plant, the physical features of the old production facilities restricted the available 
solutions concerning environmental issues. However, savings had been achieved through 
improvements in general housekeeping introduced by the new management. 
 
8. In one plant, technological development was slow, investment cycles were long, and the 
production technology was capital intensive. The main raw material was both the largest 
cost item and the largest pollutant, wherefore recovery opportunities had been exhausted 
long ago. However, the environmental issues facing the plant were not particularly 
difficult to deal with, and certain cost savings and environmental improvements could be 
simultaneously achieved in close cooperation with the suppliers of the main raw material. 
 
9. In one plant, the production technology was highly capital intensive and initial 
technological choices largely determined environmental performance. The production 
facilities were of medium age. The production process was complex and the 
environmental issues facing the plant were such that finding and implementing solutions 
was not straightforward.  By-products had been recovered since the beginning; remaining 
opportunities for recovery did not offer significant economic potential.  
 
10. In one plant, no opportunities to achieve cost savings from environmental performance 
improvements were foreseeable. Expensive technologies were needed to address the 
issues faced by the plant. The plant suffered from diseconomies of scale in environmental 
protection. The initial environmental solution was quite old and restricted present 
opportunities for environmental performance improvements. No environmental 
management system or other systematic approach to environmental performance was in 
place.   
 
11. In one plant, the issues faced were such that no opportunities to achieve cost savings from 
environmental performance improvements were foreseeable. 
 
Regime 
 
Regime-related reasons quoted by case plants why they could or could not achieve cost 
savings from environmental performance improvements, or why cost increases from 
environmental performance improvements were or were not significant: 
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1. In the case of one plant, there were several environmental taxes, charges and payments 
affecting the plant, wherefore savings could be achieved by avoiding or reducing them. 
 
2. In one plant, it was felt that the regime within which the plant operated had the power to 
affect any profitability calculations by causing shifts in relative prices for inputs. 
 
3. In one plant, it was felt that regulatory costs could be managed by voluntarily performing 
well in environmental issues. 
 
4. For one plant, the form and content of the environmental regulations did not pose any cost 
problems but neither did they provide opportunities for savings. 
 
5. In one plant, it was felt that since production costs were already higher than in some 
competitor countries for other reasons, there was no scope for further cost increases 
through strict environmental requirements. 
 
6. For one plant, environmental permits had always been strict because of the limited 
carrying capacity of the surrounding environment. 
 
7. In the case of one plant, it was felt that environmental instruments based on concentration 
values disadvantaged small plants.  
 
8. In one plant, cost savings from environmental performance improvements were negligible 
as the price of a key input did not reflect its full environmental costs.  
 
9. One plant considered environmental regulations to be too strict and their requirements to 
be irrelevant. 
 
10. In the case of one plant, the lack of economic instruments of environmental protection 
reduced the profitability of environmental investments and reduced opportunities to 
achieve savings through avoiding regulatory charges. 
 
11. In one plant, an environmental tax on the plant's product that was in place in some 
countries increased costs without bringing opportunities for savings since it could not be 
avoided through environmental performance improvements. 
 
Visibility 
 
Visibility-related reasons quoted by case plants why they could or could not reduce 
stakeholder costs or increase customer revenue318 through environmental performance 
improvements: 
 
1. One plant was situated in the middle of a city, by a significant water body. Several of the 
environmental issues relating to the plant's production were easy to perceive by the local 
inhabitants. A key environmental issue was readily learned from the characteristics of the 
end product by customers. The plant advertised its environmental performance and had 
established eco-product lines. There were no further production steps between the plant 
and the end customer. The product was a consumer product with a well-known brand 
name. However, the name of the company and the name of the product brand were not the 
same. The end product typically attracted environmental attention, and the industry in 
                                                 
318  In the context of visibility, willingness to pay, and benchmarks, increasing customer revenue refers 
to a with-without comparison, not to a before-after comparison. Hence, maintaining customer 
revenue, or restricting its loss, may also be counted as "increasing customer revenue" in certain 
situations. 
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general was regarded as a polluting industry. However, within its industry sector, the 
plant was relatively small and thus escaped most intense attention. There were both non-
governmental organisation activity and environmental labels relating to the industry and 
its products. Some of the plant's customers were professional buyers, with whom 
information sharing on environmental issues was much easier than with consumers. 
 
2. One plant belonged to an industrial sector that was regarded as particularly harmful by the 
general public. In the past the plant had been part of a corporation that was considered a 
significant polluter. The plant had relatively large environmental impacts, and was 
situated on an industrial site with several other major polluters. The main environmental 
issue relating to the plant's products was a consumption externality and as such very 
easily perceived by the general public. However, other than this issue, it was difficult for 
a customer to perceive the environmental issues relating to the end product. There were 
numerous end product applications for the plant's product; some of them were quite 
distant from the original product but others were not. Some of the end product 
applications attracted a lot of environmental attention. 
 
3. One plant was situated exceptionally near housing and many of the environmental issues 
that the plant was facing were such that they could be easily perceived by the local 
inhabitants. The plant was under heightened environmental attention because of the bad 
historical image of its location, the perceived harmful environmental impacts of the parent 
corporation whose name was identifiable in the plant's name, and the perceived 
environmental harmfulness of the industry and its products. The plant had various end 
customer types: some with a very close connection to the plant's operations but others 
with practically no connection. The plant's product related to the environment, wherefore 
the plant could not have the image of a polluter. 
 
4. One plant was located in an area where summer cottages were very important. The 
residents of the summer cottages were keen to preserve the quality of the local 
environment and complained easily about the activities of the plant.  
 
5. One plant, a single-plant company with a remote location, was a small polluter. Its 
"product" was only a small processing step in manufacturing the end products of other 
companies. However, the environmental issues relating to the industry were perceived 
harmful by the general public, and the whole industry attracted environmental attention. 
Competitors could also bring up environmental issues in business-to-business 
negotiations. It was thus important to avoid negative visibility, even if much could not be 
gained from positive visibility. 
 
6. In one plant, the environmental issues were only of local interest. The remote location of 
the plant reduced the environmental impacts felt by stakeholders. (For comparison, the 
socioeconomic composition of the city where another group plant was located had 
changed and environmental impacts that were previously accepted by the local population 
had become less acceptable.) The end product did not attract environmental attention, and 
neither the product nor the plant were targeted by non-governmental organisations. 
However, improving the environmental friendliness of the packaging of the end product 
was well received by customers. But, the parent corporation was publicly traded and 
operated in environmentally sensitive areas, wherefore this plant could not afford to 
tarnish its image. 
 
7. One plant was situated near inhabitation, in an area with much recreational use.  The 
plant, however, was a minor polluter. In general, the industry was considered polluting by 
the general public, but this particular branch of the industry was relatively clean and did 
not attract much environmental attention. Some of the materials used were, however, 
perceived particularly harmful. An average customer had difficulty in understanding in 
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detail the environmental issues facing the plant. Many of the products of the plant were 
almost invisible to an ordinary consumer. The plant kept a low profile on environmental 
issues so as not to draw attention to another group plant whose environmental 
performance was perhaps less good. 
 
8. In one plant, the relevant environmental issues were easily perceivable, but generated 
only local interest. The industry in general was perceived polluting by the general public 
and non-governmental organisations were active concerning the environmental 
performance of the industry. However, this particular plant was relatively small within the 
industry and had outsourced the most environmentally harmful production steps. There 
were several vertical production steps between the plant and the end customer; in 
practice, the product of the plant was hardly noticeable in the end product and the plant 
remained anonymous to customers. 
 
9. For historical reasons, one plant was located in a beautiful area in the middle of a holiday 
resort. The plant was so dominant in the community that its activities were closely 
followed. However, this part of the production chain was less polluting than some others, 
and besides product packaging, customers hardly perceived the environmental issues 
relating to the plant's activities. This, nevertheless, varied between customers: some 
industrial end customers were very close to the plant and its activities but some other end 
customers were quite distant and for them the plant remained practically unknown.  
 
10. The environmental impacts of one single-plant company were so small compared to the 
pollutant load of other emission sources that even if the plant ceased all emissions, no 
discernible impact on the surrounding environment would be felt. The whole industry 
branch, however, was emotionally considered a "poison branch" by the general public. 
The plant's "product" was only a small production step in a long chain of steps required 
for the end product. 
 
11. The environmental impacts of one plant were local and minor. Customers were situated 
far away and hardly visited the plant. The plant could not make a noticeable improvement 
in the surrounding environment – which was already polluted and of relatively low 
recreational value – because its environmental impacts were so small compared to those 
of other emission sources. But, because of past environmental problems, the plant was 
constantly under local scrutiny, and it was part of a large publicly traded corporation 
whose image was not to be harmed. The product of the plant was perceived by customers 
to be a marginal part of the end product, and neither the end product nor this part of it 
attracted environmental attention.  
 
Willingness to pay 
 
Willingness to pay -related reasons quoted by case plants why they could or could not 
increase customer revenue through environmental performance improvements: 
 
1. One plant had several customers who were interested in the plant's environmental 
performance. Some had purchasers with a high personal interest in the environment. 
Some sold their product to environmentally conscious markets and therefore demanded 
high environmental performance from their suppliers. Some customers faced mandatory 
labelling requirements if a certain environmentally harmful substance was used in the 
production process and thus required that the substance not be used, even if this meant 
weakening some other quality aspects. Some customers, however, were not in a position 
where they had to demonstrate high environmental performance, and did not require this 
from their suppliers, either. The physical product could not be improved through better 
environmental performance, but continuity and reliability, which were very important in 
the business, were more secure when environmental risks were minimised. 
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2. The customers of one plant were clearly environmentally conscious, in some markets 
even to the extreme.  However, the consciousness did not materialise as a price premium 
but rather as the protection of the market share. There were a number of environmental 
labels, environmental management certificates, and environment-related public 
procurement requirements affecting the customers, as well as market pressure from the 
customers' customers. Depending on the intended use of the product, other product 
attributes were or were not weakened by the environmental improvements. However, the 
other product attributes were never enhanced by environmental performance 
improvements.  
 
3. In one plant, customers were hardly interested in the plant's environmental performance. 
Larger customers, however, were interested in whether the plant had an environmental 
management system certificate. The question of the final disposal of the product was of 
some interest to customers, too.  Environmental performance improvements did not make 
other attributes of the product any better. 
 
4. In one plant, different customer segments exhibited very different environmental 
consciousness: private consumers were conscious but not particularly knowledgeable and 
relied on the product's image.  Industrial customers were both conscious and 
knowledgeable about the plant's environmental performance. They themselves had 
certified environmental management systems whose requirements trickled down to 
suppliers. A third customer group, "professional consumers", was under certain regulatory 
pressures to take environmental issues into consideration. Besides these pressures, 
however, the price was the most important parameter for these customers as they were not 
doing well economically. It had been possible to develop a product type that was 
environmentally preferable and at the same time more efficient and thus less expensive 
for the customer to use. These products commanded a significant price premium.  
 
5. For one plant, the ordinary, significant mass of customers was not particularly interested 
in the plant's environmental performance. Consumers relied mostly on the product image, 
and they did not perceive environmental issues to relate to the image of this kind of a 
product. Industrial customers and delivery channels were beginning to enquire about 
environmental management system certificates, though. The actual product itself could 
not be affected by environmental performance improvements.  
 
6. In one plant, customers were not that interested in the environmental performance of such 
a minor polluter. There was significant variation between geographic markets in this 
respect, however. And, industrial customers were interested in whether the plant had an 
environmental management system certificate so that they could prove their own 
environmental friendliness to their own customers.  
 
7. In one plant, the customers were in general not environmentally conscious. However, 
some interest in environmental issues was beginning to show, especially in certain 
geographic markets. Environmental management systems were emerging with customers, 
as well as packaging requirements, which were reflected in supplier demands. In one 
environmental issue, it was possible to bundle improvement with lower use costs for 
customers. 
 
8. In one plant, the environmental consciousness of customers varied between markets, and 
the plant mainly served the market that was the least environmentally conscious. There 
was no way to augment other characteristics of the product through environmental 
performance improvements. In general, thus, customers were "surprisingly uninterested" 
about the plant's environmental performance. Some customers, though, faced packaging 
requirements in their own country and hence were interested in packaging-related issues. 
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9. One plant could not think of any customer that would pay a price premium for improved 
environmental performance. Environmental issues almost never came up in discussions 
with customers. Some large companies might enquire about environmental performance, 
but more as a formality, and the content of the answer was not that important.  
 
10. In one plant, the customers were not environmentally conscious when it came to the 
products of the plant. Many of the end products were such that environmentally conscious 
customers would not be their significant users anyway. Neither were there any 
environmental labels relating to the products, and environmental certificates were not 
widespread among the customers. All in all, environmental issues were not significant in 
the markets: customers did not react when the plant was breaking environmental laws and 
they did not react when the plant made environmental improvements. For some customer 
segments the economic situation was so tight that only price mattered in a purchasing 
situation.  
 
11. An important share of the sales of one plant was destined to a geographic market where 
there was little purchasing power and where environmental issues were of little interest. 
By contrast, customers had expressed a preference for less modern production facilities 
and a cheaper product.  
 
Benchmarks 
 
Benchmark-related reasons quoted by case plants why they could or could not increase 
customer revenue through environmental performance improvements: 
 
1. One plant had been a first-mover and was now the market leader in terms of 
environmental performance. High environmental performance was thus a competitive 
weapon for the plant since it was ahead of competition. However, there were signs that 
competitors were following suit and it was expected that high environmental performance 
would soon become a must instead of a competitive weapon. It was possible for the plant 
to raise rivals' costs by forcing stricter environmental permit requirements on them. The 
environmentally friendly product lines of the plant were less expensive than competing 
products because their production costs were smaller.  
 
2. The domestic competitors of one plant were completely different from the plant in terms 
of their production methods and image. The plant could not afford to be an environmental 
laggard since the competitors' environmental image was so much better than its own.  
 
3. One plant was ahead of competition environmentally and felt that it was beneficial to 
keep it that way. 
 
4. In the case of one plant, all competitors paid attention to environmental performance. 
Good environmental performance had become a natural part of the activities of each 
producer: a plant would not get a prize for it but would get punished for neglecting it.  
 
5. In one plant, lagging behind competition in terms of environmental performance would 
produce a negative market reaction. Price competitiveness also needed to be guarded 
since global free trade reigned in the industry. Through proactive measures, the plant 
could raise costs for certain rivals. Substitutes with different environmental properties 
were available for the plant's products.  
 
6. In the case of one plant, a substitute for the plant's product existed that was both less 
expensive and more environmentally friendly. There was competition from other 
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jurisdictions with different environmental performance requirements and thus different 
production costs. 
 
7. In one plant, the product and the production process did not, practically speaking, differ 
from those of competitors. The product was a bulk product with a world market price. In 
environmental terms, the relevant comparison was rather to substitutes than to other 
producers of the same product. 
 
8. One plant had practically no competition in its main market. It was also in a particular 
situation where the product prices were largely guaranteed. The plant's customers thus 
had almost no comparison points for the price or for environmental performance. The 
little competition that there was did not utilise environmental performance as a 
competitive weapon.  
 
9. In the case of one plant, no competitors had tried to differentiate themselves through 
environmental performance. 
 
10. In the case of one plant, there were lots of small identical producers and price competition 
was extremely tough. There were no particular environmental measures, such as 
environmental management system certificates, in the industry.  
 
11. In the case of one plant, there were no domestic competitors. None of the foreign 
producers had used environmental issues in competition, and it was perceived that 
environmental management system certificates could not be used to achieve competitive 
advantage against competition since imitation would quickly erode their differentiating 
power. By contrast, price competition was tough, and much of the plant's production 
capacity had been reduced after price wars with foreign producers.  
 
Discount rate 
 
Discount rate -related reasons quoted by case plants why they would or would not take a long-
term perspective to the costs and benefits of environmental performance improvements:  
 
1. One plant was doing well economically, its market share was growing, and it had access 
to the large R&D resources of the parent corporation. The plant estimated that both 
environmental permit limits and eco-label criteria would become stricter in the future, and 
that competitors were constantly improving their environmental performance.  
 
2. In one plant, stringent short-term return requirements were not followed.  
 
3. In one plant, profitability was moderate, but had been reduced. It was perceived that the 
environmental demands of the regulators and markets were becoming stricter.  
 
4. In one plant, it was expected that environmental permits would become stricter and that 
customers would start to pay more and more attention to environmental issues. The parent 
corporation required that environmental issues be treated as important. It was easy to 
devote attention to environmental issues as the plant was doing well financially.  
 
5. In one plant that was part of an international publicly traded corporation, the first priority 
for the owners was profitability. Demand for the product was stable. Especially in the 
past, when the major environmental investments were implemented, the industry was 
protected, and the plant was doing very well economically. Now the situation had slightly 
changed, and as a result, the environmental profile had been somewhat lowered. 
However, it was believed that environmental issues would matter more in the markets in 
the future, and preparing for the long-term success of the plant thus had to take into 
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consideration also environmental performance. Similarly, when environmental 
investments became necessary, it was considered best to invest in good equipment once 
and for all since it was perceived that permit limits would only get stricter in the future.  
 
6. One plant was not doing well economically. Moreover, there was competition between 
the group plants for investment funds, and the plant was not well positioned in this 
competition: it was not a priority plant, its production capacity had been significantly 
reduced, and the other group plants faced more serious environmental problems than this 
plant. However, it was perceived that compliance with the present environmental 
requirements was not sufficient since customer expectations and permit requirements 
were becoming stricter. 
 
7. In one plant, profit margins in the industry were tight, investment funds were relatively 
scarce, and payback times exceeding five years were not considered acceptable. The plant 
was not doing well economically; it had suffered market share loss and there had been 
layoffs. However, both the plant management and top management of the parent 
corporation saw that environmental issues would be an important competitive weapon of 
the future, wherefore they could not be neglected. 
 
8. In one plant, the first priority for the owners was profitability. Short payback times were 
required of investments, and it was felt that the parent corporation might cease operations 
at the site if a large non-profitable environmental investment is suggested. The plant was 
not doing well economically: there had been major changes in its operating environment, 
product prices had been cut by half, there had been layoffs and the plant had on occasions 
been at the verge of closure. 
 
9. One plant had undergone significant crises and was not a strategic plant for the parent 
corporation. Hence, funds for large investments or investments that were not directly 
profitable were not to be expected. Investments in environmental performance instead of 
some other, more profitable investments could be made only if extra funds were available. 
 
10. One plant felt that environmental issues would become more important in the future, even 
if they so far had played no role in the markets. 
 
11. In the case of one plant, there were many small producers in the industry, all of which 
were doing badly economically. Demand for the product was falling, and there were no 
resources for investments or R&D. It was perceived that the whole industry in its present 
form was doomed. 
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APPENDIX V 
Determinant profiles of the case plants 
 
Figures V-1 and V-2 contain the profiles of the eleven case plants in terms of the six main 
determinants of environmental profit. Each radar chart displays three concentric circles. The 
innermost circle refers to circumstances that are unfavourable to the creation of win-win 
situations, the middle circle to circumstances that are neutral to the creation of win-win 
situations, and the outermost circle to circumstances that are favourable to the creation of 
win-win situations. The assessment of the situation of each plant is based on the case data 
relating to water pollution only, since compliance information refers to water pollution only. 
 
 
Figure V-1 Determinant profiles of the case plants in the overcompliance cluster 
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Figure V-2 Determinant profiles of the case plants in the non-compliance cluster 
 
The radar charts show how it is not a single determinant but the delicate balance of the six 
determinants that separates the plants in the overcompliance cluster from the plants in the 
non-compliance cluster. 
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